A. “How Does One Dance Before the Bride?”

The Gemara says towards the beginning of the second chapter of Ketubot (16b-17a):

The Rabbis taught: How does one dance before the bride? 

Beit Shammai say: [One describes] the bride as she actually is.

Beit Hillel say: “A beautiful and graceful bride.”

Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Say she is lame or blind; shall we say to her, “A beautiful and graceful bride”?  But the Torah said, “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood”!

Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: According to your view, one who made a poor purchase in the market – should one praise it in his eyes, or denigrate it in his eyes?  Surely we would say, he should praise it in his eyes.

From here the Sages said: One’s disposition must always be pleasant towards people.

The Gemara here presents the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding the proper way to celebrate with a bride and groom.  According to Beit Shammai, one may not deviate at all from the truth and speak imprecisely.  Beit Hillel, by contrast, maintain that one should show flexibility in terms of truthfulness in order to bring satisfaction to the couple.  To substantiate their claim, Beit Shammai cite an explicit verse from which they conclude that a person may not utter any falsehood: “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” (“You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood” – Shemot 23:7).

            Beit Shammai’s comments indicate that in their view, there exists an issur asei (prohibition expressed in the form of a positive commandment) forbidding false speech, and we derive this prohibition from the aforementioned verse.  Beit Hillel’s response, however, gives us no clear indication as to their position concerning the parameters of this prohibition.  In light of the Rishonim’s comments, we may raise three different approaches to understanding this debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai:

1. Beit Shammai maintain that this verse introduces a general prohibition against speaking falsely, whereas according to Beit Hillel, the prohibition applies only to judges, and not to people in general.
2. Both views believe in principle in a prohibition against speaking falsely; their debate surrounds the issue of whether this prohibition applies to any false speech, as Beit Shammai claim, or specifically to falsehoods that inflict harm.
3. Both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel limit the prohibition to instances where the false speech inflicts harm, but they argue as to whether imprecise compliments work in favor of the person about whom they are spoken, or cause him harm.

B. Judges, or All People?

Let us take another look at the aforementioned verse and its context:

You shall not subvert the rights of your needy in their disputes.  You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood; do not bring death upon those who are innocent and in the right, for I will not acquit the wrongdoer.  Do not take bribes, for bribes blind the clear-sighted and upset the pleas of those who are in the right. (Shemot 23:6-8)

The prohibition against speaking falsely appears in the context of the mitzvot involving a judge’s conduct.  Alongside the prohibition against subverting people’s rights or taking bribes, the Torah introduces the command to distance oneself from words of falsehood.  In light of the context, the commentators on the Chumash debate the scope of this prohibition.  Ibn Ezra understood that the prohibition relates specifically to judges:

“From matters of falsehood” – this speaks to the judge, that he should not render false judgment, similar to “Justice, justice shall you pursue” (Devarim 16:20). 

The Rashbam takes this approach, as well:

“You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood” – if you detect a false case with false witnesses, but you cannot disprove them, distance yourself from that case, and do not preside over it at all.

Seforno, by contrast, appears to have understood that this verse refers to a general prohibition that applies to all people, not merely judges:

“You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood” – from any matter that can involve falsehood, as the Sages said: “Exercise care with your words, lest people learn to speak falsely from them.”[1] 

            Corresponding to this debate among the commentators, the Rishonim argue as to the halakhic parameters of the prohibition.  The primary Talmudic source for the prohibitions emerging from this verse is the sugya in Shavuot (30b):

The Rabbis taught: From where do we know that a judge should not appoint advocates for what he has to say?  The verse states: “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood.” 

From where do we know that a judge should not assign an ignorant student to sit before him?  The verse states: “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood.” 

From where do we know that a judge who knows his fellow [judge] is a thief, or a witness who knows his fellow [witness] is a thief, should not join with him?  The verse states: “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood.” 

From where do we know that a judge who knows the case is false should not say, “Since the witnesses testify, I will decide it [the case] and let the blame rest on the witness’ neck?”  The verse states: “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood.” 

From where do we know that if two come for trial, one dressed in rags and the other dressed in a one-hundred “maneh” suit, that we say to him, “Dress like him or give him clothing to wear like yours”?  The verse states: “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood.”

