Ch. 7 (3) | Stages in the Redaction of the Talmud

 

III. From Amoraic Statements to the Stama De-Gemara, as Understood by the Rishonim

The most significant editing operation, with an impact on matters of content, is evident in the additions and expansions introduced by the editors, which were generally formulated in Aramaic, in relation to the original statements of the Amoraim, which were generally formulated in Hebrew. The Rishonim comment in hundreds of places on the activity of the Gemara's editors, who are referred to with terms such as "the Gemara," "the Shas," and others. In particular, the Tosafists systematically commented on this phenomenon in dozens of places. I will highlight two types of such additions:

1. Adding a reason to an Amoraic law:

          The Tosafists note a contradiction between two Talmudic passages regarding how to understand an opinion of Rav Papa. In one place it is stated:

Rav Papa said: The law is [that] a verbal loan may be recovered from the heirs but may not be recovered from the buyers. It "may be recovered from the heirs" in order that doors might not be locked in the face of borrowers; "but may not be recovered from the buyers," because it is not [sufficiently] known. (Bava Batra 176a)

In the case of an oral loan, as opposed to that of a written loan, the debt can only be collected from the heirs (if the borrower dies) – not from property that the borrower had sold to another person. The Gemara explains that the reason is that the Sages awarded the lender the right to collect from the heirs, so that people not refrain from lending money out of concern that they will not be able to recover it, but they did not grant that right in a case where the property was sold; the buyer was presumably unaware of the seller's debt, since an oral loan is not a matter of public knowledge, and there is no justification to impose a loss for him. 

On the other hand, elsewhere the Gemara states:

Rav Papa said: The law is that an oral loan may be recovered from the heirs, but may not be recovered from the buyers. It "may be recovered from the heirs" because [the property of a debtor] is subject to a lien by Torah law, "but may not be recovered from the buyers," because it is not [sufficiently] known. (Kiddushin 13a)

According to the Gemara there, collecting the debt from the heirs is based not on a Rabbinic ordinance, but on the fact that the whole concept of a lien on property is by Torah law, and therefore the collection of the debt is by Torah law, for the lien rests on the borrower's property from the time of the loan. However, the Sages enacted that the debt cannot be collected from a buyer, because an oral loan is not sufficiently known. In any event, the two passages present two opposing positions in understanding Rav Papa's position: in the case of an oral loan, is the right to collect a debt from the heirs only because of a Rabbinic enactment, or is it by Torah law?

The Tosafot offer a simple explanation for the contradiction:

It may be explained that Rav Papa only said: "An oral loan may be recovered from the heirs, but may not be recovered from the buyers." And the Gemara explains this – here according to the one who said: The property of a debtor is not subject to a lien by Torah law, and there according to the one who said: It is subject to a lien by Torah law. It is like: there are those who say what is [stated] here and what is [stated] there. (Tosafot, Bava Batra 176a)  

The Tosafot distinguish between Rav Papa's own words, which simply state the law itself, and the interpretation created by "the Gemara" in two different and contradictory places. The Gemara in Bava Batra interprets the words of Rav Papa according to the opinion that we are dealing here with a Rabbinic right to collect a debt from the heirs, whereas the Gemara in Kiddushin explains Rav Papa according to the opinion that the lien on the debtor's property is by Torah law.[1] It should be noted that Rav Papa's own words are in Hebrew, whereas the expansions are in Aramaic.

Elsewhere, the Tosafot note the same phenomenon with regard to additions to the wording of the Mishna. The Gemara in Megilla (10a) discusses the question of whether, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the first consecration of the Temple and of Jerusalem was “for that time and for the future,[2] or only lasted while the Temple stood. The Tosafot (ad loc., s.v. de-kuli) raise a difficulty: the answer to the Gemara’s question is explicit in Rabbi Eliezer’s words elsewhere, that the first consecration was not for the future:

For it was taught: Once Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit went to pay his respects to Rabbi Eliezer at Lod. The latter said to him: What new thing was taught in the beit midrash today? He said to him: They decided by vote that in Amon and Moav, poor man's tithe should be given in the seventh year…

What is the reason? Many cities were conquered by those who came up from Egypt, which were not conquered by those who came up from Babylon; since the first consecration held [only] for the time, but did not hold for the future [permanently], therefore they were left in order that the poor might rely upon them in the seventh year. (Chagiga 3b)

Why, then, is the Gemara in Megilla unsure of Rabbi Eliezer's position on the matter? The Tosafot explain:

Rabbeinu Tam answered that "What is the reason?" there – it is the Gemara that said that, and not the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Know that this is true, for in the Mishna in tractate Yadayim (4:3), where the words of Rabbi Eliezer are taught, that is not taught.

