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MOTZAEI

The verse in Parashat Toledot describes Esav as an "ish yodei'a tzayid" - "a man who knew hunting" (25:27). Rashi, citing the Midrash Tanchuma, interprets this to refer not to animal hunting, but rather to Esav's deviousness and power of deception. He would ensnare his father by posing halakhic questions that reflected, or so it seemed, a degree of intense piety on Esav's part. Specifically, the Midrash cites Esav as questioning whether or not straw and salt must be tithed. Halakha requires that only actual grain and produce itself be tithed, not straw or salt. By asking such a question, Esav hoped to give the image of meticulous and stringent observance of halakhic details.

When approaching this Midrash, one question we should address is why Esav selected straw and salt as the focal point of his phony halakhic inquiry. Did he mention these coincidentally, simply because they happen to be exempt from tithing, or is there perhaps some deeper message that the Midrash seeks to convey?

Rav Shlomo Yosef Zevin suggests an insightful explanation in his "le-Torah u-le-Mo'adim.” Straw and salt do not require tithing for two opposite reasons. As the Torah requires one to tithe only actual food, anything beneath or above the formal status of "food" is excluded from this mitzva. Hence, straw, the refuse of the grain which one feeds to animals, does not require the separation of ma'aser. On the opposite end, salt, which adds flavor to and preserves food, is likewise exempt; it is not actual food, but rather a higher form.

Rav Zevin extends this basic idea to unearth the spiritual symbolism behind "straw" and "salt.” Straw represents moral "refuse," the evil and depravity which must be discarded. Salt, by contrast, represents spirituality, it symbolizes the Torah. Salt has three primary uses: it cleanses (salt is used to extract blood from meat), it adds flavor, and it preserves. Similarly, Torah cleanses our daily life; it is what enables us to distinguish between the desirable and the objectionable and compels us to embrace the former and reject the latter. Secondly, Torah provides spiritual flavor to an otherwise mundane life, much as salt brings out the savor in foods. Finally, just as salt never becomes rotten, it retains its flavor eternally, so is Torah the only constant in the world; it is our preservative, as it guarantees our survival under any and all circumstances.

Chazal often refer to the process of tithing as "tikun," as "fixing" the produce. The separation of tithes renders the rest of the food halakhically edible, and is therefore viewed as the final procedure in the processing of the food. Esav's questions, as presented by the Midrash, symbolize his ideology, which allows and calls for the "correction" of "straw" and "salt.” Esav felt that anything can be improved - including depravity, and including Torah. First, he argued that even the most evil, the most immoral, the most distasteful qualities and conduct can be made holy. One need not discard the straw - it can be tithed, it can be improved, and transformed into a sacred object. Such a belief effectively eliminates all moral barriers and amounts to the loss of all restraint. On the opposite end, Esav believed in the need to correct and improve the "salt," his spiritual tradition. It was not perfect; changes must be introduced and implemented, it must be altered to accommodate changing times and attitudes.

Esav thus demonstrates how one can persuasively undermine our basic ideals of holiness under the guise of piety. Underlying his religious inquiry was a theology that sought to sanctify that which is evil and corrupt that which is sacred. This Midrash teaches us to look behind deceptive disguises and firmly commit ourselves to discarding the "straw" and leaving the "salt" unchanged.

SUNDAY

Parashat Toledot tells the famous story of Yaakov's deceptive seizure of his father's blessing intended for Esav. As Esav left at his father's behest to hunt game and prepare meat for him, Rivka dresses Yaakov in Esav's clothing to help him trick his blind father into giving him the blessing. Interestingly, the verse describes the clothing as "bigdei Esav… ha-chamudot" - "the beautiful clothing of Esav" (27:15). Rashi brings two possible interpretations as to what this might mean. First, he cites Targum Onkelos' translation of the term, to mean "clean.” Rashi then proceeds to cite a Midrashic explanation, which interprets "chamudot" as meaning "the coveted" (as in "lo tachmod"). The Midrash claims that Esav coveted - and then stole - this clothing from Nimrod, the mighty warrior of whom we read much earlier, in Parashat Noach (see 10:8-9). What are we to make of this notion, that Esav stole the clothing of Nimrod?

