The Implications of Preventing Embarrassment
Bein Adam Le-chavero: Ethics
of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin Zimmerman
Shiur #11: The Implications of Preventing
Embarrassment
To What Degree?
In last week's lesson, we introduced the prohibition
of embarrassing others (halbanat panim) and highlighted the efforts one
must take to avoid putting others in uncomfortable positions. The parameters of the prohibition
play an important role in defining the unique elements of the Torah's outlook on
interpersonal relationships.
The Chinnukh (Mitzva 240) explains the rationale of
the prohibition:
The root reason of this precept is self-evident, for
shame causes great anguish to human beings; indeed, there is none greater. Therefore, God forbids us from
inflicting excessive anguish upon His creatures; after all, it is possible to
give rebuke when they are alone, as there will not be as much embarrassment.
Similarly, the Mishna (Avot 3:15) makes
explicit reference to the severity of embarrassing others publicly, listing it
among five acts which cause one to forfeit a share in the World to Come:
Rabbi Elazar Ha-Modai said: One who
publicly
mortifies his companion
though he may have the knowledge of Torah and good
deeds, has no share in the World to Come.
The severe prohibition of embarrassing others is
indicative of the Torah's understanding of the inner world of emotions and human
character. Because embarrassment
carries with it such anguish, as the Chinnukh explains, God issues a strict
prohibition against causing it.
However, this is only the tip of the iceberg. We must go deeper to fully understand
the ramifications of this mitzva.
What are the affirmative measures which one must take to avoid violating this
prohibition? What steps must be
taken to ensure one doesn't embarrass another, even in the slightest? Up to what point must one be willing
to forgo benefit or even accept harm so as not to hurt another? Ultimately, the question that has to
be dealt with is the following: are there any circumstances in which the
prohibition may be overlooked or put aside for what would seem to be the greater
good?
Caring for Inanimate Objects and Losing Our Balance
Embarrassing others is a common occurrence. A pithy one-liner may be on the tip
of one's tongue, and there is only a split second to decide if one should let it
out and be rewarded with the laughs of the crowd or keep quiet for fear of
shaming another. For this reason, it
seems, Judaism feels the need to reinforce our sensitivity to the feelings of
others by elevating the treatment of inanimate objects.
The precedent for treating lifeless objects as if
they have feelings is biblical, as the Torah commands:
And you shall not ascend with steps upon My
altar, so that your nakedness shall not be exposed upon it. (Shemot
20:23)
Rashi explains this fascinating mitzva with the
description:
So that your nakedness shall not be exposed
due to the steps, you must widen your stride,
although it would not be an actual exposure of nakedness, as it is written: And
make them linen pants (Shemot 28:42). Nevertheless, widening the strides is
close to exposing nakedness, behaving toward [the stones] in a humiliating
manner. A fortiori, if the Torah
says that you must not behave in a humiliating manner towards these stones,
which have no intelligence to object to their humiliation, how much more so does
your fellow, who bears Gods image and who does object to being humiliated,
require consideration!
This biblical teaching, as explained by Rashi, finds
expression in numerous laws which require us to treat inanimate objects with
respect, with the hope that we will take to heart the analogy to human beings. In fact, we find that Halakha
prohibits embarrassing inanimate objects.
On Shabbat, the two loaves of challa used for the
Shabbat meals are covered during the recitation of Kiddush over wine. There are a number of opinions
recorded as to the reason behind this practice.
Both the Rosh (Pesachim 10:3) and his son the Tur (OC 271)
quote a passage from the Talmud Yerushalmi (not found in our versions) which
provides a fascinating reason, explaining that we do this so that the bread
will not see its embarrassment." Normally,
one would recite the blessing over bread before the blessing over wine, as this
is the order in Devarim 8:8, but the order is reversed on Shabbat. Fearing that the bread might be
embarrassed about not receiving its usual precedence, we cover it, so that it
will not witness its shame.
Presumably, the idea of preventing the embarrassment
of challa is meant to show our care even for inanimate objects and to inspire us
to recognize that certainly we should be careful regarding those created in the
image of God. However, it is much
easier to worry about covering the challa than to ensure we treat others with
their due respect. In fact,
sometimes we lose sight of where the real importance lies.
A story is told about the Chafetz Chayim (I
personally have heard similar stories told of others as well), who was invited
to the home of a local Jew on his travels to other communities. Knowing that they were having an
important guest, the hosts ensured that everything in the house would be
perfect. Understandably, much of the
workload fell on the wife. As the
husband returned home from prayers with the Chafetz Chayim, the smell of the
Shabbat meal was enticing, and the table was truly immaculate. However, there was one thing missing:
the challa lay on the table, uncovered.
