SALT | Shelach 5784 - 2024

MOTZAEI

         Parashat Shelach tells of the infamous incident of "chet ha-meraglim," the sin of the scouts.  Upon the twelve scouts' return from their mission in Canaan, we read, "They came to Moshe and to Aharon and to the entire congregation of Benei Yisrael… They brought back word to them and to the entire congregation… " (13:26). Rashi, commenting on the words, "They brought back word to them," writes, "To Moshe and Aharon," clarifying for us to whom the phrase "to them" refers. Why Rashi felt compelled to make such a clarification requires some explanation.  Once the verse told us that the scouts returned "to Moshe and Aharon and to the entire congregation," then obviously if they reported "to them and to the entire congregation," "to them" refers to Moshe and Aharon!  What does Rashi really mean with this brief remark?

         An interesting explanation of Rashi's comments is cited in the name of Rav Chayim Yitzchak Aharon Rappaport, the "maggid" of Vilkimir.  Rashi here clarifies for us not this verse, but rather the verses that follow, the report presented by the scouts.  We are told that the report, which the Torah records in the verses that follow, was not conveyed to just a single audience; the scouts told part of it to Moshe and Aharon, while the rest was directed to the nation.  The first verse, which speaks of the superior agricultural quality of Eretz Canaan, was told to Moshe and Aharon.  (Indeed, that verse begins, "Va-yesaperu lo" – "They told him," to Moshe, the primary recipient of their report.)  The next two verses, however, which warn of the military dangers facing the nation in Canaan, were directed towards Benei Yisrael.  By emphasizing "to Moshe and Aharon," Rashi isolates the report to Moshe and Aharon from the rest of the scouts' remarks, which they directed towards the nation at large.

         This analysis of the scouts' report may help resolve a fundamental contradiction noted by many commentators between the account here in Parashat Shelach and that in Parashat Devarim.  Parashat Shelach opens with an explicit command of God to dispatch a scouting mission. In Parashat Devarim, by contrast, Moshe describes the mission as Benei Yisrael's initiative (see Devarim 1:22). Rav Elchanan Samet suggested that in fact both occurred; God ordered one scouting mission, whereas Benei Yisrael requested a different excursion.  God told Moshe to send scouts "ve-yaturu et Eretz Canaan" (Bamidbar 13:2), to observe and become acquainted with the land.  The purpose was not to devise military strategy, but rather for Benei Yisrael to learn about the land they now prepare to settle.  The people, however, requested that a team be sent "ve-yachperu lanu et ha-aretz" – to spy out the land, to determine if and precisely how the conquest can proceed.  Moshe decided to combine both these missions into a single group of twelve men, whom he charged with both tasks. 

         This thesis is perhaps reinforced in light of what we have seen regarding the scouts' report.  As we saw, they first reported to Moshe and Aharon, and then they presented their findings to the people.  Since they were charged with two distinct tasks, one initiated by God – through Moshe – and the other by the people, the scouts presented two reports, the first to Moshe, and the second to the rest of the nation. 

SUNDAY 

         Towards the beginning of Parashat Shelach (12:3), the Torah emphasizes that the twelve men selected for the scouting mission were the leaders of Benei Yisrael.  In Midrashic literature, we find that these men not only comprised the political leadership, but were the spiritual leaders, as well.  The question, of course, then arises as to why and how they deteriorated so quickly, from men of spiritual greatness to the ones who led the entire nation to reject Eretz Canaan.  One explanation, found in the Zohar and elsewhere, claims that the twelve leaders feared the loss of their positions in Canaan.  They were concerned that once Benei Yisrael cross the Jordan River and settle the land, they will be replaced by other leaders.  They therefore devised a plot to ensure that Benei Yisrael would remain in the wilderness, so that they could retain their leadership positions.

         But this itself requires explanation.  If, indeed, we deal here with the nation's spiritual elite, the religious mentors of the people, how could they have steeped so low, to design such a devious plot solely out of concern for their honor and noble stature?

         Before addressing this question, perhaps a different problem with this view in the Midrash should also be noted.  What reason did the leaders have to fear the loss of their positions in Canaan? Why would the crossing of the river warrant replacing the twelve tribal leaders with others?