The Gemara brings twelve examples of applications of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak,” and they all involve legal settings.  This, of course, raises the aforementioned question of whether the prohibition applies only to legal scenarios, or even generally, whenever some harm or loss will be incurred as a result.  The fact that all the Gemara’s examples deal with judges and legal deliberation appears to indicate that the imperative to distance oneself from falsehood applies strictly to judges.  According to the second approach, however, we might explain that generally speaking, instances of falsehood resulting in damage occur in the courtroom setting, but fundamentally, the prohibition is not restricted to the legal realm.

            A study of the Rambam’s rulings reveals that in his view, the prohibition of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” does not apply generally, and refers only to judges.  The Rambam codifies all the examples mentioned in the Gemara,[2] citing the verse “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” in reference to each, with one exception:

If there were two litigants, one dressed in expensive clothing and the other dressed in dishonorable clothing, he says to the prominent one, “Either dress him in clothing like yours before standing trial with him, or dress like him, so that you are equal; only then can you stand trial.” (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 21:2)

The Gemara explicitly bases this requirement – to try the litigants only when they are similarly dressed – on the verse, “Mi-devar sheker tirchak.”  The Rambam, however, does not mention the verse in reference to this halakha, as he does in reference to all the Gemara’s other examples.  It is likely that the Rambam here relies on what he wrote in the previous halakha:

There is a positive mitzva to judge a case fairly, as it says, “You shall judge your kinsman fairly” (Vayikra 19:15).  What does a “fair judgment” mean?  It means equating the two litigants in every respect: one should not be allowed to speak as much as he wishes, whereas to the other he [the judge] says, “Keep your words brief;” he should not show favor to one and speak to him softly, while showing disdain for the other and speaking to him harshly. (ibid., halakha 1)

In this halakha, the Rambam cites the general verse from which we learn that a judge must conduct a case fairly: “You shall judge your kinsman fairly.”  After citing this verse, the Rambam does not, in the following halakha, where he mentions the requirement of similar dress, bring the verse, “Mi-devar sheker tirchak,” since he views this halakha as falling under the general obligation to conduct fair trials.  Evidently, he understood the imperative of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” as intended to expand the parameters of the general obligation of “Be-tzedek tishpot amitekha” (“You shall judge your kinsman fairly”).  Whereas this obligation to judge fairly applies only to judges, the command to distance oneself from falsehood comes and extends the obligation of fairness to other participants in the judicial process: witnesses, litigants, etc.

            We may thus conclude that according to the Rambam, “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” applies to a judge presiding over a case, as well as to all those who take part in the judicial process, but only to them.  The purpose of this command is to promote the general ideal of fair judgment, and does not stand on its own.  We deal not with an independent prohibition, but rather with one component of a series of measures to be taken by the court so as to ensure a fair and honest judicial ruling.  Consequently, the Rambam had no reason to bring the verse requiring distancing oneself from falsehood, once he had already, in the previous halakha, noted the general obligation of “Be-tzedek tishpot amitekha,” for this latter imperative includes as well the obligation to avoid falsehood in judicial proceedings and decision-making.

            In fact, elsewhere the Rambam clearly indicates that in his view, no prohibition exists at all against speaking falsely outside the judicial framework.  The Rambam brings the verse, “Mi-devar sheker tirchak,” only in Hilkhot Sanhedrin (seven times), Hilkhot Eidut (17:6), and Hilkhot To’en Ve-nit’an (16:10).  Nowhere do we find the Rambam mentioning this verse regarding speaking falsely outside the context of judicial proceedings and reaching legal decisions.

            This understanding of the Rambam explains why in his Sefer Ha-mitzvot, the Rambam does not list the obligation to distance oneself from falsehood as one of the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot.[3]  According to what we have seen, the reason is obvious: the Rambam views this obligation not as an independent mitzva, but rather as part of the general imperative to render fair judgment.

            However, in order to gain a full understanding of the Rambam’s position in this regard, we must also consider his comments in Hilkhot De’ot (2:6):

It is forbidden for a person to conduct himself with false speech and flattery; he should not have one thing in his mouth and something else in his heart; rather, his interior should correspond to his exterior, and matters in his heart should be what is spoken by his mouth.

This ruling is based on the Gemara’s comments in Sota (32a):

Rabbi Yirmiya bar Abba said: Four groups of people may not greet the Shekhina: the group of cynics, the group of flatterers, the group of liars, and the group of gossips… The group of liars, for it says, “He who speaks untruth shall not stand before my eyes” (Tehillim 101:7).

