SALT | Tazria - Metzora 5785

MOTZAEI

Parashat Tazria makes brief mention of the mitzva of mila (circumcision): "… and on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised" (Vayikra 12:3).  The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (132b) derives from this verse that a circumcision must take place on the eighth day from birth, even should this day fall on Shabbat.  Whereas cutting a piece of flesh would generally constitute a Shabbat violation, the Torah itself empowers the mitzva of circumcision with the halakhic ability to override Shabbat.

Several Rishonim and Acharonim raise an interesting question based on a common halakhic phenomenon familiar to us from Rosh Hashana and Sukkot.  When either of these two festivals falls on Shabbat, we refrain from performing the unique mitzvot of shofar and lulav, respectively.  As the Gemara explains in several places, Chazal were concerned that one may inadvertently take his shofar or lulav to his teacher to learn how to properly blow the shofar or wave the lulav, thereby violating the prohibition of carrying in a public domain on Shabbat.  (For the same reason, when Purim falls on Shabbat - as it did this past Purim in Jerusalem, the Megila is not read.)

In these instances of Rosh Hashana and Sukkot, Chazal suspended that year's fulfillment of a Biblical commandment in order to safeguard the sanctity of Shabbat.  Why, then, do we perform circumcisions on Shabbat?  Should we not be concerned that one may carry the knife and thereby violate Shabbat?  What more, applying the concern to this mitzva seems even more acceptable than to those of shofar and lulav: the circumcision can be performed on the following day.  By contrast, refraining from blowing the shofar on the first day of Rosh Hashana or from taking the lulav on the first day of Sukkot means the complete suspension of the Biblical commandment for that year.  (The second day of Rosh Hashana is observed only by force of rabbinic enactment; and taking the lulav on Sukkot after the first day is required on the level of Torah law only in the Bet Ha-mikdash.)  Why did Chazal not extend this decree to a case of a Shabbat circumcision?

Tosafot (Megila 4b) offer two answers.  First, circumcision constitutes a more stringent mitzva than shofar or lulav; Chazal were therefore unwilling to suspend it for even a single day.  The most obvious indication of this mitzva's severity emerges from the punishment for its neglect: "karet" (eternal excommunication from the nation). Although we find many prohibitions that carry this penalty, circumcision and korban pesach are the only two instances where one becomes liable for this punishment by neglecting to perform a mitzvah (as opposed to actively violating a transgression).

Secondly, Tosafot claim, while each and every Jewish male must perform the mitzvot of shofar or lulav, only professional "mohalim" perform circumcisions.  Chazal felt confident in the diligence and proficiency of the mohalim and therefore felt it unnecessary to forbid Shabbat circumcisions. Regarding lulav and shofar, however, they feared the absentmindedness of the commoners who might carry these objects on Shabbat.  (Is this really true regarding the shofar??)  A similar answer with a slightly different twist appears in the Ran (beginning of the fourth chapter of Masekhet Sukka).  Since everyone finds themselves preoccupied with the mitzvot of lulav and shofar, the likelihood exists that nobody will remind the potential inadvertent transgressor not to carry his lulav or shofar on Shabbat.  In the case of circumcision, by contrast, only the mohel runs the risk of a careless Shabbat violation.  Everyone around will therefore remind him about Shabbat as soon as they see him preparing to carry the knife through the public domain.

A final answer, offered by Rav Barukh Epstein and others, relates to a famous principle established by the Taz (O.C. 588:5; Y.D. 117:2; C.M. 2).  The Taz sets a limit on Chazal's power to override Torah law: they may not suspend a law written explicitly in the Torah.  Only obligations (or perhaps even prohibitions) derived through the system of halakhic "derash" (extrapolation) can be suspended as a result of rabbinic enactment.  Some have claimed that when Chazal derived from our verse the suspension of Shabbat laws for the performance of circumcision, they actually interpreted the simple meaning of the verse in this fashion.  Meaning, they understood the verse as saying, "On the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised - even on Shabbat." Therefore, Chazal could not legislate the delay of the circumcision until Sunday, since the Torah explicitly requires its performance on Shabbat.  (Question: does the enactment prohibiting blowing the shofar or taking the lulav on Shabbat not override an explicit Biblical imperative??)