The husband, afraid to be considered an ignoramus by the great Chafetz
Chayim, looked for his wife. He
found her asleep on the floor, exhausted by the preparations for Shabbat. Rather than thank his wife for
outdoing herself, he scolded her: Don't you know we cover the challa?
How could you forget?"
The Chafetz Chayim, who was famed for his
consideration of others, was not bothered by the uncovered challa; rather, he
was taken aback by the callousness with which the husband had treated his wife,
specifically under these circumstances.
The Chafetz Chayim asked the husband, "Why is it that we cover the
challa?"
The husband, wanting to show off his knowledge,
explained with pride, "Why, it is so the bread will not see its embarrassment."
The Chafetz Chayim continued, "Exactly. But what embarrassment does the bread
feel compared to the embarrassment of flesh and blood?
What of your wife, who has slaved over
preparing a meal that you intended to make you look hospitable? If the bread must not be embarrassed,
how much more so must you care about your wife's embarrassment!
It would be best to trade your contempt
for praise; commend your wife for outdoing herself."
Essentially, our concern is not with the inanimate
objects feelings, but with our personalities, trying to ingrain within us
feelings of care and compassion.
Despite the difficulty of maintaining the balance, this endeavor is essential.
The challenge of keeping our equilibrium regarding
this prohibition of embarrassing others may lie behind the Torah's choice of a
textual location for it. After all,
the source of the prohibition (as described in the previous lesson) is in the
context of an individual, without malice, attempting to rebuke another who is
sinning and return the offender to the path of righteousness. Intentions aside, one is prohibited
from rebuking others in a way that would cause them halbanat panim. One must balance the responsibility
to care about others actions with the requirement to maintain their dignity
under all circumstances.
Remedying Another's Embarrassment
Besides ones remaining silent when tempted to
embarrass someone else, there may be another way to excel in caring about the
honor of others and not causing unnecessary embarrassment. In a situation where another
individual has done something embarrassing, one has almost a knee-jerk reaction
to laugh. It takes a lot of hard
work to train oneself not to make a big deal of another's embarrassing mishap,
but there is a higher level of behavior, as exemplified by Rabbi Akiva Eger.
The story goes that Rabbi Akiva Eger once had a poor
man over to his home as one of his many Friday night guests.
The Shabbat table was adorned with a
beautiful white tablecloth. During
the meal, as the poor man lifted his glass of wine, it accidentally slipped out
of his hand and stained the pure white cloth. Seeing
the poor man squirming in embarrassment, Rabbi Eger immediately knocked over his
own glass of wine, "accidentally" spilling it over the tablecloth. As the poor
man looked on in great relief, Rabbi Eger remarked, "It seems as if the table is
very shaky, isn't it? I must
apologize! We are going to have to have
it fixed."
The behavior of Rabbi Akiva Eger underscores the
outlook of one who has come to appreciate the Torah's concern for the
embarrassment of others. Instead of
worrying about his dirty tablecloth, he focuses on the mortified guest, forgoing
his own honor in order to prevent another's shame.
Similarly, when Moshe
Rabbeinu began his final speeches to the Jewish people near the end of his life,
including historical moments of the Israelites sojourn in the desert, he does
so very tactfully. As Rashi (Devarim
1:1) explains:
Since these are words of rebuke and he
enumerates here all the places where they angered God, therefore it makes no
explicit mention of the incidents but rather merely alludes to them, out of
respect for Israels honor.
The sins of the Jewish people are only
hinted to, so as to ensure that no pain will be caused. This sensitivity of Moshe Rabbeinu to
the feelings of others, even when trying to make a point, underscores how the
prohibition is not limited to explicitly shaming others; the Torah precludes
even being insensitive to those statements which might hurt another.
Along the same lines, the Talmud (Bava Metzia
58b) prohibits calling others by nicknames and tells of certain sages who were
willing to conceal the identities of individuals involved in crimes in order to
spare others unnecessary embarrassment. (See
also Sanhedrin 11a.)
The Big Three or Four?
In last week's lesson we made mention of a number of
sources which seem to compare halbanat panim to homicide. The changes in others complexion due
to rushing blood leads the Talmud (ibid.) to view embarrassing others as
akin to bloodshed.