We begin our explanation by taking a quick look at a verse earlier in Parashat Toledot, describing Esav as he entered adulthood: "The lads grew, and Esav was a skilled hunter, a man of the field" (25:27). In the following verse, we read that Yitzchak loved Esav "ki tzayid be-fiv," which seems to refer to Esav's skill in hunting. It is noteworthy that only one other Biblical personality before Esav was described as a hunter - Nimrod. The verse in Parashat Noach portrays Nimrod as a "gibor tzayid," literally, "a mighty hunter.”

If we view the Torah's description of Esav as intentionally associating him with Nimrod, then we will arrive at a somewhat startling conclusion: Yitzchak favored Esav specifically because he resembled Nimrod. Such a notion merely compounds the famous question as to why Yitzchak favored Esav over his righteous younger brother. Chazal accuse Nimrod of several crimes, including megalomania to the point of self-deification, instigating the infamous incident of Migdal Bavel (the Tower of Babel), and casting Avraham into the furnace for espousing monotheism. Why would Yitzchak love Esav "ki tzayid be-fiv" - because he was a hunter like Nimrod?

In truth, the association drawn between Esav and Nimrod actually helps explain why Yitzchak favored his eldest son. The Midrashim describe at length the conflict between Nimrod and Avraham. Nimrod and his empire represented the antithesis of Avraham's teachings, of monotheism, ethics, kindness, and humility. Esav stole Nimrod's clothing. One passage in the Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 65:12) describes the clothing mentioned in this verse as "bigdei malkhut" - royal garb. Esav coveted, and apparently seized, or at least opposed, Nimrod's authority and rule. Yitzchak thus saw in Esav the potential resistance to Nimrod that the world had been waiting for. The polytheistic and heartless rule of Nimrod could now, once and for all, be replaced by a grandson of Avraham Avinu, it will now give way to a kingdom founded on the principles he preached. If Avraham could not overthrow Nimrod's empire, then perhaps Esav, a skilled hunter and warrior of Nimrod's caliber, could. Therefore, Yitzchak wished to bestow upon Esav the blessings of prosperity and dominion. A close look at the blessings given to Yaakov under the guise of Esav reveals that it contains only these two themes - economic success and power. Yitzchak wanted Esav to rule the world in Nimrod's place, to establish a new empire that would overthrow Nimrod.

Rivka, of course, disagreed. Leaving aside the age-old question of why Yitzchak did not know what she knew, she understood that Esav did not represent the values of his father and grandfather; his campaign against Nimrod was prompted not by a desire to establish a kingdom of Godliness, but rather out of a sheer lust for power. She therefore ensured that the blessing of power would be given to Yaakov; it would be he and his offspring who would oppose the polytheistic and corrupt empire of the time, and one day establish the nation that would represent God and the values of kindness, compassion and generosity.

MONDAY

Parashat Toledot opens with the story of the birth of Esav and Yaakov, after which we are told, "The lads grew up" and followed two very different paths (25:27). Esav became a hunter, and Yaakov spent his time in "tents," generally understood as a reference to Torah study halls. The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 63:10) writes that the "growing up" spoken of by the verse means the age of thirteen, which marks a young man's entry into independence and adulthood. In this context, the Midrash comments that a parent must tend to his children until the age of thirteen; at this point, he should recite the berakha of, "Barukh she-petarani me-onsho shel zeh" - "Blessed is He who has exempted me from the punishment of this [child].” The father blesses Hashem who has now exempted him from his formal obligation of chinukh (educating his son), on account of which he has been held responsible until this point for his child's wrongdoing. (See Magen Avraham for an additional interpretation of the berakha.)

This berakha is mentioned by the Rema, in Shulchan Arukh Orach Chayim (225:2), as a requirement upon a father when his son reaches the age of bar-mitzva. The Vilna Gaon (in his Beiur ha-Gra) observes that according to the Maharil, a father recites this berakha with "Shem ve-malkhut," meaning, with the entire formula - "Barukh Atah Hashem… “ The Gaon rules accordingly, requiring the recitation of a full-fledged berakha when one's son becomes a bar-mitzva.