SUNDAY

Parshiyot Tazria and Metzora deal at length with the intricate laws of tzara'at.  Do these laws apply nowadays?  At first glance, there appears to be no reason why at least some forms of tzara'at should not.  The Rambam (Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at 11:6) rules explicitly that the halakhot of tzara'at inflicted upon one's body apply equally in Eretz Yisrael and in the Diaspora and whether or not the Bet Ha-mikdash stands.  The laws of tzara'at on the walls of houses apply only in Eretz Yisrael (Rambam, ibid., 14:11), while a dispute exists as to whether or not tzara'at on clothing takes effect halakhically outside of Eretz Yisrael (see Minchat Chinukh 172:4).

In any event, no basis seems to exists for rendering the laws of at least tzara'at on one's body inapplicable nowadays. Indeed, the Tiferet Yisrael, in his introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Nega'im, writes that he posed this question to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who replied that he has no sufficient answer. Rav Yaakov Emden likewise raises this question ("She'eilat Yaabetz" 136).

One basis may emerge from a careful reading of the Rambam's comments in Hilkhot Terumot 7:9.  As the verses clearly indicate, however incriminating a discoloration one may see on his skin, he does not become a "metzora" (someone formally smitten with tzara'at) for halakhic purposes until a kohen declares him as such.  Now the Rambam implies that the laws of ritual impurity relevant to a metzora become binding only through the declaration of a special type of kohen: a "kohen meyuchas."  This term refers to a kohen who can verify his status as a kohen by tracing his lineage accordingly.  The Radbaz, commenting on the Rambam, suggests that for this reason the laws of tzara'at would not apply nowadays, as generally speaking our kohanim cannot prove their priestly lineage.  Any declaration of tzara'at on the part of a kohen today can take effect only as a questionable status of tzara'at.  Since the metzora's purification process involves otherwise prohibited procedures - i.e. cutting one's hair with a razor, we cannot implement these laws given our uncertainty.

The Tiferet Yisrael notes, however, that this approach suffices only for one form of tzara'at: that which develops on one's skin. But what about the other two types, tzara'at on the walls of one's home and on one's clothing?  These forms of tzara'at involve no otherwise prohibited procedures, and should therefore apply today at least in Eretz Yisrael!

The Tiferet Yisrael answers that given the uncertainty of kohanim's lineage today, situations of house and clothing tzara'at are cases of "safek mamon."  Meaning, based on the declaration of a possible kohen, the given individual would have to destroy his clothing or house.  Since the Jewish authorities cannot extract property from someone without establishing his obligation beyond doubt, even these forms of tzara'at cannot apply in contemporary times.

MONDAY

Among the distinguishing features of the Hebrew language is the usage of seven different verb forms, called "binyanim." The seven forms in which verbs can appear in Hebrew can be classified into two groups: active and passive forms. Verbs appearing in the three forms called "pa'al," "pi'el" and "hif'il" generally describe an active occurrence.  For example, "I said" would translate into Hebrew in the "pa'al" form: "amarti."  Similarly, "I arranged" would assume the "pi'el" form: "sidarti."  The third of these forms, "hif'il," generally describes an action relating to another person, like "le-halbish," which means to dress another person. 

In any event, all these three forms are used to describe activity.  The three passive forms, "nifal," "pu'al" and "hufal," which correspond to the three active forms, refer to inactivity, if you will. For example, "chunakh" (in "pu'al") means, "was educated" and "nishma" (in "nifal") means "was heard" (though it can also be used as first person, plural, future tense, to mean "we will hear").

The seventh, unique verb form is called "hitpa'el."  This form fits into neither category and generally describes a reflexive action. For example, "le-hitrachetz" means to bathe oneself, and "le-hitlabesh" means to dress oneself.

Recognizing these different verb forms and seeing them in action often proves critical in studying Biblical text, as we will now demonstrate from Parashat Metzora.

