SALT | Behaalotekha 5785

MOTZAEI

In Parashat Beha'alotekha we are introduced to the "chatzotzerot," the silver trumpets blown by the kohanim at various times as mentioned in the parasha (10:1-10). Among the occasions requiring the blowing of the chatzotzerot are "the days of your joy and your festivals." To what does "the days of your joy" refer? Interestingly enough, the Sifrei understands this as a reference to Shabbat.

This interpretation raises the halakhic issue of an obligation of "simcha," joy, on Shabbat. Generally speaking, we associate this obligation with Yom Tov, specifically the three "regalim" (pilgrimage festivals). On Shabbat, however, halakha generally speaks in terms of two obligations instituted by the prophets, that of "kavod" (honor) and "oneg" (enjoyment). "Oneg," which requires the consumption of three meals on Shabbat (Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat), differs from "simcha," which is very much connected to the sacrifices offered on Yom Tov. The practical ramifications of this distinction will become clear as we examine some of the sources related to this issue.

Along the lines of the Sifrei, several sources indeed imply that a mitzva of "simcha" applies on Shabbat. The Yerushalmi in Masekhet Megila (1:4) forbids conducting a Purim feast on Shabbat (even when Purim falls on Shabbat). The Megila requires us to turn the days of Purim into "days of festivity and joy"; this requirement cannot apply when the day is already deemed a day of joy. Likewise, the Behag, in his listing of the 613 mitzvot, includes "simcha" and "oneg" on Shabbat as two mitzvot, implying that indeed the obligation of simcha applies on Shabbat. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha-manhig rules that we omit the solemn "tachanun" prayer on Fridays in anticipation of the onset of Shabbat, due to Shabbat's status as a day of "simcha."

Other authorities, however, deny the existence of such an obligation on Shabbat. This position is taken by the Maharil in a ruling related to the institution of "ta'anit chalom," a fast conducted after experiencing a frightening dream. If one has such a dream on the night of Shabbat or Yom Tov, may he fast on the following day? The Maharil rules that fasting is forbidden on Yom Tov, as the requirement of simcha does not allow self affliction. On Shabbat, however, when no such obligation applies (in the Maharil's view), one may fast after experiencing a bad dream. Similarly, Tosafot in Masekhet Moed Katan (23b) employ this distinction between Shabbat and Yom Tov to explain why only festivals cancel mourning, but not Shabbat. Since Shabbat does not require "simcha," it can only temporarily suspend, but not end, the given mourning period.

How do those holding this second view explain the aforementioned comment in the Sifrei, which interprets "the day of your joy" as a reference to Shabbat?

Rav Soloveitchik zt"l answers by arriving at an interesting "compromise" between these two views. Unlike Yom Tov, Shabbat does not, in and of itself, require "simcha." However, the "mussaf" offering brought on Shabbat does generate such an obligation. The verse cited above from Parashat Beha'alotekha states explicitly that the trumpets were to be blown on these occasions in conjunction with the sacrifices offered in the Midkash. In this respect, Shabbat indeed acquires the status of a "day of your joy," as the Sifrei comments. In all other respects, however, no such obligation applies on Shabbat. Rav Soloveitchik employed this principle to explain the text of Shabbat shemoneh esrei according to the version of "nusach ashkenaz." Unlike "nusach sefard," "nusach ashkenaz" does not include the sentence, "Yismechu be-malkhutekha" ("They shall rejoice in Your Kingship") in all the shemoneh esrei prayers on Shabbat; it does so only in the mussaf prayer. Rav Soloveitchik explained that since the concept of "simcha" relates to Shabbat only through the mussaf offering, it earns mention on Shabbat only in the mussaf prayer, which commemorates the sacrifice.

(Based on Rav Binyamin Tabory's column, "Ha-mitzva She-beparasha," in Shabbat Be-shabbato, Parashat Beha'alotekha 5760)

SUNDAY

Among the topics that arise in Parashat Beha'alotekha is that of the korban pesach. God has Moshe order the people to perform the ritual of the paschal offering "be-mo'ado," in its proper time. The Gemara (Pesachim 66a) derives from this verse the halakha that should Erev Pesach fall on Shabbat (as it did this past Pesach), we nevertheless bring the korban pesach, despite the Shabbat violations involved. A dispute exists, however, as to which activities generally forbidden on Shabbat may be performed on Shabbat Erev Pesach for the sake of the korban pesach. The majority view among the tanna'im, represented in the mishna (Pesachim 65b) by Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, maintains that only the actual offering of the sacrifice, including the various rituals entailed, overrides the Shabbat. The preparatory activities, known as "machshirei mitzva," such as carrying the sheep over distances forbidden on Shabbat to be offered in the Mikdash, are forbidden. Rabbi Eliezer, however, allows even these preparatory activities.