This ruling, however, appears to raise a serious halakhic problem. When we consider a thirteen year-old boy a "bar-mitzva," an adult who has now become obligated in mitzvot, we do so on the basis of what is called, "chazaka de-Rava," the presumption - attributed in the Gemara to the amora, Rava - that the child has physically matured. Physical maturity - determined by the presence of two pubic hairs - is necessary before a boy formally attains the status of a bar-mitzva. "Chazaka de-Rava" allows us to presume physical maturity for all halakhic issues on the level of de-rabbanan - of rabbinic origin. Thus, for example, we allow a thirteen year-old to read the Torah, receive an aliya, and lead the prayer service, because all these are required by Chazal, not by force of Torah law. However, when it comes to those halakhot involving Torah law, we cannot make such a presumption. Therefore, many authorities do not allow a recent bar-mitzva to read Parashat Zakhor (the special reading conducted on the Shabbat before Purim), as this reading, according to many views, is obligated by Torah law.

If so, then we encounter considerable difficulty understanding how a father can recite a full-fledged berakha of "asher petarani" on his son's thirteenth birthday. According to the Rambam, the recitation of a "berakha le-vatala" (unnecessary berakha) violates a Torah prohibition. Therefore, the question of whether or not the child has reached physical maturity has relevance in this respect on the level of Torah law. If he is technically still a minor, the father cannot recite this berakha. How, then, did the Vilna Gaon allow a father to recite a full-length berakha on the assumption that the child has reached physical maturity? How can we rely on "chazaka de-Rabba" with regard to Torah law?

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank zt"l (Har Tzvi, O.C. 1:114) offers the following explanation. The "chazaka de-Rabba" principle mandates that a child, upon reaching the age of thirteen, must observe the mitzvot as an adult. We do not bother inquiring as to his current stage of physical maturity, and instead presume the development necessary to render him an adult male. Accordingly, as far as the berakha of "asher petarani" is concerned, the child's current stage of development is of no consequence. Once halakha declares the child independently obligated in mitzvot, the father recites the berakha, as he is now formally exempt from accountability for the child. Once the child himself bears personal responsibility, if only because of "chazaka de-Rabba," the father is "off the hook," so-to-speak, and may recite the berakha, even if, in truth, the child has not reached the prerequisite stage of physical development.

TUESDAY

Towards the beginning of Parashat Toledot, we read of Yaakov's purchase of the birthright from his older brother, Esav. After hearing Yaakov's offer to sell him the birthright in exchange for lentils, Esav declares, "Behold, I am going to die, so of what use is the birthright to me?" (25:32). The commentators and Midrashim offer different explanations as to what precisely Esav meant. Rashi claims that Yaakov had informed Esav of the high risk involved in performing the sacrificial rituals, a responsibility that came with the birthright. Esav then willingly sold this privilege, claiming that it would only bring him death. Some commentators, including the Rashbam and Da'at Zekeinim, explain that Esav refers here to the occupational hazards of his profession - hunting. He spent his days in the fields and woods where all types of dangerous animals loomed; given the constant risk to his life, he held out little hope that he would even live to reap the benefits of the birthright, which would not take effect until after his father's death.

This interpretation formed the basis of a famous halakhic ruling of Rav Yechezkel Landau of Prague (18^th century), in his Noda bi-Yehuda (Mahadura Tanina, Y.D. 10). The Noda bi-Yehuda was asked whether halakha forbids sport hunting. After first pointing out the moral problem involved in killing animals just for sport and fun, Rav Landau advanced a halakhic argument to forbid the practice, on the grounds of "sakana," or unnecessary risk to life. As we see from this interpretation of the verse, hunting entails a considerable risk to life even for as experienced and skilled a hunted as Esav. Given the strict prohibition against putting oneself in a life-threatening situation, hunting for sport would clearly be forbidden.