This parasha opens with the presentation of the purification process required of a metzora, one who had become afflicted with tzara'at (a skin disease similar to leprosy).  Several times throughout this parasha, the Torah refers to the metzora undergoing this process as the "mitaher," or "the one being purified."  This word, which features the "chirik" vowel under the "mem" (yielding a pronunciation of, "mEEtaher") may not be confused with the term used here in reference to the administering kohen: "metaher" (with a "sheva na" under the "mem"), or "the one purifying."  Although both words come from the same root, "t.h.r.," which refers to purification, they appear in different forms.  The kohen, who performs the rituals necessary for the metzora's purification, is described with the active verb form of "pi'el" (like "medaber," "meshalem," etc.).  More interestingly, however, the metzora's description adopts the reflexive "hitpa'el" form.  Now a cursory reading of the first 32 verses in Parashat Metzora clearly reveals that the metzora plays no active role whatsoever throughout this entire procedure. He needs only to come before the kohen, who then does the rest.  Should not the Torah have therefore described the metzora with the purely passive form of "nifal" - "nithar"?

Rav Meir Simcha Ha-kohen of Dvinsk explains that the Torah here teaches us that the metzora's purification process does, in fact, require proactive involvement on his part.  Although ritually the kohen assumes the dominant role, the metzora's restoration to normal life requires his own personal initiative, as well.  As Chazal emphasize, one contracts this supernatural disease of tzara'at as punishment for certain sins, most notably that of lashon hara (negative speech about others).  The process of spiritual cleansing cannot work through the kohen's efforts alone.  The "mitaher" must look into himself and work to correct the flaw that brought on this illness.

The usage of "hitpa'el" in this context thus teaches us a critical lesson for religious life: nobody can help you if you don't help yourself.  One can place himself in a spiritually conducive environment and surround himself with the most inspiring and effective rabbis, teachers, mentors and role models, and still fail to move forward in his observance if he doesn't exert himself.  True, a metzora cannot become purified without the kohen's involvement, and we cannot grow without the guidance and inspiration of our teachers.  However, the metzora cannot remain passive; the Torah requires a reflexive action on his part, that he conducts a serious and intense process of introspection to raise himself from the impurity of tzara'at. We must do the same if we hope to raise ourselves to higher levels of mitzva observance.

TUESDAY

The verse in Parashat Tazria (13:45) requires that a metzora's clothing be ripped: "As for the person with a leprous infection, his clothes shall be rent… "  This requirement immediately brings to mind the obligation of "keri'a," that one tears his clothing upon a relative's death.  One important distinction, however, seems to exist between these two laws.  The obligation relevant to a mourner involves tearing a garment as an expression of grief. In addition, the mourner must wear his torn clothing throughout the seven days of mourning ("shiva"). Regarding the metzora, however, the Torah introduces only the second of these two requirements.  Meaning, the verse simply states that the metzora's clothing "shall be rent"; it does not require that the metzora actually rend his clothing.  Thus, as opposed to the bereaving relative, Heaven forbid, the metzora may, upon having this status conferred upon him, remove an old, torn shirt from his drawer and wear it to fulfill this obligation.

The Minchat Chinukh (150) assumes this definition of the mitzva, and therefrom he reaches a similar conclusion in a different context. This past Shabbat, we read of the tragic death of Nadav and Avihu, Aharon's two eldest sons.  After their death, Moshe instructs Aharon and his remaining sons not to rend their garments (10:6).  From here Chazal derived that "the kohanim may not enter the Mikdash with rent garments" (Sefer Ha-chinukh 150).  Meaning, kohanim may not conduct the service in the Mikdash or enter the Sanctuary wearing clothing torn over the loss of a relative.  The Minchat Chinukh notes that the Torah presents this prohibition in second person imperative form: "You shall not rend your garments… "  Nevertheless, insists the Minchat Chinukh, this prohibition applies only to conducting the service and entering the Mikdash with torn clothing, as stated.  A kohen may, however, tear his clothing in grief over a personal tragedy, so long as he does not wear those garments to the Mikdash.