Rabbeinu Tam explains that the Gemara in Chagiga added to the words of Rabbi Eliezer, as an explanation of his position, even though he himself never said those words; therefore, there is still room to be in doubt about his actual view.

It should be noted that the Acharonim also sometimes followed this path. For example, the Gemara brings the words of Shmuel:

Shmuel ruled: If a woman examined the ground and sat on it and then found on it some blood, she remains pure, for it is stated: "In her flesh" (Vayikra 15:19) – implying that [she is not impure] unless she feels in her flesh. (Nidda 57b)

It would seem from the plain meaning of his words that according to Shmuel, a woman is not impure, even if she found blood, unless she felt the blood issuing from her. This is also implied by the words of Rav Yirmeya of Difti there: "Shmuel agrees that she is impure according to Rabbinic law." That is to say, even though a woman who did not feel that she was bleeding is pure by Torah law, she is impure by Rabbinic law. However, immediately afterwards, the Gemara (58a) brings a different opinion:

Rav Ashi said: Shmuel gave his ruling in accordance with the view of Rabbi Nechemya. For we have learned: Rabbi Nechemya said: Anything that is not susceptible to impurity is not susceptible to stains.

Rav Ashi seems to maintain that according to Shmuel, the reason the woman remains pure in this scenario is "not because of feeling" (Rashi, ad loc., s.v. Rav Ashi), but because he agrees with Rabbi Nechemya that the law of stains instituted by the Rabbis only applies to something susceptible to impurity, and since the ground is not susceptible to impurity, the stain on it does not render her impure even by Rabbinic law.

This explanation, however, is difficult, for Shmuel seems to offer an explicit rationale: "For it is stated: 'In her flesh' – implying that [she is not impure] unless she feels in her flesh." How can we say that according to Rav Ashi, Shmuel maintains that the reason is "not because of feeling"? Rabbi Yechezkel Landau[3] answers:

And the conclusion at the beginning of the passage, "[she is not impure] unless she feels in her flesh," is not the words of Shmuel, but rather the Gemara explains Shmuel's intention in that manner, in keeping with the view of Rav Yirmeya – but according to Rav Ashi, Shmuel's intention was different. (Noda bi-Yehuda, 1^st series, Yoreh De'a, no. 55)

          In his opinion, Shmuel merely stated the law itself, and it was the Gemara that added the explanation, since it agreed with Rav Yirmeya of Difti. Rav Ashi, however, explained the position of Shmuel according to its original formulation, which does not negate an understanding that is different from that of the stama de-Gemara,[4] the anonymous frame of the Gemara.

2. The addition of content to a law found in the original Amoraic statement:

The Gemara (Shabbat 10a) brings the law of Rav Ada that a person is permitted to pray inside a bathhouse, and interprets it as referring to a new bathhouse, which was designated for that purpose but was still unused. The Gemara then raises an objection:

But surely [this is just what] Ravina had asked: “What if a place is designated for a toilet; is designation recognized or not?” – and it was not solved. Does not the same [query of his] apply to a bathhouse? No; perhaps a toilet is different, because it is disgusting. (Shabbat 10a-b)

The Gemara initially argues that interpreting Rav Ada's law as referring to a new bathhouse, which was merely designated as a bathhouse but has not yet been used for that purpose, does not resolve the difficulty, for such a case is subject to Ravina’s unresolved question about whether a toilet that has not yet been used is treated like a toilet for all purposes, and as such one is forbidden to pray there. At this point, the Gemara assumes that if Ravina was in doubt about a toilet, the same uncertainty applies to a bathhouse. However, it then rejects this assumption, arguing that the uncertainty is only about a toilet, which is particularly offensive, while designating a structure as a bathhouse has no impact.