The Talmud continues by stating, It is preferable
to commit an act of potential adultery rather than publicly mortify ones
companion. The Talmud relates that King
David himself, despite being a king, was embarrassed about his past actions and
explained how one who embarrasses others publicly has no place in the World to
Come. The most startling expression
of this idea is found in the next passage, which seems to say explicitly that
one should give up his or her life rather than embarrass another.
It is preferable for an individual to throw himself
into a burning furnace rather than publicly mortify his companion.
This may be derived from the act of
Tamar
The literal understanding of the passage would seem
to insinuate that one must give up one's life rather than embarrass another,
since halbanat panim is viewed as akin to murder. The gravity of this statement is
startling and possibly of tremendous halakhic significance. For this reason, the commentators
deal with the question of whether this statement is to be taken literally.
Certainly, a number of commentators cite this
statement as hyperbolically emphasizing the severity of the prohibition,
expressed by the Talmud with no intention of it being taken literally. While certain latter-day authorities
only cite the Meiri (Berakhot 43b, Sota 10b) in this context, it
clearly appears that a number of authorities, such as the Chinnukh, view it as a
mere admonition.
Similarly, the Rambam and Shulchan Arukh include no
explicit mention of the need for martyrdom in this scenario.
However, other great authorities seem to understand
the requirement for one to give up his or her life rather than embarrass another
quite literally. Besides the Rif,
who cites the Talmud verbatim, seemingly ratifying its authoritativeness,
Rabbeinu Yona (cited last lesson) seems to explicitly state this in his
commentary on Avot (3:15) and in his work Shaarei Teshuva (3:139).
The difficulty associated with this understanding is
that it is generally accepted that only three issues require martyrdom, the
prohibitions of murder, idolatry and illicit relations. Why is embarrassing others not
mentioned in this list? This
question is asked by Tosafot (Sota 10b), and their explanation as to why
there is no fourth requirement seems to accept the premise of the question, that
one must in fact give up one's life so as not to violate the prohibition.
Tosafot explain that it is not recorded in the list
because it is a prohibition not mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and the list
of three only records explicitly-mentioned prohibitions. Rabbeinu Yona, on the other hand,
seems to understand that it is actually recorded on the list; after all, if
embarrassing others is akin to murder, then it should be subsumed under that
category! He thus refers to it as
resembling murder.
With the substantial sources that seem to accept the
line literally, a
number of authorities (see Binyan Tziyon 172 and Minchat Shelomo
7) reevaluate the rulings of the Rambam and Shulchan Arukh, understanding their
view as accepting the position which requires martyrdom.
Implications of this idea
are even found in a number of responsa which argue that if the connection
between homicide and halbanat panim is accepted literally, then it will
have other implications for the way in which we view murder. Some analyze whether a kohen
who embarrasses another might be prohibited from reciting the priestly blessing,
just as a murderous kohen is sidelined.
Others discuss the possibility of waiving ones right not to be
embarrassed. If it truly akin to
murder, no one has the right to permit oneself to be murdered, and thus shaming
would be universally prohibited as well.
(See Rav Daniel Feldman's The Right and the Good for extensive
sources on this topic.)
Preference and Precedence
Nevertheless, assuming that the prevention of public
embarrassment requires martyrdom is rather novel, and there is reason to believe
that even the Rishonim who mention the concept did not mean for it to be taken
literally. Rav Asher Weiss (Minchat
Asher, Bereishit ch. 53) notes that if we were to accept the axiom
literally, we would we have to kill someone to prevent that individual from
publicly humiliating another if there is no other way to stop him, something he
finds untenable. He, therefore,
reexamines all of the sources requiring martyrdom and tries to explain why that
is not their true meaning.
He, like others, points out that the language of the
Talmud never explicitly mandates giving up one's life; rather, it only says that
it would be preferable for one to do so.
In fact, the Talmud (Ketubot
67b) relates the story of one sage who seems to take the concept literally. Mar Ukva and his wife secretly put
money by a poor man's door daily.
One day, the receiver decides to stake out the site in order to see who his
benefactor is. When Mar Ukva and his
wife notice the man emerging from his hiding place, they run so as not to be
noticed and embarrass the recipient.
They see a still-hot furnace and jump in, and Mar Ukva's legs are singed by the
fire.
Still, the Brisker Rav is
quoted as noting that our Sages never explicitly say that one must throw himself
into the fiery furnace rather than embarrass another. Rather, they say that it would be
better for one to do so, as the fiery furnace is easier on a person than the
punishment for embarrassing another publicly.