We cannot conclude from either the Rambam’s ruling or the Gemara on which it is based that there is a prohibition against lying.  Besides the fact that we likely deal here not with a bona fide Torah prohibition, but rather with a rabbinic enactment, the Rambam’s formulation clearly indicates that he speaks not of uttering something false, but rather of accustoming oneself to false speech.  He refers here to the requirement of avoiding becoming a “chronic liar,” meaning, someone who regularly speaks differently than what he really feels.

            The Rambam there also mentions the prohibition against “geneivat da’at ha-beriyot,” or deceiving people:

It is prohibited to deceive people, including gentiles.  How?  One may not sell to a gentile non-kosher meat as if it is properly slaughtered meat, nor a shoe made from [the leather of] an animal that died [naturally] as if it is from a slaughtered animal; one may not implore of his fellow to eat with him if he knows that he will not eat; one may not prepare a large gift for someone if he knows he will not accept it; one may not open for someone barrels [of wine] that he must anyway open to sell, in order to have him think that he opened them in his honor – and the like.  Even a single word of flattery or a misleading word is forbidden.  Rather, truthful lips, a proper spirit and pure heart [is better] than any dishonesty or treachery.

This prohibition overlaps somewhat with the prohibition against lying, but fundamentally differs from it.  As clearly emerges from the Rambam’s examples, this prohibition does not include all types of false speech; conversely, the prohibition of geneivat da’at includes some forms of speech that do not involve falsehood.

            In any event, from the fact that these are the only two prohibitions the Rambam mentions in this regard, we may deduce that the actual utterance of falsehood per se is not forbidden at all.  We learn, then, that according to the Rambam, the prohibition of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” applies only with respect to judges and does not constitute a general prohibition applicable to all circumstances.  We may perhaps draw proof for the Rambam’s stance from the Gemara’s comments in Bava Metzia (23b):

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shemuel: With regard to three matters Rabbis are accustomed to speaking untruthfully: regarding [whether or not he is proficient in a given] masekhet, his bed [marital relations], and his host.  What is the practical ramification of this?  To return a lost item [he claims is his] based purely on his general impression of its form.

The Gemara first brings Shemuel’s list of the three areas regarding which Torah scholars customarily speak imprecisely, and then seeks to determine the halakha Shemuel thereby conveys.  The Gemara answers that Shemuel’s comment affects the laws of hashavat aveida – returning lost items.  One may return a lost item to a Torah scholar who identifies the object based on its superficial appearance, because we do not suspect Torah scholars of lying, except in these three areas.  At first glance, however, the Gemara could have presented a far simpler halakhic ramification of Shemuel’s remark, namely, that a Torah scholar may speak dishonestly with regard to these three matters.  From the fact that the Gemara did not mention this as the halakha embedded within Shemuel’s comment, we may conclude that even in other areas there is no prohibition to speak falsely.  Shemuel informs us merely that in only these three areas Torah scholars actually have the practice of speaking falsely.[4]  It emerges, then, that this Gemara reinforces the Rambam’s view, that the prohibition against speaking falsely applies strictly in the framework of judicial proceedings, and stems from the general obligation to judge fairly.[5]

            On the basis of the Rambam’s view, we may establish the first approach mentioned to understand the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.  Beit Shammai hold that the prohibition of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” has relevance not only with respect to judges, but in all areas, and may therefore be applied when determining how to “dance before the bride.”  Beit Hillel, by contrast, limit the prohibition to judges, such that there is no prohibition against lying outside the context of judicial hearings.

            It would appear that this understanding of the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai is reflected in the following comments in Kalla Rabbati (10:1):

How does one dance before the bride?  Beit Shammai say: [One describes] the bride as she actually is.  Beit Hillel say: “A beautiful and graceful bride.” 

Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Say she is lame or blind; shall we say to her, “A beautiful and graceful bride”?  But the Torah said, “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood”! 

Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: According to your view, one who made a poor purchase in the market – should one praise it before him, or denigrate it before him?  Surely we would say, he should praise it before him.  Beit Hillel therefore say: One’s disposition must be pleasant towards people. 