Rabbi Eliezer here follows consistently his general view permitting prerequisite activity on Shabbat for the sake of a mitzva. Most famously, he allows the performance of all activities on Shabbat necessary for a circumcision, including transporting the knife through a public domain. The conventional view permits only the actual circumcision itself. The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (131a) asks why Rabbi Eliezer would not allow tying one's tzitzit to his four-cornered garment or affixing a mezuza to his doorpost on Shabbat. After all, these activities, too, constitute necessary preparations for the fulfillment of mitzvot! The Gemara answers that Rabbi Eliezer does not permit these activities on Shabbat because one can easily put himself in a situation whereby he becomes exempt from these mitzvot. Namely, one can renounce his ownership over his garment or house; he then has no obligations of tzitzit or mezuza as far as the now ownerless garment or house is concerned.        

Since one can effectively excuse himself from these mitzvot, the preparatory activities do not override the prohibitions of Shabbat.

The Chatam Sofer (O.C. 124) was asked an interesting question regarding Rabbi Eliezer's view as it affects the korban pesach. Tosafot (Masekhet Pesachim 3b) posit a controversial theory that one who does not own land in Eretz Yisrael is exempt from the mitzva of korban pesach. (Some Acharonim strongly reject this notion.) According to this position, presumably, one who renounces ownership over his property before Pesach need not bring a korban pesach. Therefore, how can the needs of the korban pesach override the prohibitions of Shabbat? According to Rabbi Eliezer, as we have seen, if one can excuse himself from a given obligation by renouncing ownership, then that obligation cannot override Shabbat!

The Chatam Sofer answers based on another position taken by Rabbi Eliezer, in the mishna in Masekhet Arakhin (28a). There Rabbi Eliezer establishes that one cannot donate all his assets to "hekdesh" (the Temple fund), a halakha that the Gemara there explicitly applies to charity, as well. If one declares that all his property should go to "hekdesh" or charity, his words are null and void. The Chatam Sofer extends Rabbi Eliezer's view to "hefker," the renunciation of ownership, as well. One cannot renounce ownership over all his assets; he must leave some for himself. Therefore, one cannot renounce ownership over all his land. As such, there is no way for one to exempt himself from the obligation of korban pesach, and its prerequisite activities thus override the prohibitions of Shabbat.

MONDAY

The commentators devote much time and ink to the issue of the relationship between the end of Parashat Naso and the beginning of Parashat Beha'alotekha. Parashat Naso concluded with the dedication offering of the tribal leaders in honor of the mishkan's inauguration, while the final verse describes God's "speaking" to Moshe from above the aron in the mishkan. Parashat Beha'alotekha begins with the mitzva of lighting the menora in the mishkan.

The Ibn Ezra suggests that the opening of Parashat Beha'alotekha continues the theme of God's communication with Moshe. The kohen would light the menora before sundown, and it remained lit through the night. Thus, suggests the Ibn Ezra, the mention of the menora here subtly indicates that the Almighty would speak to Moshe by night as well as by day.

The Ramban (after having rejected Rashi's approach) takes strong issue with the Ibn Ezra, noting Chazal's explicit comment that God spoke to Moshe only during the daytime hours. We might add a question of our own: why would the Torah choose the menora as the means by which to convey the message? Could it not have stated this fact more clearly?

The Netziv comes to the Ibn Ezra's defense and, in so doing, uncovers for us the beautiful symbolism reflected in his approach to this issue. The mishkan contained two symbols of Torah: the aron kodesh (which contained the two "luchot" and the Sefer Torah) and the menora ("For a mitzva is a candle, and Torah is light"). The former represents the written law, the "Torah she-bikhtav." The aron therefore remains hidden behind the curtain, beyond the reach of the human being, symbolizing its static quality and inability to be tampered by human initiative. The menora, by contrast, alludes to the oral law (referred to by the Netziv as "pipula shel Torah"), whose interpretation is entrusted to the human minds of the scholars. Just as the kohen himself lights the menora, so do the sages produce with their own initiative the light of the oral law, employing their reasoning and intuition to understand the laws of the Torah.

With this in mind, suggests the Netziv, we may explain the Ibn Ezra's commentary. True, as the Ramban noted, God in fact did not commune with Moshe at night. However, as the menora symbolizes, Moshe continued his indirect encounter with the Almighty by applying his own intellectual faculties in processing, assimilating and developing the Torah he heard directly from God. Even when God did not speak to him directly, Moshe maintained his ongoing communion at nighttime through his own initiative in studying the material transmitted to him by day. The indirect encounter thus continued well after the direct encounter came to an end.

