Ch. 6 (8) The Plain Meaning of the Mishna and Its Interpretation in the Gemara

 

IV. The Logic Behind Ukimtot

If we accept the idea expressed in the above sources, that some of the Gemara’s ukimtot serve as a tool that allows Amoraim to disagree with Tannaitic sources, we must try to understand the logic behind this phenomenon. For if an Amora is indeed permitted to disagree with a Tanna, why does he need the ukimta; and if fundamentally an Amora cannot disagree with a Tanna, except in rare cases, how can the ukimta enable such disagreement?  

In order to answer this question, we must first examine the fundamental question of the authority of the Mishna with respect to the Amoraim. This question was raised in connection with the Rambam's ruling (Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1): "When, using one of the rules of exegesis, the Great Sanhedrin derived a law through their perception of the matter and adjudicated a case accordingly, and afterwards, another court arose and they perceived another rationale on whose basis they would revoke the previous ruling, they may revoke it and rule according to their perception." In light of this ruling, Rabbi Yosef Karo asked: 

If you say: If so, why can't Amoraim disagree with Tannaim, for in all places objections are raised against an Amora from a mishna or a baraita, and he must say: "I said [what I said] in accordance with this Tanna," and if he does not say that, the objection is deemed valid, but according to the words of our master, [Amoraim] are permitted to disagree with the words of the Tannaim? (Kesef Mishneh, ad loc.) 

Rabbi Yosef Karo finds it difficult to reconcile the Rambam’s statement with the basic assumption that underlies the great majority of Talmudic passages – that an Amora cannot disagree with a Tanna, at least as long as he does not have another Tannaitic opinion supporting him. If it is within the authority of a court in every generation to revoke a ruling of a previous court, why can't an Amora disagree with a Tanna? Rabbi Yosef Karo answers as follows:

It may be suggested that from the day that the Mishna was sealed, it was accepted that the later generations cannot disagree with the earlier [generations]. The same thing happened when the Gemara was sealed, that from the day that it was sealed, nobody is permitted to disagree with it.

In the Kesef Mishneh's opinion, an Amora cannot disagree with a Tanna, because at the time of the sealing of the Mishna, the determination was accepted that "the later authorities cannot disagree with the earlier ones," and a similar determination was accepted at the time of the sealing of the Gemara.

Even though the circumstances in which this decision was reached are unknown to us,[1] and the literature of Chazal contains no hint to the matter, nevertheless, the existence of such a decision is indeed a necessary basis for understanding the principles of Talmudic discourse. Rabbi Yosef Karo's wording implies it was a formal determination,[2] not a rule that stems from an essential principle;[3] therefore, we must carefully define what was included in that formal determination.

In light of what we have seen, it seems that the rule was not that it is impossible for an Amora to disagree with a Tanna. Rather, the rule was that it is impossible to say about a Tannaitic source that it is wrong (other than in exceptional cases, as we saw above). It is, however, possible to interpret a Tannaitic source by way of an ukimta that greatly reduces the practical scope of the law stated in the source, which allows us to say that the law is usually not in accordance with that Tannatic source. The benefit of this approach is that it creates a balance between preserving tradition on one hand, and advancing innovation and change on the other. Commitment to earlier sources makes it impossible to reject them, but there is still a need for renewal and change within that respectful attitude towards our ancient tradition. The need to establish an ukimta for the Tannatic source allows for space, but at the same time sets limits, and where the Amora fails to establish a reasonable ukimta for the Tannaitic source, his opinion is rejected. Rabbi Shlomo Fischer formulated this idea as follows:

With this you can understand the forced explanations and ukimtot that the Amoraim propose when objections are raised against them from the words of the Tannaim, this being a matter that many have questioned. Since the Amoraim know that the truth is with them, and it is only the prohibition to disagree [with the Tannaitic source] that stands in their way, therefore they offer a forced explanation of the wording of the Tannaim, so their words will be consistent with the truth. (Beit Yishai, Derashot no. 15)[4]

