SALT | Korach 5785

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Dedicated in memory of Elisa bat Tsirelé z”l
whose yahrtzeit is 1 Tammuz
By Family Rueff
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MOTZAEI

Moshe responds to the challenge posed to his authority by Korach and his followers with total helplessness: "Moshe listened and fell on his face" (16:4). Although he later regains his composure and, as we know, wins a decisive victory, if you will, against his opponents, his initial reaction requires some explanation. Rashi points to the cumulative effect of the nation's misdeeds as the source of Moshe's despair. He already interceded on their behalf after the incidents of the golden calf, the "mitonenim" (when Benei Yisrael complained), and the scouts. Now, at the fourth such rebellion against God, he experiences a sense of helplessness.

It has been suggested, however, that the particular nature of Korach's rebellion prompted this response, beyond the cumulative effect. Rav Moshe Feinstein zt"l points to the issue of rabbinic authority as the key factor in Moshe Rabbeinu's loss of hope. As harmful as any wrongdoing is on the nation's character, it seldom overcomes the entire nation. The loyal adherents generally retain their fidelity even in the face of widespread corruption. Although Rav Moshe himself does not elaborate in this regard, we may humbly add (and Rav Moshe himself likely intended) that this phenomenon clearly manifested itself in the three sins spoken of by Rashi. The tribe of Levi withdrew from the service of the golden calf. In response to the "mitonenim," God punished only "the fringe of the nation" (Bemidbar 11:1), suggesting that the complaints never spread too far. Finally, Kalev and Yehoshua courageously led the resistance to the scouts' conclusion that Benei Yisrael could not conquer Eretz Yisrael. In all three instances, at least one significant sector of the population remained loyal to God.

Korach, however, introduced a new type of rebellion: he rejected Moshe's authority. Moshe correctly saw Korach's argument that "the entire nation - they are all holy" as the opening of a Pandora's box that threatened to lead the entire nation to heresy. Once each individual receives equal standing as a religious authority, Torah is finished. Every person will reach his own conclusion in line with his own, personal feelings and temperament. The breakdown of Torah authority effectively translates into the breakdown of tradition and the end of the process that began at Sinai. Faced with such a prospect, Moshe understandably loses hope.

Indeed, Korach succeeds in garnering the support of the entire nation, which assembles by the mishkan for the "showdown" between Korach's supporters and Aharon (16:19). As Moshe feared, God threatens to destroy the rebellious nation. Moshe, despite his initial concerns, manages - together with Aharon - to intervene on their behalf: "Shall one person sin - and He will be angry with the entire nation?!" Moshe and Aharon argue that despite the nationwide involvement in the rebellion, Korach himself stood at the root of the uprising. It was he who shattered the sense of authority that had kept the people bound to the Torah as transmitted by Moshe. God accepts their prayer and destroys only the instigators, sparing the rest of the nation.

While some room for personal initiative certainly exists within the bounds of Torah, those bounds must be respected. Karaism rejected the exegetical authority of Chazal and upheld the right of the individual to interpret Scripture as he sees fit and reach practical conclusions on that basis. Quite naturally, the once flourishing sect all but disappeared. Torah cannot continue if it remains without an authoritative body that determines its application. For us, this authoritative body is none other than Chazal and their successors, the Torah scholars of every generation.

SUNDAY

Towards the end of Parashat Korach, the Torah outlines the various "matenot kehuna," required gifts for the kohanim, the most familiar of which is probably "pidyon ha-ben" (18:15-16). The father of a first-born son must symbolically "redeem" the child upon his becoming one month old by paying five silver "shekalim" to a kohen. Debate and discussion concerning the precise amount required occurred already during the time of the Geonim. Today, common practice is to give the kohen a full 100 grams of pure silver, despite the fact that, strictly speaking, one fulfills his obligation by giving less - 95 grams according to Rav Chayim Na'eh, 57 grams according to the Chazon Ish.

