The Laws of Shechita of a Kuti

The Gemara in Chullin (3a) discusses the shechita of a kuti. The kutim were a group of people who were resettled in the northern part of Eretz Yisrael after the Assyrian conquest under Sancherib. They converted to Judaism, but it is unclear whether their conversion was sincere or out of fear because lions began attacking them, and they saw conversion to Judaism as a way to protect themselves. Several Gemaras debate whether the kutim were geirei arayot —converts due to the lions, meaning they weren't authentic converts—or geirei emet —real, authentic converts.

Of course, according to the position that they were inauthentic geirei arayot, their shechita is disqualified just like the shechita of any non-Jew , based on the Mishna in Chullin 13a.

However, according to the position that they were geirei emet, their shechita could, in theory, be validated. Despite their adherence to the Torah, they had no compunctions about the prohibition of lifnei iver—enabling others to commit an aveira. Interestingly, while they were personally committed to halakha, they lacked a sense of collective responsibility. Therefore, even though their shechita may be formally valid, they cannot be trusted to report whether it was performed correctly. Unlike a regular Jewish shochet, whom we trust to inform us if the shechita was improperly executed, the kuti might not, due to their indifference about us consuming neveila. Consequently, to rely on their shechita, a degree of supervision is necessary to ensure that no technical errors occurred.

The Gemara in Chullin 4a cites the position of Abaye that a Jew has to be standing nearby the shochet, watching the act of shechita to assure that it was performed correctly (omed al gabav). Rava disagrees, claiming that this level of supervision is unnecessary; rather, it is sufficient for a Jew to occasionally step in and observe the shechita room, just so that the kuti knows that he could potentially be seen and checked at any moment. This will motivate him to either perform their proper shechita or inform us of any malfunctions

Though this debate may seem technical, whether constant supervision or occasional observation is required, Rabbi Soloveitchik believed that it represented something much larger and more central to the laws of shechita. Logically, Abaye is correct: for a Jew to testify that the shechita was performed correctly, he must observe the entire shechita or omed al gabav. By minimizing the requirement of supervision and just requiring occasional checks, Rava is dramatically minimizing the level of proof necessary to confirm that a proper shechita was performed.

Rava’s scenario where someone performs shechita knowing that a Jew could catch him through a spot check provides no direct, concrete testimony about a proper shechita, but rather suggests a likelihood that the shechita was performed correctly, as the shochet is aware he could be caught at any time.

Effectively, Abaye and Rava are debating the level of proof necessary to certify the shechita. Abaye requires edut (testimony), therefore a Jew must watch the entire process so he can testify that it was performed properly. In contrast, Rava holds that a mere likelihood of proper shechita suffices, so occasional checks are enough. If a Jew is entering occasionally and we had no reports of malfunction it's likely the shechitah was performed properly.

By creating broader categories about Abaye and Rava's seemingly technical debate, we can associate this question with other parallel disputes. For example, what would happen if a katan who is an expert in shechita performs it and assures us that it was done correctly? The Tur in Yoreh De'ah 2 permits this, while the Rema (ibid 1:5) disagrees.

Perhaps this depends upon the level of certification necessary to validate a shechita. In Abaye's view, we require edut, and since a katan is not suited to be a witness, we cannot rely upon his shechita. However, in Rava's view, where only the likelihood of a proper shechita is necessary, a katan who is an expert in the laws and mechanics of shechita provides sufficient likelihood or umdena that the shechita was performed correctly.

The possibility that we would not require full edut to certify a proper shechita, but would suffice with likelihood and probability (i.e., umdena or the halakhic equivalent), appears in a fascinating Tosafot on Chullin 9a. The Gemara discusses situations of safek shechita, where it is unclear whether the shechita was performed in a technically correct manner. Rava claims that we apply chezkat issur and treat the item as if it is prohibited to eat. Yet according to one position in the Gemara, we do not treat the animal as a full-fledged neveila, in which case it would be forbidden to eat and also tamei, but only as meat that is forbidden to eat but remains tahor.

If we believe the shechita was performed properly, we should be allowed to eat the meat. If we don't believe the shechita was performed properly, then it should be both forbidden and tamei. How do we explain this partial status of neveila where the meat is forbidden, but we don't assume that it is tamei?

Tosafot s.v. Ve-asura provides a novel approach. In Tosafot’s opinion, any time there is a safek regarding shechita, we should apply the principle that most animals are slaughtered properly, , and we should be allowed to eat the meat. The prohibition of eating meat in cases of safek shechita is only mi’derabbanan. Since the entire foundation of the issur is derabbanan, the Sages were lenient, and we don't have to treat it as tamei —we just can't eat it. This implies that any safek shechita could be resolved by rov or umdena without requiring the level of testimony of eidut. This logic suggested by Tosafot in Chullin 10a is much more in line with Rava's position, allowing a Jew to walk in and out during a kuti's shechita, as opposed to Abaye's position, which required constant supervision throughout the entire act of shechita.

Further indication that verifying proper shechita does not require edut-level information stems from the fact that a mumar le-te’avon —someone who adheres to all of halakha but has an extreme craving for non-slaughtered meat—can fundamentally perform a shechita. The Gemara recognizes that he may end up being lazy and might not take care to secure a proper knife. However, if we provide him with the proper shechita knife, we can eat his shechita because he is still considered a Jew. Why is he believed to tell us that he executed the shechita properly? Is a mumar considered someone who is kasher for edut?

If we do not require edut to verify proper shechita, the fact that a mumar can help us verify shechita proves nothing about his status as an eid. If, however, we require edut-level information, and we fundamentally accept a mumar's shechita assuming we provided the knife, we must consider the mumar kasher for edut, at least in the realm of issur.

This question—whether we require edut-level information or merely umdena-level information to certify a proper shechita —is, of course, reflective of the status of the animal before the shechita. If, as the Rashba on Chullin 9a maintains, every animal prior to shechita has an inherent issur neveila, which remains unless shechita is properly performed, we are dealing with an object that is classified as itchazek issura. The meat has an issur before the safek emerges, and the consequence of the safek is either to retain that issur or to remove it. Situations of itchazek issura are not typically resolved by anything less than edut-level information.

By contrast, if there is no issur neveila surrounding the live animal, and neveila is merely an outcome of a failed shechita, we are essentially dealing with an item that did not have any label of neveila, and the question is whether a new label of neveila ever emerged. This question could more easily be resolved by umdena-level information.