Let us illustrate both sides of this approach. On one hand, the possibility of disagreeing with a Tannaitic source with the help of an ukimta can be illustrated through the examples with which this chapter opened. In the first example, we saw a mishna whose plain meaning is that in order to be liable for an oath of testimony, it suffices that the testimony have potential practical force. However, the Gemara starts with a different assumption, according to which liability only applies if it would have been impossible to obligate the defendant without these specific witnesses.[5] This position is clearly contradicted by the plain meaning of the mishna. Therefore, in order to retain the basic premise of the Gemara, on one hand, and remain committed to the Mishna, on the other, the solution was to find an exceptional case in which it is possible to rule in accordance with the Mishna without contradicting the principle of the Gemara, and for that purpose, the Gemara brings the ukimta: "Here we are discussing [a case] where, for example, the second set, at the time of the denial of the first set, were related through their wives; and their wives were dying." This limitation is not even hinted in the Mishna, and effectively means that in the vast majority of cases, the law will not be as stated in the Mishna. The ukimta offers a way to maintain the basic premise of the Gemara without saying the mishna is completely incorrect.

The same is true in the second example. The plain meaning of the mishna that states: "If two [persons] were passing one another in the public domain, one [of them] running and the other walking, or both of them running, and they were injured by each other, both of them are exempt," is that in any case of mutual damage between a runner and a walker, or between two runners, both parties are exempt, and there is no difference between a runner and a walker. The Gemara that interprets the mishna as referring to a case of running on "Shabbat eve at twilight" is not explaining the plain meaning of the mishna, but wishes to rule in accordance with a different Tannaitic opinion, which distinguishes between a runner and a walker. Instead of disagreeing with the Mishna directly, it exploits this ukimta, which allows us to reconcile the mishna with the halakha.

This is also how we can understand the Talmudic passage regarding kneeling in the thanksgiving blessing in Shemoneh Esrei. Rava maintains that one should kneel at the beginning and at the end of the blessing, as he saw was the custom of his teachers. This custom stands in opposition to an explicit statement in a baraita: "It is reprehensible." The Gemara interprets the baraita as dealing with the thanksgiving blessing in Birkat Ha-mazon, thus allowing us to rule in accordance with Rava, even though his position runs counter to the plain meaning of the Tannaitic source, without rejecting the Tannaitic source.

With regard to the Tosefta regarding the nature of an object that can reduce the dimensions of a window between two rooms, and thus prevent the transfer of impurity from one room to the other, the plain meaning of the Tosefta indicates that it suffices that the object have permanent substance and that it not be able to contract ritual impurity. Rav Yosef, however, maintained that it must also be clear that the object will remain there for an extended period of time. Rav Yosef cannot directly say that what is written in the Tosefta is wrong, but he can find a way to interpret the Tosefta as referring to very exceptional cases, and in that way he can rule against what is implied by the plain meaning of the Tosefta.

On the other hand, when the Tannaitic source directly contradicts the words of the Amora, and it cannot be interpreted by way of an ukimta, the opinion of the Amora is rejected. This phenomenon is found in hundreds of cases in which the Gemara uses the term, "teyuvta," "refutation." Thus, for example, the Mishna (Berakhot 1:2):  "If one recites the Shema later [than the time of its obligation], he loses nothing, being like one who reads in the Torah." Rav Chisda is of the opinion that this applies only to the Shema itself, but not to its blessings: 

Rav Chisda said in the name of Mar Ukva: Provided he does not say the blessing of "Who forms the light." (Berakhot 10b)

However, the Gemara then raises an objection from an explicit baraita:

An objection was raised: He who recites the Shema later loses nothing; he is like one reading in the Torah, but he says two blessings before it and one after. (Ibid.)