The halakha allows one to give the value of this quantity of silver, as well (Shulchan Arukh, Y.D. 305:3). At first glance, then, one could simply give the kohen the amount of money that could purchase 100 grams of silver and thus fulfill his obligation. However, the mishna in Masekhet Bekhorot (51a) disqualifies the use of "shetarot," contracts testifying to monetary obligations, for a pidyon ha-ben. The Gemara explains that this mitzva requires the use of something "that is itself money," meaning, that possesses inherent, monetary value. Legal documents possess only representative, rather than inherent, value. The question thus arises concerning the use of the currency issued by the State Treasury. In these systems, otherwise cheap materials such as paper (in the case of bills) receive significant, monetary value by the government. Thus, do we consider dollar bills, for example, as bearing inherent, monetary worth, given the direct value afforded them by the government, or, since they are but pieces of paper, is their value only representative by nature?

The Chatam Sofer (Y.D. 134) addressed this issue and determined that "money" from the Torah's perspective means anything "that the king decreed upon it that it should be recognized… It makes no difference if it is gold, silver or paper." In a similar vein, the Chazon Ish (Y.D. 72) defines "money" as "anything with which the people of the country agreed to sell, purchase and assess the entire market… " Thus, government-issued currency has the status of money, rather than a legal contract of obligation. Accordingly, it would seem, one may perform a pidyon ha-ben with standard currency.

However, the Chatam Sofer raises another consideration that potentially renders his definition of "money" irrelevant in the context of pidyon ha-ben. This definition becomes important when dealing with halakhot governing interpersonal, monetary transactions. The institution of pidyon ha-ben, however, requires an "exchange" of sorts between the father and the Almighty Himself. True, the mitzva requires giving the money to a kohen. Essentially, though, the father "redeems" his son from God, who stipulated a "price" of five silver "shekalim" and for whom the treasury's mintage of currency bears no significance. Therefore, suggests the Chatam Sofer, these pieces of paper we call "bills" would perhaps not fulfill the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben. He remains undecided as for a bottom-line ruling (though the Pitchei Teshuva understood him as ruling stringently).

Many poskim, including Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Ha-pardes, Shevat 5720) and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo 71:23), rule that one should not use government currency for pidyon ha-ben, and common practice has adopted this ruling. If, however, the father did use government currency, he need not perform the ritual again (Arukh Ha-shulchan, Y.D. 305:18). It should be noted that even those authorities who allowed using state money for pidyon ha-ben would not allow using currency of a country other than where the pidyon takes place. This applies even if the other country's currency has buying power in the given country (Otzar Pidyon Ha-ben, 14:10).

MONDAY

Today we will further discuss the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben, which the Torah in Parashat Korach includes as one of the gifts given to the kohanim (18:15-16).

A general dispute exists regarding the issue of "mitzvot tzerikhot kavana," whether or not one fulfills an obligation if he performs the act without intention. Generally, we assume that intention is necessary and indispensable for the fulfillment of Biblical commandments, whereas one fulfills rabbinically-ordained mitzvot even without proper intent. Thus, a father who performs a pidyon ha-ben, a mitzva from the Torah, must have in mind that he does so to fulfill the Biblical obligation. It may happen, however, that amidst the excitement, crowd, tumult, and crying baby, the father may go through the motions without the necessary concentration. We may compare this case to a more common occurrence: our daily fulfillment of the Biblical obligation of keri'at shema. We often fail to concentrate properly before reciting shema; have we fulfilled our obligation? The Chayei Adam, as cited by the Mishna Berura, writes that one has fulfilled his requirement in this situation, since he did not "just happen" to recite shema. He specifically came to the Beit Kenesset and followed his siddur in order to fulfill his obligation. The same principle can be applied to the overly excited father; since the entire ritual was conducted for the purpose of the mitzva, he clearly fulfilled his obligation even without specific intent (Otzar Pidyon Ha-ben, 18, note 25).