To prove his case, the Minchat Chinukh points to a comment by the Rambam in Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at (9) regarding a kohen who is declared a metzora.  This kohen faces a predicament of sorts: on the one hand, he may not rend his garments as an expression of grief; on the other, as a metzora, he must tear his clothing. To resolve this conflict, the Rambam employs in this context the principle of "asei docheh lo ta'asei" - a positive mitzva overrides a negative mitzva.  Meaning, a required mitzva performance overrides a prohibition that potentially stands in its way.  Hence, the mitzva for a metzora to tear his garments outweighs the prohibition against a kohen to do so.

Now recall that the metzora is under no obligation to tear his clothing; he must merely wear torn clothing.  Therefore, asks the Minchat Chinukh, why does the Rambam portray these two laws as conflicting with one another?  Why can't someone else tear this kohen-metzora's clothing for him, thus avoiding the kohen's prohibition while still fulfilling the metzora's obligation?  The Minchat Chinukh thus proves from this comment by the Rambam that the kohen's prohibition resembles the metzora's obligation.  Meaning, a kohen may tear his garments as an expression of mourning; the prohibition applies only to his wearing torn clothing in the Mikdash. Therefore, these two provisions, that of the kohen and that of the metzora, do, in fact, clash: as a metzora, this kohen must wear torn garments, while as a kohen, he is forbidden from performing his service with rent clothing.

WEDNESDAY

As we discussed earlier this week, a verse towards the beginning of Parashat Tazria establishes the ability of the mitzva of mila (circumcision) to override the prohibitions of Shabbat.  Namely, a boy born on Shabbat is circumcised on the same day the following week, despite the fact that making an incision of this sort would normally constitute a forbidden activity on Shabbat.

Though we cannot claim knowledge of the reasons for this halakha, we should note that these two mitzvot - Shabbat and mila - reflect two necessary forms of subservience to the Almighty.  As is commonly explained, the observance of Shabbat signifies one's awareness of God as Master over nature.  The seven-day cycle commemorates the creation of the universe, and hence our observance of this cycle declares our recognition of the natural world as belonging to God.  By refraining from normal activity on Shabbat, we proclaim our commitment to conducting our natural lives within the framework of Godliness.  Mila, by contrast, takes place on the eighth day, thus symbolizing that lying beyond nature.  It represents our willingness to overcome natural tendencies and even move beyond natural confines for the sake of the Almighty.  At times, we are called upon to exhibit supernatural devotion and resilience for our religion.

These are the two covenants of Shabbat and mila: to serve God within the framework of nature, and, at times, even beyond.  Only halakha can afford preference to one or the other; both, however, comprise indispensable components of the secret of our nation's survival.

A male child's introduction to life, according to Jewish law, requires the pain and blood of circumcision.  Similarly, the rebirth of our nation in the last century has necessitated - and continues to demand - the tragic loss of life and consistent, bloody struggle.  In short, we have had to display supernatural courage and strength, and, in too many cases, the ultimate sacrifice of life.

Today we honor the memory of our nation's recent heroes, the brave men and women who sacrificed their dreams, hopes and aspirations so that we could realize the dream of millions of our ancestors: the restoration of Jewish sovereignty in our ancient homeland.  We can only ask ourselves what sacrifice we are prepared to further the goal for which these young martyrs gave their lives.

THURSDAY

The beginning of Parashat Tazria presents the laws relevant to the "yoledet," a woman after childbirth. After a period during which she may not enter the Mikdash, the woman must bring a sacrifice consisting of a pigeon and dove.  This offering, of pigeons and/or doves, appears several times throughout Chumash, usually (though not always) in the context of a purification process, such as in the case of a "yoledet."  For example, in Parashat Metzora, we read of the required purification process of a metzora, who must bring an offering before he can reenter the Jewish camp.  A metzora who cannot afford the more expensive, standard offering brings two pigeons or doves.  Similarly, in certain cases of bodily discharge ("zav" and "zava"), the individual must bring this offering before resuming his or her prior status of ritual purity.