This baraita clearly contradicts the position of Rav Chisda, for it explicitly states that even after the time of Shema has passed, one can recite not only the Shema itself, but even its associated blessings. Here, it is impossible to propose a reasonable ukimta, and therefore the Gemara rejects the position of Rav Chisda, saying: "Is not this a refutation of Rav Chidsa? It is [indeed] a refutation."

Sometimes, the Gemara rejects an ukimta that seems excessively forced. For example, the mishna at the beginning of tractate Shabbat brings several examples of cases in which there is liability for carrying an object from one domain to another, such as:

The poor man stands outside and the master of the house stands inside: if the poor man stretches his hand within and places [an article] into the hand of the master of the house, or if he takes [an article] from it and carries it out, the poor man is liable, and the master of the house is exempt. (Shabbat 1:1)

The Gemara (Shabbat 4a) has difficulty with these and other examples, because it assumes that liability in a case of carrying from one domain to another is limited to a case where the person removes the article from a place that is four handbreadths by four handbreadths, and then deposits it in a similarly sized place. "Why is he liable? Surely, removal and depositing must be from [and into] a place four [handbreadths] square, which is absent here?" This principle appears to contradict the plain meaning of the mishna, and the Gemara (ibid. 4a-5a) offers several solutions. Among others, it brings the answer proposed by Rabbi Abahu, which gives rise to a short discussion:

Rather, Rabbi Abahu said: It means that he lowered his hand to within three handbreadths [of the ground] and accepted it. But it is taught: "He stands"! It refers to one who bends down. Alternatively, [he is standing] in a pit; another alternative: this refers to a dwarf. (Ibid. 5a)

Rabbi Abahu interprets the mishna as referring to a case where the poor man lowers his hand to a height less than three handbreadths from the ground, in which case the object is considered as if it is resting on the ground. Ostensibly, this is an ukimta with the same goal as those in the cases we saw above – to reconcile the law accepted by the Amoraim, that removal and depositing must be from and into a place four handbreadths square, with a mishna that appears to contradict this rule. The goal is achieved by interpreting the mishna as dealing with an exceptional case, which implies that in the usual case, when an article is placed in a person's hand, there is no liability for carrying from one domain to another. The Gemara, however, has difficulty accepting this ukimta, because the mishna explicitly states that the poor man is "standing," and when a person stands, his hands are not less than three handbreadths from the ground. In order to answer this question, the Gemara suggests three possibilities: Either that the poor man is bending down, so that his hand is close to the ground; or that the poor man is standing in a pit, so his hand is in fact within three handbreadths of the ground; or that the poor person is a dwarf, whose hand reaches close to the ground. The Gemara raises the following objection:

Rava said: Does the Tanna trouble to inform us of all these?!

Rashi there (s.v. ikhpal) explains: "Did the Tanna trouble himself with all this? He should not have informed us that one who carries an article from one domain to another is only liable in these situations, which are not the normal way. Let him teach: If he stretched the corner of his garment inside, which gives rise to four [cases]." In other words, it is not at all reasonable that the Tanna would illustrate the foundation of the law of carrying from one domain to another with such unusual cases, rather than offering much more common examples. For this reason, the Gemara rejects the ukimta[6] – demonstrating that the path of ukimta does not allow raising unreasonable possibilities – and therefore also rejects the view of the Amora.[7]

To summarize, we have examined a prevalent type of ukimta that deliberately interprets Tannaitic sources not in accordance with their plain meaning, as part of the dynamism of the Oral Law. Many comments in the writings of the Rishonim and Acharonim indicate that while it is true that as a rule, Amoraim cannot disagree with Tannaitic sources in a direct manner, they can interpret those sources by proposing certain ukimtot, which allows them to disagree with the fundamental law appearing in the Tannaitic sources. The ukimta in such cases does not pretend to reflect the original meaning of the Tannaitic source, but rather it is a means that allows the Amora to disagree with that source in a way that accepts the formal authority of the source.

(Translated by David Strauss)