         The Sefat Emet explains that the scouts' thought process as described by Chazal reflects a fundamental misconception concerning Benei Yisrael's entry into Canaan.  The scouts understood, and correctly so, that life in the land will differ drastically from the life currently experienced in the wilderness.  Benei Yisrael traveled in the wilderness under the supernatural care and protection of the Almighty, which freed them from all mundane responsibilities and concerns.  They had no need to till the land or form an army.  Once they cross the river, these responsibilities would suddenly fall upon them. What the scouts experienced when they assessed the land may be described as a "culture shock" of sorts. They came face-to-face with the stark contrast between the miraculous life in the wilderness and the "down-to-earth" existence awaiting them in Canaan.  This led to the realization that Am Yisrael would have to undergo a major transition to adjust to the new circumstances, a transition that would likely involve a change of leadership.  They would likely be replaced by  leaders who could more easily adapt to the challenges of economy, diplomacy and warfare that would arise once Benei Yisrael inhabit the land. The current religious leadership, they thought, was perhaps relevant only in the wilderness; in the land, however, a much different type of system of authority would become necessary.

         The scouts were thus deterred by the transition the nation would have to undergo upon crossing into Canaan.  They erred in preferring the purely spiritual existence of the wilderness to the more challenging fusion of the sacred and the mundane they would have to confront in the land.  They refused to accept the fact that the desert experience was but a means through which Benei Yisrael would acquire faith and trust in God, preparing them for their lives in Eretz Yisrael, rather than the nation's ultimate destiny. 

MONDAY

         Just before dispatching the scouting mission to Canaan, Moshe renames one of the scouts, from "Hoshea" to "Yehoshua" (13:16).  The Gemara (Sota 34b), cited by Rashi, explains the name change as a reference to Moshe's prayer, "K-a yoshi'ikha" – God shall save you from the plot of the scouts.  Suspecting the forthcoming trouble caused by the scouts, Moshe offered a brief prayer that God would somehow free Yehoshua from his peers' sinful influence.

         The Talmud Yerushalmi (Sanhedrin 2:6), however, presents a different explanation for the symbolism underlying the name change.  The Yerushalmi traces the origins of the letter "yud" added to Hoshea's name all the way back to our matriarch Sara, who was originally named "Sarai."  In Parashat Lekh-Lekha (Bereishit 17:15), God changes her name from "Sarai" to "Sara," which involved replacing the letter "yud" with the letter "hei."  The Yerushalmi records that the "yud" taken from her name petitioned the Almighty, "Master of the world!  You have uprooted me from this righteous woman!"  God consoled the embittered letter by promising to affix it at the very front of Yehoshua's name.

         What does this mean?  Wherein lies the connection between Sara's name change and Yehoshua's?

         Rav Yitzchak Stollman, in his "Minchat Yitzchak" to this parasha, suggests a fascinating approach to understanding this story, and in so doing arrives at an entirely new perspective on the incident of the scouts. Rabbi Stollman claims that what frightened the scouts was not the military threat per se, the formidable armies of Canaan they would have to confront, but rather a far more general issue, one which touches upon the very nature of Am Yisrael's mission as a people. Since their departure from Egypt, Benei Yisrael gradually rose to considerable spiritual heights and acquired precious spiritual treasures.  As yet without a home, they might have instinctively found it preferable to travel about amidst other nations to disseminate their newfound knowledge. Why keep the valuable wares of Sinai to themselves?  Why not return to Egypt and teach their former taskmasters about God's laws?  Why should Benei Yisrael take their Torah to Canaan, where they must eliminate the country's population and establish their own, insular kingdom in its place?  What point is there in keeping the treasures of the Torah for themselves?

         Herein lies the mistake of the scouts.  They had little desire in embarking on a campaign to create a new sovereign state for the nation of the Torah.  They preferred instead living as a nation without a homeland, a wandering people who would share with the world their unique teachings and way of life. They saw no need for confronting the nations of Canaan in order to establish themselves as an independent country.

         This, Rav Stollman writes, explains for us the relevance of the "yud" from "Sarai."  Chazal (Berakhot 13a) explain that the transition from "Sarai" to "Sarah" is one from the personal to the universal.  The letter "yud" at the end of a word means "mine"; for example, "beiti" means "my home." By changing Sarai's name to "Sarah," God assigned Sarah as a leadership figure not only for the nation that will emerge from her womb, but for the world at large.  Sarah must now become matriarch not only for her own offspring, but for all nations.  In response, the "yud," the symbol of self-focus and separateness, complained before the Almighty.  The universal quality of Sarah's role, of the mission assigned to Benei Yisrael, threatens to undermine the need for internal focus, the building of the nation itself. If Am Yisrael concentrates exclusively on its universal role, how will it focus enough attention on its self-development, on becoming a strong, independent nation representing God in the world?  Later generations might mistakenly assume that we mustn't strive for independence and the cultivation of a unique national identity, but to the contrary, we should remain a wandering people with no separate national identity so as to allow for the dissemination of the Torah throughout all nations on earth. 