A somewhat obvious challenge to this ruling is raised by Rav Aharon Lewin, in his "ha-Derash ve-ha-Iyun" on Parashat Toledot. Can one necessarily compare the conditions under which Esav hunted and those of 18^th century sport hunting? Esav presumably hunted in uninhabited forests and jungles far away from developed population areas. Such a setting undoubtedly posed considerable risk to his life. More recent hunting, by contrast, takes place in wooded areas just beyond the city or town. It is hard to imagine that someone hunting outside Prague in the 18^th century ran the risk of encountering a lion or bear as he searched for game.

In any event, Rav Lewin points to a different source as forbidding hunting, a Gemara in Masekhet Avoda Zara (18b). The Gemara there interprets the first verse in Tehillim, which praises the one "who did not stand on the path of the wicked," as referring to one who refrains from participating in the "kengiyon," which Rashi interprets as a form of hunting for sport. Indeed, Rav Lewin notes, the Rema (Orach Chayim 316:2) forbids hunting animals with dogs because this constitutes a "moshav leitzim" - "the company of the insolent" (mention in the aforementioned, opening verse of Tehillim). Rav Lewin expresses wonder over the fact that the Noda bi-Yehuda did not cite this Gemara in his discussion. One could argue that he deemed this Gemara irrelevant to the issue at hand because of its specific context. The Gemara there interprets this entire verse in Tehillim as praising one who avoids all types of sporting events and other crude forms of entertainment. The focus appears to be not on the hunting per se, but rather on the event, the company, the gathering of delinquents for childish games or shows. Perhaps for this reason the Noda bi-Yehuda felt this Gemara had no bearing on our issue. The aforementioned passage in the Rema, however, does, indeed, imply that hunting itself is forbidden on the grounds of "moshav leitzim."

WEDNESDAY

Parashat Toledot begins with the story of Yitzchak's and Rivka's inability to have children, their appeal to God and the ultimate birth of their children, Yaakov and Esav. Amidst its discussion of this story, the Gemara (Masekhet Yevamot 64a) comments: "Why were the patriarchs infertile? Because the Almighty longs for the prayers of the righteous.” At first glance, this passage appears theologically difficult. Why does God want or need anyone's prayers? How does the supplication of pious men and women "serve the interests," so-to-speak, of the Almighty?

Rav Chayim of Volozhin, in his "Nefesh ha-Chayim" (2:10), explains based on the general principle he develops in that work. Man's spiritual activity on earth has direct impact upon the metaphysical workings of the world. God specifically designed the world in such a way that through spiritual endeavors, man can participate, so-to-speak, in God's rule of the earth. An individual's prayer, specifically that of a tzadik, makes him a partner with the Almighty in the creation and ongoing dominion over the earth. This constitutes God's ultimate goal for man - to take part in His rule and control of the universe; therefore, He "longs for" the prayers of the righteous, as they are most qualified to fill this role, of sharing the Almighty's power, as it were.

It would appear that this understanding of this passage deepens its connection to the statement that immediately follows. Noting the irregular term, "va-yetar" used to describe Yitzchak's prayer for a child (see 25:21), the Gemara there associates this term with the Aramaic word, "atar," or pitchfork. It comments, "Why are the prayers of the righteous likened to a pitchfork? Just as a pitchfork turns the grain over from place to place, so do the prayers of the righteous turn God's attributes from the attribute of anger to the attribute of compassion.” This is precisely why God "longs for" the prayers of the righteous; as their prayers dictate to Him, as it were, how to govern the world - with mercy, rather than with strict justice, thereby allowing man to achieve his ultimate goal in the world, the Almighty wants them to pray.

The principle established by the Nefesh ha-Chayim may also add a further dimension to the "pitchfork" analogy. Agricultural activity represents man's partnership with God in creation; God created the world in such a fashion that it requires man to "pick up where He left off.” By plowing, sowing, and harvesting, by establishing dominion over the natural forces, harnessing them, and manipulating them for his own use, mankind effectively becomes God's partner in the creation and sustenance of the world. It thus serves as an accurate model for Chazal's perspective on prayer: the control exerted down below through cultivating the land is parallel to the control one exerts in the upper spheres through the power of prayer. Man is offered the opportunity to become God's partner not only in the physical cultivation of planet earth, but in its metaphysical and cosmic existence, as well.