The Peri Megadim, however, adds a further level of concentration required for this mitzva. Twice in his work on the Tur Orach Chayim (8; 625), the Bach rules that when the Torah explicitly states the reason behind a given mitzva, it did so to require one to have that reason in mind when performing the mitzva. For example, when eating in the sukka one must concentrate on the mitzva's purpose of reminding us of the "sukkot" in which we dwelt in the wilderness (see Vayikra 23:43). As the Peri Megadim observes, the Torah specifically explains the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben as commemorating the smiting of the firstborn in Egypt (Shemot 11:13-16). Accordingly, the father performing a pidyon ha-ben must have this in mind.

An earlier source, however, clearly indicates otherwise. The Rosh (Shut Ha-Rosh, 24:2) writes that God instituted many mitzvot to commemorate the Exodus, including pidyon ha-ben, but one need not specifically have this function in mind while performing the mitzva. Rather, the Torah intends for the performance of the mitzva to naturally trigger the recollection of yetzi'at Mitzrayim. In a similar vein, Rav Shmuel Wosner (Shut Sheivet Ha-levi 6:169) notes that the Torah does not directly present the smiting of the firstborn as the reason for pidyon ha-ben. It does so only in the form of a response to the anticipated question by one's children regarding this mitzva. One therefore cannot compare pidyon ha-ben to other mitzvot, such as sukka (as we saw), tzitzit (Bemidbar 15:40) and tefillin (Shemot 13:9), regarding which the Torah directly presents the underlying reasons.

TUESDAY

The Midrash Tanchuma on Parashat Korach seeks to identify the source of Korach's error, of initiating a mutiny against the authority of Moshe and Aharon: "Korach, who was intelligent - what brought him to this absurdity? His vision misled him. He saw a great dynasty standing before him.. He said, 'Could it be that this greatness will arise from me [i.e. my progeny] and I will be destroyed?' He did not see properly - for his children would ultimately repent."

Korach was not only a gifted politician and leader, he was a man of keen insight; what more, he had, according to this Midrash, no less than actual, prophetic powers! He saw that his family will give rise to the great leader Shemuel, and hence assumed for himself "political immunity." He reasoned that this future greatness must evolve from his own inherent, leadership qualities and destiny, and hence sought to usurp Moshe's authority. Of course, Korach was mistaken; he begot Shemuel only in the merit of his children, who rejected his approach and underwent a process of genuine teshuva.

This Midrash brings to mind the celebrated prophecy of Yirmiyahu that concludes the haftara read on Tisha B'Av:

"Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom; let not the strong man glory in his strength; let not the rich man glory in his riches. But only in this should one glory: In his earnest devotion to Me, for I, God, act with kindness, justice and equity in the world; for in these I delight, declares God" (Yirmiyahu 9:22-23).

God grants everyone certain gifts, generally related to the three areas spoken of by Yirmiyahu: intellect, material means, and physical strength. These gifts themselves, however, by no means guarantee one success as far as the Almighty is concerned. In fact, one who overly prides himself over these talents or accomplishments runs the risk of being destroyed by them, as was Korach. Strength requires responsibility in order to yield productive results; raw talent in and of itself guarantees nothing. Only through "earnest devotion" to God, a sincere effort to perform His will, does one capitalize on his God-given skills. Korach's prophetic vision not only fell short of bringing him glory, but it sent it him deep down beneath the ground.

We may learn another important lesson from this Misrash, as well. While different approaches exist as to Korach's precise plan, be it heretical in nature or purely selfish politics, this Midrash almost suggests that Korach sincerely believed that he had what offer to the nation that Moshe and Aharon did not. He may have felt that the establishment needed fresh new ideas, a different outlook, and entirely different approach, and he was the one to bring about the much-needed change. As the Midrash notes, Korach was no fool; for good reason he attracted such an impressive following. His mistake lay in his failure to recognize that not everyone can be leader, not even those who believe they have what to contribute. To some extent and at some level, virtually everyone has something special to offer in the capacity of leadership. But a nation cannot exist without respect for authority. God had to eliminate the rebellion through such supernatural means in order to leave no doubt whatsoever as to the governing power of Moshe and Aharon. True, others, like Korach, may have possessed unique qualities from which the nation could have benefited. However, rather than challenging Moshe's authority, these people were to instead find legitimate forums in which to put these talents to use within the framework of the accepted, governing body.