         God reassured the "yud," as it were, that this awareness, of the critical importance of our national identity, will be preserved by Yehoshua, the one who heroically stood up to the other scouts and resisted their rejection of our national homeland.  It was he who felt confident in the nation's destiny to settle Canaan and build a country of their own, a strong, national infrastructure from which they would spread the truth about God and His Torah.  The "yud" from Sarai's name, the symbol of internal development and focus, was transferred to Yehoshua, who embodied this ideal of remaining a distinct nation despite our ultimate role as God's representatives to the world.

TUESDAY

Parashat Shelach introduces us to the mitzva of "chala," requiring one to take a piece of his dough and give it to a kohen (15:17-21).  Several categories of dough are exempt from this obligation, including hekdesh (dough belonging to the Temple treasury) and hefker (ownerless dough).  The Rambam, in Hilkhot Bikkurim (8:6-7), specifies that this exemption takes effect only if either of these two statuses – hekdesh or hefker – applies at the time of kneading.  He writes:

"One who consecrates his dough or declares it hefker before it was kneaded, and he redeemed it or took acquisition of it and thereafter kneaded it, or if he consecrated it or declared it ownerless after kneading it and thereafter redeemed it or took acquisition of it – it is obligated in chala."

In these cases, the individual had ownership over the dough at the time of kneading; since at that point it was neither hekdesh nor hefker, chala is required.  In halakha 7, the Rambam describes how the exemption works: "If he consecrated it before it is kneaded and kneaded it while it was under the property of hekdesh, and then he redeemed it, it is exempt." Oddly enough, the Rambam, in describing the exemption from chala, chooses to speak only about hekdesh, omitting any mention of hefker.  He mentions the hefker exemption only by implication, in the previous halakha, when he clarifies that if the hefker status was not in effect at the time of kneading chala is required.  Why does he not mention explicitly that dough that has no owner at the time of kneading is exempt from the chala obligation?

         Rav Chayim Brisker, in his famous work on the Rambam, explains that the Rambam sought to draw a subtle distinction between the exemption of hefker and that of hekdesh.  According to the Rambam, Rav Chayim claims, these two exemptions from chala evolve from two very different sources.  The exemption of hekdesh property from chala is derived from the word employed in the verse "arisoteikhem" ("your dough" – 15:20), which implies that if the dough was under the ownership of hekdesh, the chala obligation does not take effect.  The exemption of hefker, however, originates from a different source.  Rav Chayim claims that ownerless dough is exempt from chala because of the association between the mitzva of chala and that of terumot and ma'aserot.  Terumot and ma'aserot are not taken from hefker because of a verse in Sefer Devarim (16) that implies that one gives terumot and ma'aserot only from property to which the kohen or levi himself has no access.  The Torah requires giving terumot and ma'aserot in order to help support the kohanim and levi'im, who receive no share in the land.  Since, however, they do have the legal right to claim ownerless property and produce, no terumot and ma'aserot are given from hefker. This exemption, Rav Chayim claims, extends to chala, as well.  It thus turns out that the exemption of hefker from chala differs fundamentally from the exemption of hekdesh, and therefore the Rambam formulated these exemptions in a manner that alludes to a distinction between the two.

         Later writers, however, have noted one difficulty with Rav Chayim's analysis, specifically, with his claim that hefker's exemption from chala is derived from the exemption of hefker produce from terumot and ma'aserot.  The Yerushalmi (Chala 1:3) states explicitly that the aforementioned verse in Sefer Devarim, from which, as mentioned, we derive the exemption of hefker from terumot and ma'aserot, applies only to terumot and ma'aserot and cannot be extended to chala.  If so, then we cannot attribute the hefker exemption from chala to a different source than the hekdesh exemption, and they both, presumably, evolve from the word "arisoteikhem."  The question, then, remains: why did the Rambam distinguish between the hefker exemption from chala and that of hekdesh?

