SALT | Behar - Bechukotai 5785

MOTZAEI

Parashat Behar focuses a good deal of attention on issues concerning those in financial straits, including the prohibition against lending other Jews money on interest (25:37). Immediately following this instruction, God reminds the people of His having taken them from Egypt. Chazal derive from the juxtaposition of these two verses that whoever accepts interest is considered as denying the Exodus. Wherein lies the connection between usury and our having left Egypt? Can someone not believe in the Exodus if he takes interest?

The Ketav Sofer offers a clever - and insightful - explanation of this Midrash. Naturally, one would expect compensation for the temporary loss of money; it is hard for a person to give of his own wealth - even as a loan - and receive nothing in return. (We might add that according to the Ramban, collecting interest involves no inherent, moral deficiency. It even assumes a central role in a perfectly legitimate, economic system. This prohibition thus adds a unique dimension of piety to the Jewish people, reflecting their rising to a higher standard of financial conduct.) However, if one would receive a handsome sum of money as a gift from his friend on condition that he and his family will have borrowing rights from time to time, the recipient would certainly not object to such an arrangement. Realizing that on this condition he received his wealth, he would not think twice about lending to his benefactor. Likewise, one who views our redemption from Egypt, including the wealth and grandeur received as a result thereof, as a special gift from God, will have no qualms about sharing his possessions with others. After all, all this was given to us on condition that we help others.

One who stingily demands something in return for a favor, however, fails to recognize the message and purpose of the Exodus. He may believe in the historical event, but he has little concept of its meaning. We were blessed with our freedom and unique stature only for the specific purpose of setting a higher standard of social interaction and general conduct.

SUNDAY

The Torah at the beginning of Parashat Behar describes the mitzva of shemitta, currently observed this year here in Eretz Yisrael (as we discussed in our S.A.L.T. series on Parashat Mishpatim). The verses present the various prohibitions regarding agricultural activity during the seventh year and require that the produce be made available to any person or animal who wishes to partake therefrom. The halakha establishes that produce grown in Eretz Yisrael during the shemitta year is exempt from the requirements of "terumot" and "ma'asrot," the gifts generally given from one's crop to the kohanim and levi'im as well as other tithes. While this exemption is undisputed and generally considered axiomatic, three different reasons for this halakha exist in the literature of the Rishonim.

The Rambam (Hilkhot Matenot Aniyim 6:5) compares the produce of the seventh year to "hefker," ownerless property. The halakha states clearly that produce with no owner does not require "terumot" and "ma'asrot." Given the requirement to consider one's produce ownerless during the year of shemitta, it de facto assumes the status of "hefker" and becomes exempt from the generally required tithes and gifts to the kohen.

By contrast, the Mekhilta in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:11) derives this exemption from the Torah's implicit equation between man and beast regarding the consumption of shemitta produce (there in Shemot, and in our parasha - 25:6-7). Just as animals eat indiscriminately, even before the separation of the necessary "terumot" and "ma'asrot," so may human beings. Rashi and Tosafot in several places throughout their commentaries to the Gemara cite this association as the source for the halakha.

Interestingly, some commentators, including Rabbeinu Meyuchas (cited in Torah Sheleima, Shemot 23:11, note 149) and the Ritva (Rosh Hashanah 15a), combine these two reasons. Meaning, they understand the Mekhilta as teaching us that because we consider shemitta produce as ownerless, it naturally becomes exempt from the gifts to the kohanim and levi'im. Rather than presenting an objective "gezeirat ha-katuv" (Biblical law with no apparent reason), the verse simply affirms the "hefker" status of the shemitta produce.

We should also note that the Yerushalmi (Ma'asrot 1:1) follows these same lines only from a different verse - Devarim 14:29. There the Torah discusses the general obligation of giving "ma'aser" to a levi and emphasizes that we do so "because he has no portion or inheritance among you." Meaning, we must give the levi some produce from our lands since the tribe of Levi never received its own portion of Eretz Yisrael. The Yerushalmi thus concludes that since levi'im do, in fact, enjoy free rights to the fields of Eretz Yisrael during the shemitta year, the requirement of "ma'aser" does not apply. During this year, they in fact do own a share in the land, as thus do not earn their annual tithes.