Now, the Tosafot note that it is clear from a passage in Nedarim that Ravina's uncertainty did apply equally to both a toilet and a bathhouse:

Ravina asked: What if a place is designated for a toilet? What if a place is designated for a bathhouse? Is designation effective or not? (Nedarim 7a)

The Tosafot offer several explanations for this contradiction; in their last answer, they write:

"What if a place is designated for a bathhouse" is not part of the words of Ravina, but rather it is the Shas that concludes that he does not wish to distinguish, and so we find in several places. (Tosafot, Shabbat 10b, s.v. shani)

According to this explanation, the Gemara in Nedarim added "what if a place is designated for a bathhouse" to Ravina's original words, based on the assumption that there is no room to distinguish between a toilet and a bathhouse. However, the Gemara in Shabbat disagreed, arguing that a distinction between the two cases can indeed be made. The words of the Gemara in Nedarim, then, are an example of the possibility of the Gemara adding content to an earlier Amoraic statement.

In another place, the Gemara brings a question posed to Rav Sheshet:

Rav Sheshet was asked: If a laborer was hired as a contractor, does [the employer] violate the prohibition of delaying wages, or does he not violate the prohibition of delaying wages?[5] Does the artisan obtain a title in return for the improvement [he effected] in the article, so that it [his wages] rank as a loan, or does he not, and hence it is considered wages?[6] Rav Sheshet said: He violates [the prohibition]. (Bava Metzia 112a)

The Gemara explains that the question as to whether the prohibition to delay payment of wages applies in the case of a contractor who is paid for the completed job, rather than by the hour, depends on the question of whether or not an artisan obtains title in return for the improvement he effects in the article. Since Rav Sheshet says that the employer does indeed violate the prohibition, he must maintain that the artisan does not obtain title in return for the improvement he effects in the article.

Now, the Gemara in Bava Kama (99a) brings the view of Rav Asi that an artisan does in fact obtain title in the article, and asks: "Shall we say that Rav Sheshet disagrees with Rav Asi?" but it answers: "Shmuel bar Acha said: [Rav Sheshet was speaking] of a messenger sent to deliver a letter"; that is to say, Rav Sheshet may actually agree that an artisan does obtain title in the article, and when he says the prohibition of delaying wages applies to a contractor, he refers to a special case of contracting, in which there is no improvement in the article – e.g., a messenger who delivers letters from place to place. This, however, seems to contradict the passage in Bava Metzia, which explicitly hangs the question of whether the prohibition to delay wages applies in the case of a contractor on the question of whether an artisan obtains title in the improvement that he effects in the article. The Tosafot resolve this difficulty:

It may be argued that they asked without specifying, and the Gemara explains his question in that manner, thinking that it was about this that they were in doubt. This is the manner of the Gemara above, at the beginning of the second chapter (19a),[7] and in several places.[8] (Tosafot, Bava Metzia 112a, s.v. bi-shelicha)

According to the Tosafot, Rav Sheshet was only asked in general about his position regarding the prohibition to delay payment of wages in the case of a contractor, whereas the details brought in Bava Metzia, according to which the question was whether an artisan obtains title in the improvement that he effects in the article, is not a citation of the original question, but rather the explanation of “the Gemara." This does not, however, negate the possibility of explaining the question differently, as in the Gemara in Bava Kama.

Based on these and other words of the Tosafot, Rabbi Betzalel Ashkenazi[9] writes:

Sometimes the Talmud inserts elements into the question that were not part of the question raised by the questioner.[10]

And Rabbi Yitzchak Canpanton writes similarly:[11]

Always, with every problem that comes up in the Gemara, look to understand the sides of the problem… And when the sides of the problem are clear, the questioner will not concern himself with explaining them, but when they are hidden, the questioner or the redactor of the Talmud will explain them. (Darkhei ha-Talmud, no.9)

The Rishonim in Spain also took note of this phenomenon. For example, with regard to a statement that Abaye cites in the name of Rav Asi:

Abaye said: Is this not what Rabbi Asi said? For Rabbi Asi said: If he [the debtor] admits the genuineness of a bond, he [the creditor] need not confirm it and can collect [his debt] from mortgaged property [sold after the debt was contracted]. (Bava Metzia 72a-b)

The Ritva (ad loc., s.v. ma'ot) notes that Rav Asi's statement appears elsewhere in a shorter version:

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: If he [the debtor] admits the genuineness of a bond, he [the creditor] need not confirm it. (Ketubot 19a)

The Ritva points out about this:

Here the Gemara spells out that according to Rav Asi, since he does not have to confirm the bond, he can collect his debt from mortgaged property. And it is the way of the Talmud to change the wording or add an explanation in order to explain the matter.[12]

These are just a few examples of the fundamental distinction between the words of the Amoraim themselves and the stama de-Gemara.

(Translated by David Strauss)