THURSDAY

Among the important - and, very often, the most controversial - issues that arise when studying the stories of our avot and imahot (patriarchs and matriarchs) is the possibility of criticizing their conduct based on a careful reading of the verses. Is a scholar entitled to point to a moral or religious flaw in one of our avot or imahot based on his careful and thorough analysis of the text, or must we limit our critique of these saintly people to that which appears explicitly in the text and Midrashim? We will demonstrate one example of this debate that expresses itself in a question concerning one verse in Parashat Toledot.

When famine strikes the land of Canaan, Yitzchak, following the example set by his father many years earlier, heads towards Egypt. But God appears to him and forbids him from leaving Canaan. At this point, God bestows upon Yitzchak the blessing of a great nation in the land of Canaan: "I will make your descendants as numerous as the stars of heaven and give to your descendants all these lands… because Avraham obeyed Me and kept My charge, My commandments, My laws and My teachings" (26:4-5). Surprisingly, God attributes His blessing to Yitzchak not to his own merits, but rather to those of his father, Avraham. Why did Yaakov not independently deserve God's blessing, but rather depended on the merits of his saintly father?

The Seforno interprets this as a subtle criticism of Yitzchak. Until this point, we do not find Yitzchak engaging in the "calling in God's Name," a phrase that appears numerous times throughout the story of Avraham, and which many commentators explain as a reference to proselytizing. Unlike Avraham, Yitzchak did not involve himself in the dissemination of monotheism and Godliness. He was therefore not independently worthy of establishing a large nation in the land of Canaan. The Seforno adds that later, after Yitzchak's banishment from Gerar, God reiterates His promise to Yitzchak and once again emphasizes, "because of My servant, Avraham" (26:24). Immediately thereafter, in the very next verse, Yitzchak indeed "calls in the Name of God.” From that point on, the Seforno observes, Yitzchak experiences no more hardship from the Philistines or any other people, as he had until this point. In fact, the very next verse tells that the Philistine king Avimelekh initiated friendly, diplomatic relations with Yitzchak. During the course of their discussion, the Seforno notes, Avimelekh declares that Yitchak is "now the blessed one of the Lord" (26:29). The Seforno does not clarify his intent by making this observation, but presumably he means that only now that Yitzchak has begun his active involvement in preaching, he is independently blessed by God, no longer dependent on his father's merits. (This is the explanation found in the footnotes to the Seforno in the Torat Chayim Chumash, on 26:29.)

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Kol Ram, vol. 2, p.28) disagrees with the Seforno's approach on fundamental, ideological grounds. After the Talmudic era, he argues, no one reserves the right to make judgments regarding the conduct of our patriarchs - neither the Rishonim nor the Acharonim. Therefore, in the absence of any source in Chazal for such criticism, we cannot ascribe to Yitzchak this flaw of failing in his responsibility to teach and educate his contemporaries.

Rav Moshe therefore offers a different, more esoteric explanation for this verse. Chazal describe Yitzchak as an "ola temima" - a perfect burnt-offering, that had been placed upon the altar. Rav Moshe explains that just as an "ola" (unlike other sacrifices) is burnt entirely on the altar, and no meat is eaten by a human being, so was Yitzchak entirely spiritual. He represented absolute devotion to spiritual concerns. By contrast, Avraham and Yaakov represent the fusion between the two realms, the physical and the spiritual. When God bestows a blessing upon all of Am Yisrael, the descendants of the patriarchs, He must include both elements - the physical and the spiritual - in His blessing. Clearly, an entire people cannot survive on spirituality alone; a strong economic and military infrastructure is necessary for the nation to achieve its goal and realize its spiritual destiny. When proclaiming this blessing in Parashat Toledot, then, the Almighty must invoke the merit of Avraham, who represents the successful merging of these two realms, and cannot bless the nation that will emerge with the blessing of Yitzchak alone.