Rav David Tzvi Hoffman suggests viewing this offering in light of Yeshayahu's prophecy in chapter 60 (verse 8), describing the future, mass pilgrimage of nations to Yerushalayim: "Who are these that float like a cloud, like doves to their nests?"  Rav Hoffman claims that this verse employed doves as symbolic of homesickness and longing to return home.  It thus serves as an appropriate sacrifice for one who had been barred entry into the Mikdash for an extended period of time.  Through this symbol, the individual demonstrates his yearning to return to the sacred, sublime environment of the Mikdash.

We have yet to realize our national dream of reentry into the Mikdash, but we have been privileged to see the fulfillment of the age-old dream spoken of by David Ha-melekh: "When God restores the returnees of Zion - we were like dreamers" (Tehillim 126:1).  The great miracle we celebrate today could not have occurred without the centuries of longing for our ancient homeland that pushed our pioneers and warriors against all odds to reclaim Eretz Yisrael. This difficult fifty-third year of the State of Israel has only reinforced that willingness to defend and protect our country and right to live therein with true sovereignty, peace and security.

Yom Ha-atzma'ut Samei'ach!!

FRIDAY

Among the punitive measures applied to the metzora is compulsory isolation outside the camp (13:46).  (Chazal interpret this to mean that he cannot enter walled cities - Masekhet Keilim chap. 1).  Some later commentators have raised an interesting question regarding this halakha: may several metzora'im reside together?  Meaning, does the Torah require solitude, or merely prohibit interaction between healthy people and those stricken with tzara'at?

The Ra'avad, in his commentary to Torat Kohanim, associated this requirement with the institution of "niduy" - excommunication.  The metzora must refrain from social activity, including mingling with fellow sufferers.  Others, however, have pointed to several sources suggesting that metzora'im would live together outside the city.  For example, the Gemara in Masekhet Berakhot (54b) writes that they were all situated at the tail end of the camp.  Furthermore, the Malbim notes that the word used by the Torah here for isolation - "badad," appears in several contexts in reference to a group of people or even nation (see Bamidbar 23:9; Devarim 32:12).  However, perhaps the most convincing proof emerges from this week's haftara, the story of the miraculous salvation from the siege on Shomron. Sefer Melakhim II 7 tells of four metzora'im who resided outside the city and decided to approach the enemy army, only to find the military camp abandoned.  The verses clearly indicate that the four men stood together and conversed with each other.

On the other hand, Chazal explain this requirement as a penalty for the sin of lashon hara (gossip).  As we know, Chazal viewed tzara'at as triggered by this particular violation.  They add that as punishment for his having separated people one from another through his inappropriate speech, the metzora must now live in solitude.  Apparently, he may not engage in any social interaction, including with fellow metzora'im!

A resolution to this apparent contradiction is cited in the name of the "Eil Ha-milu'im."  The Gemara in Masekhet Arakhin lists numerous different sins - beyond lashon hara - on account of which one is stricken with tzara'at.  We may therefore distinguish between the different metzora'im: those who had violated the specific crime of gossip may not live together with anyone, including other metzora'im, whereas those stricken with the disease for other misdeeds may interact with other metzora'im.

In this light, the "Eil Ha-milu'im" explains a passage in Masekhet Sanhedrin (107b) concerning the aforementioned four metzora'im outside the besieged city of Shomron.  The Gemara inquires as to their identity and then identifies them as Geichazi and his three sons.  Geichazi was the personal attendant of the prophet Elisha who was stricken - together with his children - with leprosy on account of his having disobeyed his mentor by seeking payment from Na'aman, the general of Aram (see Melakhim II 5).  The "Eil Ha-milu'im" suggests that our very discussion prompted the Gemara's inquiry: how did these metzora'im live together?  Weren't they forbidden from engaging in social interaction?  The Gemara therefore explained that these four men contracted tzara'at on account of a sin other than lashon hara.  As such, they were allowed to interact with one another, so long as they remained isolated from the rest of the people.

(Taken from Yehuda Nachshoni's Haggot Be-parshiyot Ha-Torah)

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