In all situations, no matter how much we feel we have to add, it is important that we know our place and avoid stepping on the toes of others.

WEDNESDAY

Yesterday, we looked at the Midrash Rabbi Tanchuma which referred to Korach as an intelligent man, whose own prophetic vision of illustrious descendants deluded him into thinking that he can (or perhaps should) challenge Moshe's authority. Today we will focus on the Midrash's choice of words to describe Korach's intelligence: "pikei'ach." The common term used for wisdom, of course, is "chakham." What could we learn from the Midrash's selection of "pikei'ach" as the appropriate adjective for Korach?

The Aderet Eliyahu, commenting on Devarim 16:19, posits that "chakham" refers to Torah scholarship whereas "pikei'ach" indicates general knowledge and acumen. According to this distinction, some have suggested, we may understand the Midrash's choice of words. It could not have possibly referred to Korach as a "chakham," as his actions clearly demonstrated an attitude antithetical to the teachings of the Torah. He possessed merely worldly know-how, earning him the title of "pikei'ach."

Rabbi Leib Pinter, contemporary author of the work, "Nachalat Tzvi," suggests a different distinction. When a "chakham" sees a situation with the potential of spiritually compromising results, he steers clear of the danger. The "pikei'ach," however, will "jump into the fire," so-to-speak, relying on his intelligence and wisdom to guarantee his ability to withstand whatever dangers and pressures await him. Very often, as in the case of Korach, the "pikei'ach" overestimates his inner strength and fails.

We may, perhaps, suggest a third possibility in light of Chazal's dictum in Masekhet Tamid (32a), "Who is a 'chakham'? He who can foresee events ('ha-ro'eh et ha-nolad')." Chazal understand "chakham" as referring to someone with keen foresight and intuition who can thus assess the results and effects of his words and deeds. At first glance, it would seem, Korach qualifies for this title as much as anyone. After all, as the Midrash relates, he had prophetic powers; he foresaw the great leadership of his descendant, Shemuel. Can there be any greater example of "foreseeing events?!" Should not Chazal have referred to Korach with the description, "chakham" particularly in this context, of his ability to foresee the future?

The answer, of course, is that Korach foresaw the future through the lenses of his desire for power. When Chazal spoke of the chakham as someone who can foresee events, they meant one who can assess circumstances with honest objectivity and thus arrive at the appropriate conclusions. He looks ahead without preconceived notions, but with a genuine interest in accuracy. Korach used his foresight to justify his pursuit of undeserved leadership; he looked to the future to draw ideological support for his rebellion that he had already decided to lead. He was not a chakham, but a pikei'ach - sharp, manipulative and sly.

Chazal present another definition of a chakham: "he who learns from all people" (Avot 4:1). The true chakham approaches everything with pure objectivity; he is thus open to learn and gain insight from everyone, regardless of background or stature. Such a description clearly has little to do with Korach, who reached his conclusions with only his selfish interests in mind, paying little attention to truth and integrity. From Korach we learn what a "chakham" is not: someone who uses his God-given intelligence to further his personal goals and interests.

THURSDAY

One of the "matenot kehuna," the gifts that Benei Yisrael must give the kohanim, is "teruma," a small portion of the farmer's annual produce. In Parashat Korach, the Torah describes "teruma" with the expression, "mishmeret terumotai," literally, "the charge of My gifts" (Bemidbar 18:8). This term has been understood as introducing the prohibition against bringing about "tum'a" (ritual impurity) on a morsel of teruma, a status which renders the teruma halakhically inedible. (Teruma that becomes "tamei" must be burned.) Kohanim and Benei Yisrael alike are "charged" with the responsibility of preserving the purity of teruma, and must therefore avoid contact with it that will render it "tamei" (see Rashi, Sukka 35b).