Tomorrow, iy"H, we will look at the third approach to understanding this exemption.

MONDAY

As Parashat Behar begins with the mitzva of shemitta, we looked yesterday at one particular feature of produce grown during this "sabbatical" year. That is, its owner need not separate the usual "terumot" and "ma'asrot" - gifts to the kohanim and levi'im and other tithes - from this year's produce. Yesterday we saw two reasons behind this exemption, related to the ownerless status of the produce. As we saw, any produce without owners does not require the annul gifts and tithes. Today we will see a third reason for this halakha.

In Sefer Devarim (26:12), the Torah refers to the third and sixth years of the seven-year shemitta cycle as "the year of the tithe." While much can be said regarding this epithet, the Sifrei (earlier, in Parashat Re'ei) deduces from this term that there is one year in the cycle that does not qualify as "a year of the tithe": the shemitta year. Said otherwise, nothing inherent about the produce itself renders it unsuitable for tithing; rather, the seventh year simply does not fall under the group of years in which one must separate these tithes. From the outset, the Torah requires tithing strictly on all years but this one.

This approach is manifest in a practical, halakhic ruling by Tosafot (Masekhet Rosh Hashana 15a) concerning an etrog. As the Gemara there discusses, a distinction exists between ma'aser and shemitta concerning the determination of the formal, halakhic "year" of an etrog. An etrog requires the tithes of a given year (different years require different tithes) if it was picked off its tree during that year. For shemitta, by contrast, an etrog is considered shemitta produce (to which several important halakhot apply) if it ripened during the shemitta year. If it had ripened before the onset of that year, it does not attain the status of a shemitta fruit.

Tosafot thus consider a case of an etrog that had ripened before shemitta but was not picked until after the year began. Clearly, we would not consider this etrog a shemitta fruit, as it ripened before the onset of the shemitta year. Does it require tithing? On the one hand, this etrog has no unique, shemitta-related status. As such, little reason appear to exist to exempt it from tithes. On the other hand, it was picked in the seventh year, which generally exempts its fruits from the obligation of tithes.

Tosafot rule that it does not, in fact, require tithing. Apparently, they adopted this final approach established here. The exemption of shemitta produce from tithing evolves not from the produce itself, but rather from the seventh year; the year itself does not require tithes. According to the Rambam, who, as we saw yesterday, relates the exemption from tithes to the produce's lack of ownership, this etrog would likely require tithing. As it has no shemitta status, its owner has full, legal ownership over the fruit. Therefore, it requires tithes like regular fruits.

(For a more complete analysis, see Rabbi Menachem Genack, "Gan Shoshanim," chap. 56.)

TUESDAY

This Shabbat we read in Parashat Bechukotai the section known as the "tokhecha," the detailed list of frightening curses that God promises to unleash against Benei Yisrael should they disobey the Torah. This section parallels the far lengthier and more graphic presentation in Parashat Ki-Tavo (Devarim 28). The Gemara in Masekhet Megila (31b) writes that these readings were specifically arranged to occur at specific times of year. We read the "tokhecha" in Devarim just prior to Rosh Hashana to symbolize our hope that "the year shall end together with its curses." The Gemara explains that Shavuot, too, marks a "new year" of sorts, as on this day God judges the fruits for the next year. We therefore conclude the "fruit year" with the reading of the curses of Parashat Bechukotai, conducted as Shavuot approaches, in hope that any agricultural ills disappear as the "new year" sets in.

The devastating nature of this section's content has led to several customs and halakhot regarding its reading in the Beit Kenesset. The mishna in Masekhet Megila (31a) posits that we do not end/begin "aliyot" in the middle of this section. (Although the Gemara clearly restricts this provision to the "tokhacha" of Parashat Bechukotai, common custom applies it to the reading of Parashat Ki-Tavo, as well - Shulchan Arukh O.C. 428:6. This is why the sixth aliya of Parashat Ki-Tavo is extraordinarily long.) The Gemara there offers two possible reasons for this halakha. First, a verse in Mishlei (3:11) warns against rejecting words of reproof; one who stops reading in the middle of this section appears as having "had enough" of the harsh rebuke of the "tokhecha." Therefore, the one who begins the reading of this section must carry it through to completion. Secondly, "we do not recite a berakha over catastrophe." Since the one receiving an aliya recites a berakha prior to his reading, we do not allow one to come to the Torah and recite the berakha over the prediction of calamity. A slight variation of this reason appears in Masekhet Sofrim (12:2): the Almighty says, as it were, "It is improper for My children to be cursed while I am blessed."