TUESDAY

Towards the beginning of Parashat Beha'alotekha, the Torah describes the ceremony by which the levi'im were formally consecrated for service in the mishkan. God describes the selection process as follows: "From among Benei Yisrael I formally assign the levi'im to Aharon and his sons, to perform the service for Benei Yisrael in the Ohel Moed and to make expiation for Benei Yisrael, so that no plague may afflict Benei Yisrael when Benei Yisrael come too near the sanctuary" (8:19). Rashi notes the five-time repetition of "Benei Yisrael" in this verse, and explains it as an expression of love on the part of the Almighty. So much does He love them, Rashi writes, that He repeats their name five times over, the same number as books in the Torah.

How are we to understand this Midrash? Of what significance is it that God repeats the term "Benei Yisrael" the same number of times as the number of Chumashim, and why specifically in this verse?

The Kotzker Rebbe explains by taking a closer look at what is happening at this point in Benei Yisrael's history. Essentially, one group of people is being singled out for special status. What more, this status was to have been available to all firstborn among the nation. Now, only one, unique tribe earns rights to the sacred activity in the mishkan. Understandably, many among the people felt slighted if not outright frustrated. Therefore, smack in the middle of His presentation of this process, God makes a subtle allusion to an equation between Benei Yisrael and the five Chumashim. Although the Torah divides into five sections, it nevertheless constitutes one, single entity. There is one Torah, not five. Similarly, we may view Benei Yisrael as twelve separate tribes, but when all is said and done we all together form a single, indivisible nation. That the role of one group may seem more appealing than that of another may not and does not undermine this tenet of our faith. The nation is one, and no faction may consider itself inherently superior to any other.

Ironically, this very same principle prompted the disastrous rebellion led by Korach, as we will read in two weeks. Korach and his followers argued that "the entire nation - they are all sacred," and thus challenged the authority of Moshe and Aharon. The rebels failed to realize that equality does not negate the need for authority. Rather, it means that regardless of where one stands on the hierarchy, he ultimately possesses the same, inherent value as everyone else above and below. It means that both the leaders and their constituents share equal responsibility and must view themselves as equally important in the formation and functioning of society. Just as all five Chumashim are of equal sanctity, so does God expect all of us, the entirety of Am Yisrael, to aspire for kedusha.

WEDNESDAY

Parashat Beha'alotekha concludes with the surprising incident of Miriam's disrespectful speech about Moshe and subsequent punishment. God smites her with the skin disease tzara'at, forcing her to remain secluded for a full week. God justifies this sentence as follows: "If her father spat in her face, would she not bear her shame for seven days? Let her be shut out of the camp for seven days, and then let her be readmitted" (12:14).

From this verse, Chazal derive the well-known principle of "kal va-chomer." Meaning, a stringency that applies in a lenient context will certainly apply in a more stringent context, as logic dictates. Just as God employed this logic to condemn the prophetess to a week-long period of isolation, so do Chazal very often reach authoritative halakhic conclusions based on this line of reasoning. As we know, this concept is listed as one of Rabbi Yishmael's thirteen exegetical methods by which Chazal extrapolated halakhot from the text.

It seems strange, however, that such a logical process of legal deduction should require a Biblical source. More troubling, however, is that this principle has somewhat limited application in relation to the other twelve. First, the Gemara posits that "ein onshin min ha-din," Bet-Din cannot administer punishment to someone violating a law deduced from a "kal va-chomer." The deductive reasoning itself does not authorize the court to punish the violator. Secondly, the Gemara tells us that "milta de-atya mi-kal va-chomer tarach ve-katav la kera" - the text will often explicate a halakha even if it can be arrived at through the process of "kal va-chomer." Apparently, the Torah is not content, as it were, with the obvious deduction of the given halakha and feels the need to provide an explicit source. Why? Even if, for some reason, the Torah must grant Chazal the authority to apply this logic, which seems self evident in its own right, should it not at least earn the same power as any exegetical device employed by the Sages?

The Kehilat Yitzchak suggests that all this is perhaps meant to humble the student or scholar before he comes to analyze and apply the Torah. Even what appears to be the most simple, basic, logical device requires authorization from the Torah itself, and even then the extent of its application falls short of that of the other, far less obvious, devices. Whatever the human mind conjures up does not necessarily accommodate the divine wisdom of the Torah. Undoubtedly, human logic plays a critical role in the development of Torah she-be'al peh, as we discussed earlier this week. However, the Torah sets limits on the authority of human reasoning in the halakhic process. The Torah student must therefore combine clear, rational thinking with a thorough knowledge of the rules and principles governing the field of talmud Torah and "pesak halakha."