The Avnei Milu'im (teshuvot, 18) extends this prohibition to include something called "bittul issur le-chatekhila." Generally speaking, if a small amount of forbidden food mixes with permissible food, then a ratio of 60 times permissible food to forbidden food will render the forbidden food halakhically null and void - a process known as "bittul." Thus, one would be able to partake of the mixture. (Needless to say, this is quite an oversimplification.) However, halakha prohibits actively bringing about such a situation. Meaning, one may not intentionally take a morsel of forbidden food and mix it with permissible food in order to allow for its consumption. It is commonly understood (though not universally so) that this prohibition, known as "ein mevatlin issur le-chatekhila," was introduced by Chazal. As far as Torah law is concerned, one may actively initiate the process of "bittul."

However, when it comes to teruma, claims the Avnei Milu'im, even Torah law would prohibit "bittul issur le'chatekhila." Given the halakha of "mishmeret terumotai," that one may not bring about ritual impurity on teruma, one may likewise not cause it to halakhically "disappear," or have its status of teruma removed. Thus, even Torah law would prohibit one from intentionally mixing teruma with the necessary ratio of regular food (unlike other mixtures, teruma requires a 200:1 ratio for "bittul" to occur) and hence actively strip the morsel of teruma of its sacred status as such.

The Steipler Gaon (in Birkat Peretz, Parashat Korach) disagrees. He argues that the Torah's prohibition regarding teruma applies only to causing the teruma to become "tamei"; it does not prohibit activating the "bittul" process. The Gaon explains that the Torah forbids taking something of inherent sanctity and defiling it by rendering it "tamei," by subjecting it to ritual impurity. "Bittul," however, does not involve the defilement of something sacred. One who actively mixes a small portion of teruma with a much larger quantity of regular food merely brings about a situation where the teruma will naturally lose it sacred status. It simply turns into ordinary food. Since no defiling of sacred food has taken place, the halakha of "mishmeret terumotai" does not apply.

FRIDAY

Facing the challenge posed by Korach and his cohorts, Moshe "pleads his case," as it were, to the Almighty. He claims to have led the nation honestly and selflessly, to the point that he never even took anyone's' donkey for his own use (16:15). As the Seforno explains, Moshe here argues that he has not abused his power in any way that could lend legitimacy to the current rebellion; it was triggered instead by sheer lack of appreciation for his efforts on the nation's behalf.

Rav Moshe Feinstein zt"l, in his eulogy for one of the great Torah figures of the mid-20^th century, Rav Yechezkel Abramsky zt"l, asks why, in fact, Moshe never taxed the people's animals. After all, Chazal in several places afford Moshe Rabbeinu the legal, halakhic status of a king (based on Devarim 33:5 - "Vayehi bi-Yeshurun melekh"), who has the power to tax his subjects as he wishes. Why did Moshe never exercise this right?

Rav Moshe explains that although Moshe Rabbeinu earned the status of king, he reached that point in a much different manner than ordinary kings. He never went through any official, formal anointing process. In fact, no one ever formally appointed him monarch over Benei Yisrael. His authority stemmed not from his position, but by virtue of his Torah knowledge and ability to transmit it. Other kings must receive an official appointment. This position formally granted to the monarch affords him authority over their subjects, including the right to tax them. Moshe's authority, however, was a function of nothing other than his Torah; he therefore could not use this power to tax, since one may not turn Torah "into an ax to make use of." Since it is forbidden to utilize Torah for one's personal interests, Moshe could not use his leadership to collect funds from the people.

Rav Moshe went on to explain that "gedolei Yisrael" earn the respect of their followers even without assuming a formal, leadership position. The Torah personalities they become serve as the primary source of their leadership and authority.

Even for those of us who will not become "gedolei Yisrael," this analysis provides a critical lesson. We cannot assess ourselves or others based only on formal accomplishments, such as prestigious positions held, rewards received, or degrees earned. Moshe assumed the eternal title of "Rabbeinu" without ever having been officially appointed to any position of leadership. One's greatness is manifest first and foremost through his devotion to God and His Torah, rather than that which appears on his resume.

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