Fear of the dreadful curses of this parasha has led to the emergence of several other customs, some of which have come under the strong condemnation of halakhic authorities. This phenomenon evolved from the refusal on the part of members of congregations to ascend to the Torah for the aliya containing the "tokhecha." They feared that the curses will be understood as directed against them. This resulted in some Batei Kenesset "paying off" needy worshippers to receive this aliya, as no one else would agree to it. In other communities, people simply refrained from coming to the Beit Kenesset for this reading, while in some locales the congregation would read the "tokhecha" without calling up anyone for the aliya. Needless to say, these last two options constitute an outright violation of halakha and have no justification. The Mishna Berura (in Bei'ur Halakha, 428) observed the disgraceful practice of some congregations to skip this reading altogether. He writes: "They commit several wrongs. First, they do not fulfill the [obligation of] Torah reading, which is an ancient institution from the times of Moshe Rabbeinu a"h; also [they violate] that which is written, 'Do not, my son, reject the rebuke of God, and do not abhor his reprimand.' Additionally, it [this practice] is altogether mistaken: because they do not read the Torah and do not want to look at the 'tokhecha' they feel confident that the 'tokhecha' will not befall them?!"

One common, acceptable practice, mentioned with approval by the Mishna Berura, has the reader ("ba'al korei") himself receive this aliya. That way, no one can view the curses as directed towards him.

Another common custom has the "ba'al korei" lower his voice for this reading, and in some areas he accelerates his speed, as well. He must, however, ensure to properly articulate every syllable in a manner audible to everyone in the congregation.

(Based on Rav Chayim Zonenfeld's column in Oneg Shabbat, Parashat Be-chukotai, 5760)

WEDNESDAY

Parashat Behar addresses the situation of one who has encountered financial crisis, requiring that others "strengthen him" so that "your brother may live with you" (Vayikra 25:35). In a word, this is what we call the mitzva of tzedaka, giving charity. The Torah discusses this obligation once again later, in Sefer Devarim: "If there is a needy person among you… do not harden your heart and shut your hand against your needy kinsman. Rather, you must open your hand… " (Devarim 15:7-8). The question, of course, arises as to the relationship between these two mitzvot, the one in Behar and that in Devarim. Does one merely repeat the other, or does each introduce a unique aspect to the mitzva of charity?

Rav Soloveitchik quoted his grandfather, Rav Chayim Brisker, as distinguishing between these two parshiyot, viewing them as reflective of two distinct requirements. Namely, the mitzva of tzedaka exists on both the individual and communal levels. First, each individual must donate charity in accordance with his means, an obligation spelled out in the aforementioned citation from Sefer Devarim. But additionally, as Parashat Behar discusses, a mitzva rests on the community at large to support those in need. Even if, for whatever reason, so single individual can personally provide for a given person in financial straits, the community bears the collective responsibility to do so.

This thesis enabled Rav Chayim to resolve a difficulty raised by Tosafot in Masekhet Bava Batra (8a). The Gemara there indicates that the Jewish court (when the courts had coercive power over its constituents) could forcibly extract money from the townspeople for the purposes of charity. Tosafot question this extension of the court's authority in light of the principle that "the court does not coerce for a mitzvat asei ['positive' commandment] whose reward is at its side." Meaning, any mitzva whose reward is explicitly mentioned in the Torah is not subject to the court's coercive measures. As God explicitly promises reward for giving charity (Devarim 15:10), how can the Jewish court force those under its jurisdiction to fulfill this mitzva?

Rav Chayim answers that the aforementioned principle applies only to mitzvot directed to the individual; once the Almighty guaranteed reward for these mitzvot, they lie outside the court's jurisdiction as far as coercion is concerned. Communal mitzvot, however, are, almost by definition, well within the legal bounds of the Beit-Din. As the religious judiciary of the town, they can and must ensure - with whatever means at their disposal - the support of the town's poor. Granted, as far as the personal mitzva of Sefer Devarim is concerned, they have no power of coercion. However, when it comes to the communal obligation of our parasha, they bear the responsibility of guaranteeing the participation of the entire community in the critical project of charity.