         Rav Yosef Blau ("Bet Yitzchak," Yeshiva University, 5741-2) suggests an explanation based on an analysis of Rav Soloveitchik zt"l in a different context, in which he distinguishes between the exemption of hekdesh from chala, and that of dough belonging to a gentile.  The Yerushalmi (Chala 3:4) posits that according to Rabbi Akiva, although both dough belonging to hekdesh and dough belonging to a gentile are exempt from chala, these two exemptions take effect at different points. The hekdesh exemption, as mentioned, takes effect at the time of kneading; the dough must belong to hekdesh at that point for the exemption to apply.  The exemption of non-Jewishly owned dough, however, applies later, at the point where the dough begins crusting in the oven.  Rav Soloveitchik explained that according to Rabbi Akiva, the chala obligation essentially takes effect at the point of kneading; therefore, if at that point the dough belongs to either hekdesh or a gentile, it is exempt. However, when the obligation did not take effect then, it can also take effect later, at the point of crusting. Therefore, even if a gentile owned the dough at the point of kneading, if a Jew took ownership before the point of crusting, the dough becomes obligated in chala.  The fact that the obligation of chala does not take effect at that point when dealing with dough of hekdesh reveals a critical feature of the hekdesh exemption: the hekdesh ownership of dough does not prevent the chala obligation from taking effect, but rather is "mafki'a," it actively dissociates the dough from the world of chala.  Therefore, although the chala obligation can take effect later, at the point of crusting, in the case of hekdesh, the hekdesh status has already removed the dough from the chala obligation, which therefore cannot take effect later. 

         We can now return to the Rambam's distinction between hekdesh and hefker. Presumably, the exemption of hefker parallels that of non-Jewishly owned dough: the obligation simply has not taken effect, but there has been no "hafka'a" – active elimination of the dough from the laws of chala.  In this sense, hefker dough differs from hekdesh dough, and for this reason the Rambam distinguished between the two in formulating their exemption from chala.

WEDNESDAY

         Parashat Shelach concludes with the mitzva of tzitzit.  Amidst this discussion, the Torah informs us of the underlying reason behind this mitzva: "You shall see it and remember all the Lord's commandments and observe them, that you do not follow your heart and eyes after which you stray" (15:39).  The fringes on our garments remind us of the mitzvot, they help prevent us from following the path that our instincts would normally have us follow – the path of physical gratification and indulgence. 

         The Midrash Rabba, cited by Rashi on this verse, explains the process by which the human being is naturally attracted and drawn to this type of behavior: "The eyes see and the heart desires… "  The verse therefore describes tzitzit as the means by which one can avoid following that which he first sees and then desires.  The Sifrei, however, takes the opposite approach. Noting the sequence in the verse – "your heart and eyes," the Sifrei comments that we see from here that the eyes follow the heart.  One does not desire because he sees, but rather sees because he desires.  One first experiences the will in his heart, and only thereafter does he follow up on that will by searching with his eyes for its fulfillment.  As proof, the Sifrei observes that many blind people commit sins as often as seeing people do.  Clearly, then, sinful conduct originates in the heart, not in the eyes.  Eyes are merely the vehicle used by the sinner who seeks to commit the act desired originally in his heart.

         Do we have in these two Midrashim two different approaches to the process and origin of sin, or do they simply deal with two different phenomena?

         Rabbi Zalman Yaakov Friederman, in his "Shoshanat Yaakov" (Boston, 1927), suggests that these two passages deal with two different groups of people – children and adults.  The first passage, from the Midrash Rabba, describes the process of how children grow accustom to sin: they see and then desire.  They become attracted by what they see around them and then decide in their heart that this is what they want.  Adults, however, who have already experienced sin, temptation and the like, begin the process in their hearts.  Their inclination to sin does not begin with what they see around them; it has already been implanted within them from earlier experiences.  For them, sin originates in the heart.

         As Rabbi Friederman notes, Chazal emphasize that a child should begin wearing tzitzit at as young an age as possible (Yalkut Shimoni, Parashat Shelach). The Torah here addresses itself to both audiences.  For the children, the mitzva of tzitzit is meant to direct them initially along the path of proper conduct, to draw their attention to Torah and mitzvot rather than to the lures they would otherwise see around them.  For the adults, tzitzit serves as a reminder that regardless of what we have experienced in the past, we must focus our attention to whatever extent possible on the fulfillment of God's commands, rather than on the fulfillment of our instinctive drives and yearnings.