FRIDAY

Among the many issues arising from Esav's sale of his birthright to Yaakov, as described in the beginning of Parashat Toledot, is the legal mechanics of this "transaction.” The Gemara, in Masekhet Bava Metzia 16a, rules explicitly that the sale of a future inheritance, which as yet does not belong to the seller, does not take effect, on the grounds of "davar she-lo ba le-olam" (literally, "something that has not yet come into the world"). The transaction of an item over which the seller as yet lacks ownership is de facto invalid. How, then, could Esav sell his birthright, which includes the inheritance privileges of the firstborn, during his father's lifetime, before the property belonged to him?

The Tur, in his commentary to the Chumash (the "Peirush ha-Tur," as opposed to the "Ba'al ha-Turim"), cites the answer given by his father, the Rosh. The Rosh introduced an important corollary to the "davar she-lo ba le-olam" principle: if the seller takes an oath that he will go through with the transaction when the merchandise comes under his possession, the transaction takes effect even now, before he owns the merchandise. This explains why, as we read in this parasha, Yaakov makes a point of eliciting an oath on Esav's part when they agree on the sale (25:33). Since the birthright constituted a "davar she-lo le-olam," an oath was required to lend legal validity to the sale. This view of the Rosh, that one can overcome the legal problem of "davar she-lo ba le-olam" with an oath, is mentioned as well in his teshuvot - Shut ha-Rosh 8:18.

The Rivash (328) strongly rejects this theory, arguing that an oath cannot validate the sale of a "davar she-lo ba le-olam.” He therefore suggests a different, straightforward explanation as to how Esav sold the birthright: before Matan Torah, the sale of a "davar she-lo ba le-olam" was valid. The law invalidating such a sale was introduced only once the Torah was given.

Presumably, what underlies this debate between the Rosh and Rovash is the reason why a sale cannot take effect when it involves property that does not yet belong to the seller. Two basic directions have been taken by the Rishonim in explaining this halakha. According to one view, such a transaction is not viable because of a lack of "semikhut da'at," or confidence, of the seller. Until the property is legally under his possession, he cannot be said to have firmly and resolutely decided to transfer it to the buyer - the type of confident decision necessary for a transaction to take effect (called "da'at makneh"). A different approach taken claims that a "davar she-lo ba le-olam" is simply not subject to transaction; the problem lies not with the mindset of the individual, but rather with the status of the object. Property can change hands only when the act of sale is performed by its owner; otherwise, even if the seller expects to acquire ownership at a later date, his action cannot change the property's status.

The most obvious ramification of this debate (as explained by Rav Elchanan Wasserman Hy"d, "Kovetz Shiurim," Bava Batra 276) arises in a society where legal protocol allows for the sale of future-owned property. Would this communally-accepted practice render such a sale halakhically valid? If the problem with a "davar she-lo ba le-olam" transaction involves the lack of confidence on the seller's part, then presumably common practice can supply the necessary confidence. Given the widespread acceptance of this practice, the seller indeed acts with the resolve necessary to effectuate the transaction. This is the view of the Maharam mi-Rutenberg (cited by the Tashbetz, 398). Conversely, if a "davar she-lo ba le-olam" cannot be sold because intrinsically it is not subject to sale, then common protocol will be of no consequence - the position cited in the name of Rabbenu Yechiel of Paris.

Correspondingly, the Rosh and the Rivash appear to debate this very point. According to the Rosh, the seller's intent lies at the heart of the problem with a "davar she-lo ba-olam.” Hence, we can overcome this obstacle by having the seller take an oath that he will follow through on the agreement with the buyer; an oath amply demonstrates the presence of the firm resolve necessary to effectuate a sale. The Rivash, by contrast, maintains that property can be transacted only by its current owner; an act of sale is meaningless unless performed by the owner at present. Therefore, regardless of how strongly the owner demonstrates his firm resolve, such as by taking an oath, the problem remains. In order to explain Esav's sale of the birthright, the Rivash draws a distinction between before and after Matan Torah. Were he to have believed that the issue at hand is one of intent, the Rivash would have no reason to claim that the situation was different before Matan Torah: why would sellers have had more confidence and resolve before the Torah was given? But since he perceives the problem as one of technical procedure, he could claim that the technicality of "davar she-lo ba le-olam" was introduced at Sinai, and did not apply before Matan Torah.

(Taken from an article by Rav Mordechai Carlebach)

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