Mar Ukva and his wife thus opt for the more bearable act.
Similarly, Rav Asher Weiss
explains that one should be cognizant of the severity of embarrassing others;
the price is not worth it, and indeed it would be preferable to give up one's
life, even though one should not actually do so (and it may very well be
forbidden). However, in Minchat
Shelomo 7, we find a view that there still may be some halakhic implications
for the opinion that requires martyrdom.
The Power of Teshuva
(Repentance)
The severity of the prohibition of embarrassing
others is expressed clearly in Avot.
The Mishna states there that one who has embarrassed others will not be
saved by his good deeds and has no place in the World to Come.
However, some Mishnaic commentators point out that
this is all assuming that one doesn't repent, as there is no act for which
teshuva isn't helpful.
This raises another question: how may one do
teshuva for embarrassing others?
Firstly, people don't recognize the severity of the crime and are therefore
negligent in trying to fix the wrongs of the past.
Secondly, one who does realize his crime
often finds it very difficult to remedy, especially after having embarrassed
others in public.
Rabbeinu Yona explains that though, in his view,
humiliating others is a subcategory of murder, it may even be worse in this
aspect. A murderer has committed a
crime that is universally acknowledged as horrendous, and society instantly will
register its complete rejection of the act. Consequently, the killer will
recognize the gravity of the crime and will repent fully. Having done so, the
killer will continue to bear the responsibility for his or her actions in this
world, but this individual will ultimately achieve atonement, and the eternal
punishment will be suspended in the World to Come. However, a person who
embarrasses others may not be chastised comparably, and thus the sinner will not
realize the gravity of the transgression. Though teshuva works, one
may not realize its necessary scope and power in this context. Thus, one who shames others may
easily end up without an eternal share in the World to Come.
The Rambam, in his commentary on the Mishna,
explains the severity of embarrassing others differently. The propensity to shame others is
indicative of a negative character; one who does so harps on others
insecurities for his or her own needs.
Therefore, one who embarrasses others has to do a complete personality
overhaul in order to truly repent.
The Iyun Yaakov (Bava Metzia 59a) comments on
the Talmuds statement that it is preferable to commit an act of potential
adultery rather than humiliate another, highlighting another aspect of this
transgression. In his opinion, martyrdom is an option rather than an obligation,
a recommendation based on the severity of the punishment. This penalty is
greater than that for adultery, as the Talmud implies, because adulterous
tendencies are a normal part of the human makeup. Humiliating others,
however, is not an innate human tendency, and thus its egregiousness is not
mitigated by the realities of mortal weakness. Therefore,
it is treated very harshly.
The Penei Yehoshua (Bava Metzia 58b) offers
another possibility in the name of the Tosafot Yom Tov, citing the Midrash
Shemuel: one who embarrasses another and strips away his or her sense of dignity
violates tzelem Elokim, the image of God in which every human is created,
as noted in our previous lesson in the name of the Alshikh. It is this divine
image that reflects the soul. One who displays a disregard for this image,
therefore, undermines his own conception of a soul. The Tikkunei Teshuva
expresses a similar notion, ruling that one who humiliates others must fast as
atonement; acquiring the forgiveness of the injured party is not sufficient.
This builds on the assumption that here
we have more than an interpersonal crime; an attack has been committed against
God himself through the vehicle of the divine image. This is a concept that has
groundings in Midrashic sources. Rabbi Tanchuma (Bereishit Rabba
24:7), in a discussion of the severity of humiliating others, is quoted as
remarking, Do you know Whom you are disgracing? In the likeness of God, He
made him (Bereishit 5:1)! Further, the Talmud (Berakhot 18a,
etc.) derives significant halakhic principles from the verse (Mishlei
17:5) He who mocks the poor blasphemes his Maker.
One who lives for the moment is often capable of
embarrassing others without a second thought.
Understanding that it isn't worth it involves delving into the human
thought-process and simultaneously understanding that others' feelings must be
taken into account.
Even if we adopt the generally-accepted position
that there is no actual requirement to give up one's life rather than embarrass
another, we certainly should recognize the severity of halbanat panim. There are certainly individuals who
would rather choose death than be embarrassed, and the pain of humiliation may
haunt the victim for a long time.
The easiest way to deal with this is to focus on personality development, which
can help combat the temptation to embarrass others. However, if one identifies this trait
in oneself, the underlying principle remains: there is no act for which
teshuva is not helpful.
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