THURSDAY

         After the scouts' return from their excursion in Eretz Canaan and their negative report about the land, God angrily turns to Moshe and Aharon, and exclaims, "How much longer shall that wicked community keep muttering against Me!?" (14:27).  The Gemara (Megila 23b) interprets this exclamation as referring not to all of Benei Yisrael, but rather specifically to the ten spies who spoke negatively about the land.  From here the Gemara deduces that the term "eida" ("community," or "congregation") in the Chumash denotes a group of ten.  The halakhic ramification of this conclusion is the famous halakha of a "minyan" (literally, "counting"), requiring ten men for any "davar she-bikdusha," meaning, special prayers such as the repetition of the shemoneh esrei, borkhu, kaddish, kedusha and Torah reading.  Since, as the Gemara explains (we will not go into the intricate details), the concept of sanctifying God is associated in the Chumash with the term "eida," this can occur only in the presence of ten men.

         May non-observant Jews count towards a minyan for the recitation of a "davar she-bikdusha"?

         The Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 55:11) explicitly rules that sinners may count towards a minyan.  The source for this halakha is the Sefer Ha-manhig, as cited in the Bet Yosef, and the Hagahot Maimoniyot (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 6) in the name of the Rokei'ach. There is some discussion, however, as to the scope of this ruling.  The Peri Megadim (Eishel Avraham) qualifies this halakha to refer only to an "avaryan le-tei'avon," one who sins out of uncontrollable drives.  One who sins with the specific intent of rejecting the Torah, by contrast, may not count towards a minyan.  As the Kaf Ha-chayim notes, however, the Peri Megadim's view is not universally accepted; he cites earlier authorities who maintain that all sinners, regardless of motive, may be counted towards a minyan. 

         Another qualification on the Shulchan Arukh's ruling is imposed by the Netziv, in his "Meishiv Davar" (1:9).  In a strongly worded letter, the Netziv forbids the inclusion of Shabbat violators in counting towards a minyan.  He claims that just as during the times of the Temple the kohanim were instructed not to accept sacrifices from public Shabbat violators, so may we not count them towards a minyan.

         While agreeing with the Netziv's position in principle, Rav David Tzvi Hoffman, in his "Melamed Le-ho'il" (1:29), allows in practice counting public Shabbat violators towards a minyan.  He draws a distinction between public Shabbat violators in his time (he lived from 1843-1921) and those whose inclusion towards a minyan is forbidden by halakha.  He bases his distinction on three factors.  First, he cites from a teshuva of Rav Yehuda Asad that even someone known to violate Shabbat publicly is not given the formal, halakhic status of a "mechalel Shabbat be-farhesya" until formal testimony to his Shabbat violation is rendered before a rabbinical court.  Secondly, Rav Hoffman, citing earlier sources, invokes the famous ruling of "tinok she-nishba," that those who violate the Torah because of their non-observant upbringing are not halakhically considered sinners. Therefore, those who grew up in non-observant homes do not attain the formal status of Shabbat violators and may be counted towards a minyan.  Finally, Rav Hoffman claims that even if we do consider such people "violators," we perhaps cannot consider them "public violators."  Rav Hoffman boldly argues that when Chazal spoke of a public Shabbat violator, they referred specifically to the gall and audacity to oppose the majority and undermine the widespread belief in and practice of the Torah.  Nowadays, however, when, to our unspeakable misfortune, Shabbat observers have become the minority among the Jewish people, Shabbat violators cannot attain the status of "public" violators, since Shabbat desecration no longer carries with it the element of brazenness and "chutzpa."  Nevertheless, Rav Hoffman does recommend that if one can avoid, in a non-provocative manner, participating in a minyan that must include non-observant Jews towards its minimum quorum of ten, he should do so.

         A drastically different approach to this entire issue is taken by Rav Moshe Feinstein zt"l, in his Iggerot Moshe (O.C. 1:23; O.C. 2:19; O.C. 3:14), where he rules categorically that any sinner, regardless of the nature or motive of the sin, may be counted towards a minyan.  Interestingly enough, he cites proof from the meraglim themselves, which, as discussed earlier, provide the source of the halakhic requirement of a minyan. Rav Moshe cites from Midrashic sources that the scouts did not believe in God's power to defeat the Canaanite nations, rendering them actual heretics and nonbelievers (see Rashi, 13:31).  And yet, they nevertheless qualified as an "eida," which halakha requires for the recitation of a "davar she-bikdusha."  Rav Moshe proves from here that even public Shabbat violators and the like count towards a minyan.