THURSDAY

Parashat Beha'alotekha contains a mitzva painfully relevant to Am Yisrael's current situation: "When you are at war in your land against an aggressor who attacks you, you shall sound blasts on the trumpets, that you may be remembered before the Lord your God and be delivered from your enemies." The Rambam considers this one of the 613 commandments of the Torah: "It is a mitzvat asei from the Torah to cry and blow [the trumpets] over any crisis that comes upon the community, as it says, 'against an aggressor who attacks you - you shall sound blasts on the trumpets.' Meaning, over anything that poses trouble for you, such as famine, plague, locusts and the like, you must cry out and sound [the trumpets]" ((Hilkhot Ta'aniyot 1:1). The Rambam understands the word "tzar" in this verse, which we translated as "aggressor," as related to the word "tzara," a more generic term for trouble or crisis. Thus, the mitzva of turning to God during wartime extends to all crises that confront Am Yisrael. The Rambam proceeds to explain that this mitzva is meant to generate an awareness that trouble surfaces as a call to teshuva.

Two halakhot later, the Rambam points to the punishment for non-compliance with this obligation: "But if they don't cry and don't sound [the trumpets], but they instead say that this occurred as part of the natural order and this crisis was coincidental, this constitutes cruelty and causes them to continue their sinful deeds; this trouble will then add other troubles."

Rav Velvel Soloveitchik (Chiddushei Ha-Griz al Ha-Torah, parashat Bo) explains more fully the system to which the Rambam refers. The crisis that surfaced to begin with came as a divine call for introspection and repentance. If Benei Yisrael do not respond accordingly, this crisis will continue. Moreover, their failure to perform teshuva in response to the situation itself constitutes a grave transgression, reflecting a fundamentally flawed perspective on world events. This sin thus in its own right will trigger further troubles. Once again, if the nation fails to react to the divine signal, more calamity will strike, and the cycle will continue, Heaven forbid.

Today, we are not entitled to point to one transgression or another as singly responsible for the terrible bloodshed, death, economic decline and drought that threatens the Jews of Eretz Yisrael. But among the tenets of our faith is the signaling process that the Rambam describes. The commentaries we hear from political analysts and the like cannot possibly undermine God's ultimate "responsibility" for current events or His exclusive ability to change them. We must acknowledge this and respond accordingly. Each of us must look into himself and find the holes that need to be patched, the flaws that need to be corrected, and the work that needs to be done. With our combined efforts of "Torah, avoda & gemilut chasadim," we hope to soon "be remembered" before the Almighty, and that He will redeem His nation from the current crisis.

FRIDAY

Yesterday, we discussed the obligation of blowing the trumpets ("chatzotzerot") during wartime, a mitzva the Rambam extends to include beseeching the Almighty in prayer during all times of crisis, Heaven forbid.

The verse mentioned yesterday begins, "When you are at war in your land against an aggressor… " In then promises that "you will be… delivered from your enemies." It is interesting to note the shift in terminology from the beginning of the verse to the end. When war first breaks out, the enemy is described as "ha-tzar," which we translated (based on the Jewish Publication Society) as "an aggressor." In the promise of victory, however, the Torah uses the term, "oiveikhem," or "your enemies." Two discrepancies perhaps require explanation: not only does the Torah refer to the foe with two different words, but it also shifts from singular and plural tense.

We may explain this verse in light of the distinction drawn by the Abarbanel (in Parashat Mishpatim) between the two terms, "tzar" and "oyeiv." The former denotes an enemy launching a frontal attack, without any attempt at deception. "Oyeiv," by contrast, refers to a more subtle enemy, the type who inflicts harm by deceptively earning the trust of others. Thus, our verse speaks of Benei Yisrael turning to the Almighty when confronted by clear and present danger, by a "tzar." God promises that should they respond accordingly, with prayer and repentance, then He will deliver them not only from the current enemy, but from the "oivim," from all unknown foes, as well.

We may perhaps better understand this notion based on the Rambam's comments cited yesterday. The Rambam views this mitzva as a litmus test of Benei Yisrael's general perspective on world events. Do we see adversity as pure happenstance, or as a divine call to teshuva? Do we dismiss difficult times as "part of life," or do we react with sincere prayer and introspection? Hard times are meant to remind us of God's unlimited control and dominion over all that transpires on earth, concealed as this power may be by the natural order. The verse promises that if we respond properly to crisis, by acknowledging the Almighty as the ultimate power and force behind all that transpires, then He will save us from all dangers, both known and unknown to us. When we recognize that God holds the key to unlock all doors, even those locks of which we are unaware open before us. 

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