Beit Hillel also [argue]: Do we not have here “beautiful” in terms of her conduct?  Perhaps [when we compliment the bride we mean] “beautiful in family background, graceful in her conduct” – for we do not presume one to be evil! 

Beit Shammai [respond]: Is it written, “You shall distance yourself from sheker [falsehood]”?  [It rather says,] “mi-devar [sheker]” (“from matters of falsehood”) – implying even plainly [if the comment is subject to various interpretations]. 

Beit Hillel [respond]: Regarding what does the Torah say, “Mi-devar sheker tirchak”?  Only because of [the continuation of the verse], “do not bring death upon those who are innocent and in the right;” but to sustain [rather than kill] – this is permissible.[6]

It clearly emerges from here that according to Beit Hillel, the prohibition of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” applies only with regard to judges, as we understood within the Rambam’s position.

C. Falsehood That Results in Damage

            The Rambam, as we saw, does not include “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” in his list of the mitzvot.  The Semag, on the other hand, indeed lists this obligation as a separate, independent mitzva (#107).  After mentioning several examples from the aforementioned Gemara in Shavuot, the Semag then qualifies the prohibition by noting the halakha of Beit Hillel in our Gemara: “However, it is permissible to deviate [from the truth] for purposes of peace and to deal pleasantly with people… How does one dance before the bride… Beit Hillel say: A beautiful, graceful bride.”  These comments require explanation.  After bringing the laws derived by the Gemara from “Mi-devar sheker tirchak,” all of which, without exception, relate to the judicial setting, the Semag extends the prohibition to include all areas of speech, and therefore had to invoke the factor of darkhei shalom (peaceful relations with people) in other areas.  From where did the Semag derive this expansion of the prohibition?

            The source of the Semag’s position is likely the comments of the Yere’im (235), by whom the Semag was strongly influenced:

Our Creator commanded us in Parashat Mishpatim, “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood.”  One must distance himself, but only from falsehood that can[7] bring damage upon one’s fellow.  One must pay careful attention in this regard, to see if one’s falsehood can cause damage.  Our Sages z”l explained some [examples] in Shavuot…The Rabbis taught: From where do we know that a judge should not appoint advocates for what he has to say?  The verse states: “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood.”… All God-fearing people should make a point of distancing themselves, for it may result in harm.  And should one say: I did not realize that this would result in harm – this depends entirely on one’s heart, and it therefore says [in this context], “You shall fear your God.” 

But falsehood that does not result in harm – the Torah did not forbid, for we learn about this matter from its context, and the verse speaks here of an evil person who does people harm, as it is written, “You shall distance yourself from matters of falsehood; do not bring death upon those who are innocent and in the right, for I will not acquit the wrongdoer.”

We may conclude on the basis of this passage that according to the Yere’im, the prohibition against speaking falsely is not limited to judges.  The examples given by the Gemara in Shavuot do not define the parameters of the prohibition, but rather serve as examples of falsehoods that can bring harm to others.  According to the Yere’im, the Torah forbids false speech that can cause harm, regardless of whether or not the given speech has any connection to judicial proceedings.  This position thus forms the basis of the comments of the Semag, who applies the prohibition of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” generally, and does not limit it to a court setting.

            According to this approach, the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai need not revolve around the issue of whether the prohibition applies outside the framework of the court, as we suggested within the Rambam’s view.  Rather, according to the Semag, both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai might agree that the Torah forbids speaking falsely in any context; however, Beit Hillel limit the prohibition to falsehood that can cause damage,[8] whereas according to Beit Shammai, one may not speak falsely even if no harm will result.

D.        Imprecise Praise: Beneficial or Harmful?

The Yere’im himself advances a different approach to understand the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai:

That which the baraita states in Ketubot: How does one dance before the bride?  Beit Shammai say: [one describes] the bride as she actually is.  Beit Hillel say: “A beautiful and graceful bride”… That [false speech] involves harm to people, as Beit Shammai maintain, as it appears as though one deceives the husband.

According to the Yere’im, Beit Shammai agree that we must limit the prohibition against speaking falsely to situations where the falsehood causes or may cause damage.  In their view, however, undeserved praise to a bride is harmful, not beneficial.  Logically, it is difficult to understand why this is the case.  What harm can possibly befall a bride or groom through undeserved compliments for her looks?  Apparently, the Yere’im felt that a certain risk is involved in engendering an unrealistic self-image, as this can lead to disappointment in the future.  In any event, in his view, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai do not argue at all regarding the parameters of the prohibition against speaking falsely.  They both agree that the prohibition applies only to falsehood that causes harm.  They debate merely the very specific point of whether it is beneficial to bestow exaggerated compliments upon the bride.