THURSDAY

Parashat Bechukotai opens by promising blessing and prosperity should Benei Yisrael observe the Torah. The first verse reads, "If you walk in accordance with My laws… " Apparently influenced by the verb "walk" in this context, the Midrash Rabba here records a famous comment attributed to King David. He is said to have told the Almighty, "Everyday I would calculate and say, I am going to this place or this residence; yet, my feet would bring me to the Batei Kenesset and Batei Midrash." In this light the Midrash reads the following verse (written by David) in Sefer Tehillim (119:59): "I have considered my ways, and have turned back to Your laws." Meaning, no matter where he considers going, David always ends up "back to Your laws," in the houses of study and prayer. Implicitly, the Midrash reads our verse, "If you walk… " as referring to this level of affinity for Torah.

This Midrash begs for an explanation. How could David's legs take him to places against his own will? Additionally, as king of a major empire, David presumably had important responsibilities resting on his shoulders; did he really miss all his cabinet meetings because his legs led him to the local yeshiva?

The deeper meaning of this Midrash is revealed to us by the Rebbe of Kotzk. In truth, David, a capable and responsible leader, tended to his business as required and competently oversaw the needs of the monarchy. Practically speaking, his legs led him to nowhere other than the places where he knew he needed to go. This Midrash stresses, however, the careful "calculation" or "consideration" David conducted as he drew up his day's schedule. He viewed his work - however important and worthwhile - as an unfortunate loss of opportunity for Torah study. David did not avoid involvement in mundane affairs, but he did recognize the spiritual cost entailed. This process of "calculation," says the Kotzker, intensified David's longing for Torah. Appreciating the sacrifice involved in taking time away from learning increased his appetite for study. Therefore, when free time availed itself, David naturally proceeded to the Beit Midrash.

FRIDAY

Parashat Behar presents the laws of the "yovel" (jubilee) year, including the return of all purchased real estate to its original owners. In this context, the Torah elaborates a bit about the issue of "ona'a," financial abuse. Since a real estate transaction is automatically revoked on the yovel year, the seller must calculate accordingly and charge the appropriate price proportional to the number of remaining years until the yovel. Accordingly, the Torah here (25:14) warns against overcharging a customer. Interestingly, just three verses later the Torah repeats the prohibition against "ona'a." Chazal interpret this second verse as referring to an entirely different matter: verbal abuse. One may not taunt or hurt the feelings of another, as doing so falls under the category of "ona'at devarim," verbal abuse.

The obvious question arises, why would the Torah introduce this second issue here, amidst its discussion of yovel? While we can easily understand the inclusion of financial abuse in this section, for, as we saw, it directly involves the halakhot of yovel, no connection seems to exist between yovel and the prohibition against verbal abuse.

One answer suggested closely examines a central theme of yovel as manifest most clearly in another of its laws: the freeing of servants. As we know from, among other sources, the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia, upon which is inscribed a verse from the Torah's discussion of yovel, the institution of yovel is very much about freedom and liberty. Granting one freedom means allowing him the opportunity to grow and develop according to his potential. Rather than exerting one's energies for the interests of another, the free man can work towards the fulfillment of his inner self.

This theme of yovel may very well relate to the "shemitta" prohibitions during this year. Like during the seventh, sabbatical year, throughout the fiftieth, yovel year one may not till the land. Rather than manipulating agriculture for his personal interests, the farmer leaves the land alone and allows to grow naturally. This perhaps symbolizes the concept of freedom as manifest through the institution of yovel.

This may also explain the Torah's sudden reference to the prohibition of "ona'at devarim." The Gemara mentions several examples of this violation, among them reminding one about his shameful past. Taunting another often involves imposing upon him a certain characteristic or tendency to which he is eternally bound. Slurs and name-calling effectively send the message that the subject cannot possibly change; his character is frozen forever. Thus, verbal abuse strips one of his liberty, preventing him from cultivating his potential and working towards the actualization of his inner self. The Torah therefore saw fit to include this prohibition among the laws of yovel, which is meant to afford everyone the freedom to develop their potential to its very fullest.

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