         Yet another view is cited in the name of Rav Yosef Rosen, the famous Gaon of Rogotchov (who served as a rabbi in the city of Dvinsk), who distinguished between the musaf service and other prayers.  In essence, sinners of any kind may be counted towards a minyan.  Musaf, however, serves only as a commemoration of the musaf sacrifice in the Temple, as opposed to the other prayer services which, though also commemorate the sacrifices, possess an additional quality of "rachami" – an appeal to God for compassion.  Since, as mentioned earlier, kohanim would not accept korbanot from public Shabbat violators, we cannot rely on them for a minyan in commemorating the musaf offering.  As Rav Moshe Feinstein notes, however, later sources disagree with this ruling.  The halakha forbidding the acceptance of offerings from Shabbat violators relates only to personal, individual sacrifices. But the public, national sacrifices, such as the korban musaf, which were brought on behalf of the entire nation in the Bet Ha-mikdash, were offered on behalf of everyone, including Shabbat violators.  We have no reason, then, not to include Shabbat violators towards a minyan for purposes of the musaf prayer service.

FRIDAY

         As part of their response to the report of the scouts, Benei Yisrael conclude that they should return to Egypt: "Why is the Lord taking us to that land to fall by the sword?  Our wives and children will be carried off!  It would be better for us to go back to Egypt.  They said one to another: Let us appoint a leader and return to Egypt!" (14:3-4).  A careful look at these two verses reveals that the people appear to raise this proposal, of the nation's return to Egypt, twice.  First, they exclaim, "It would be better for us to go back to Egypt!"  Then, "They said one to another: Let us appoint a leader and return to Egypt!" Wherein lies the difference between these two proclamations?

         One might suggest, quite simply, that the first verse, which concludes the nation's protest to Moshe and Aharon upon hearing the scouts' report, was spoken by the leadership.  Clearly, not each of the some two million Israelites personally brought this challenge to Moshe and Aharon; presumably, it was their officials, the representatives of the people, who protested the plan to enter Eretz Yisrael.  Upon hearing this idea of the public officials, "They said one to another" – the masses accepted the new plan.  Word quickly spread throughout the people that a plan is underway to return to Egypt.

         The Netziv, however, explains much differently, claiming that these two verses represent the voices of two entirely different factions among Benei Yisrael.  The first, which expressed the view of the mainstream, did not fundamentally reject the notion of Eretz Yisrael as the destined land for Benei Yisrael.  Nor did they question God's ability to oust the Canaanite nations.  When Chazal claim, as we briefly mentioned yesterday, that the scouts considered God weaker than the mighty powers of Canaan, they did not intend to attribute such a belief to the entire people – or even to all the scouts.  Rather, there was a minority voice among the scouts and the nation that held such a heretical belief.  But the mainstream felt that the current generation was not worthy of entering the land; God can and will, they believed, lead Benei Yisrael to victory over the Canaanite armies, only not in this generation, which consisted of people who worshipped idols in Egypt and the golden calf at Sinai.  They wished to return to Egypt rather than perish at the sword in battle against the Canaanites.

         The second group, by contrast, expressed their desire to return to Egypt for a different reason: "Let us appoint a leader and return to Egypt." This group correctly realized that they can enter and survive in Canaan only if they accept upon themselves the yoke of mitzvot and conduct their lives accordingly.  They were unwilling to make such a commitment.  They preferred to end the whole "deal," so-to-speak, to give up their right to the land in order to free themselves from the shackles of Torah and mitzvot.  They sought to appoint a new leader who would lead them back to Egypt with an entirely new set of rules, one which allow them more freedom than did the rigorous demands of the Torah.

         This second group, which, the Netziv claims, represented the minority among the people (and therefore the Torah describes this group as "saying one to another"), signified a far graver breach than did the first.  It was an attempt to terminate the unique bond and relationship between God and Benei Yisrael, a total reversal of the process that Benei Yisrael had undergone since they left Egypt.

         Two verses later, the Torah tells that Yehoshua and Kalev, the two spies who opposed the negative report of the other ten, rent their garments.  The Netziv explains this as a response to the blasphemy they had just heard, the desire expressed by this minority group to abandon Eretz Yisrael and the Torah.  Then, "They said to the entire congregation of Benei Yisrael, saying: The land… is a very good land" (14:7).  The Netziv points out that Yehoshua and Kalev turn their attention not to the minority group, but rather to the "entire congregation of Benei Yisrael," the mainstream, in an attempt to persuade them to continue onward into the land.  They correctly realized that there was no use in responding to the minority group.  Not every battle has a chance of victory; firm, resolute heretics of this type cannot be engaged in constructive discourse and dialogue.  Yehoshua and Kalev therefore simply ignored this minority group, and focused their efforts instead on the majority, attempting to convince them that even the current generation can wage a successful campaign against the armies of Canaan.

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