            To summarize our discussion thus far, we have seen three possible approaches to explain the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai in our sugya.  Their argument perhaps involves the fundamental question as to whether “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” applies outside court.  Alternatively, both views may agree that the prohibition indeed applies in all settings, only they debate whether it is limited to cases where the false speech can cause harm.  According to the third approach, advanced by the Yere’im, both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai restrict the prohibition to instances where harm can be caused, and they argue only in this specific instance, debating the question of whether the exaggerated compliments to the bride cause her and her husband harm, or are for their benefit.

E. Falsehood That Causes No Harm

            It emerges from the comments of the Rishonim we have encountered thus far that according to Halakha, there is no prohibition against speaking falsely when doing so causes no harm.  From the Ritva’s comments in our sugya, however, it appears that he applies the prohibition even to cases where the false speech will not harm anyone.  Commenting on Beit Hillel’s remark to Beit Shammai – “Should one praise it in his eyes, or denigrate it in his eyes,” the Ritva writes, “Meaning, that anything involving darkhei shalom does not violate ‘Mi-devar sheker tirchak.’”  According to the Ritva, Beit Hillel permit praising the bride imprecisely only because of the concern for darkhei shalom.  Otherwise, the prohibition of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak” would have forbidden one from falsely praising the bride, despite the fact that this falsehood would cause no harm.[9]

            What we deduced from the Ritva’s comments appears explicitly in the Sefer Charedim, who was among the early Acharonim: “There is a mitzvat asei to speak the truth, even in general matters that do not involve monetary obligation, as it says, ‘Mi-devar sheker tirchak’” (4:26).  In his view, we should not restrict the prohibition to cases where the false speech would cause harm, because we speak of a general prohibition against speaking falsehood, regardless of its context or purpose.[10]

            The basis for the Sefer Charedim’s position is perhaps found in the comments of the Mordekhai (end of Mo’ed Katan, 933):

Someone who lost a relative and is unaware, there is no obligation to inform him, even regarding his father and mother… If, however, he inquires about them, one may not lie and say, “He is alive,” for it says, “Mi-devar sheker tirchak.” 

The Mordekhai deals with a situation that does not involve monetary matters, and he nevertheless invokes the prohibition of “Mi-devar sheker tirchak.”  Quite possibly, however, the Mordekhai applies the prohibition to this case because he believes that this would cause no less severe harm, or perhaps even more severe harm, than financial damage.  If so, then even the Mordekhai agrees that no prohibition applies if the false speech causes no monetary or emotional harm to others.[11]

            In Rabbenu Yona’s Sha’arei Teshuva (3:178-186), too, we find expression of this distinction between falsehood that causes harm and that which does not.  Rabbenu Yona lists nine different categories of false speech, only the first of which, where monetary loss is involved, constitutes a Torah violation.  All the other types, which do not cause financial damage, are forbidden only mi-de’rabbanan.  He also posits a novel theory concerning the parameters of the halakha permitting distortion of the truth for purposes of peaceful relations.  Whereas the Semag applies this heter even to false speech that can potentially cause harm, Rabbenu Yona restricts this halakha to falsehoods spoken without intent to cause harm.  Rabbenu Yona writes:

If one lies in reporting information he had heard and intentionally distorts some of it, and his lies serve him no purpose and cause no harm to his fellow, but this is what he does because of his affinity for falsehood… and sometimes he invents complete accounts: On the one hand, this person’s punishment will be light, insofar as his falsehoods and indiscretion cause no one harm.  But his punishment will be very severe due to his brazenness and affinity for falsehood… This component was permitted for purposes of mitzva fulfillment and the pursuit of propriety and peace.  They said that one may praise the bride before the groom and say that she is beautiful and graceful even if this is not true.  And they said that one may distort the truth for purposes of peaceful relations…

In truth, however, we need not detect here an actual debate, for Rabbenu Yona perhaps deals with one who intends to cause harm to another, in which case even the Semag agrees that one may not distort the truth for purposes of darkhei shalom.