Proper Mindset II — Should One be Tempted Not to be Nice
Bein Adam
Le-chavero:
Ethics of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin Zimmerman
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Shiur #10: Proper Mindset II Should One be Tempted Not to be Nice?
In last weeks lesson, we saw that the sources seem to differ on the proper
mindset for fulfilling interpersonal mitzvot. Should one be actively cognizant of
the divine command during the fulfillment, or should one focus on the benefit to
the recipient? Alternatively, should
one perhaps strive to make the fulfillment natural, an outgrowth of ones kind
disposition? This question of
whether one should fulfill ethical commandments due to an inner calling or due
to a divine command seems to relate to the issue discussed in the Rishonim of
whether it is preferable to perform divine commandments with or without the
temptation to violate them.
Fulfilling Mitzvot
amidst Temptation A Sign of Greatness or Weakness?
The Rambam, in chapter 6 of his Eight
Chapters (the introduction to Tractate Avot) deals with the issue of
the proper attitude for one who fulfills the divine will. Is it better for a person to desire
to sin but overcome his desire, or is it better not to even contemplate sinning? He points out that, at first glance,
the philosophers and Sages argue over this issue.
The philosophers extol the righteous individual who has no desire to do
evil, elevating him above the individual who merely practices self-restraint
over his desires. After explaining
the Prophets ostensibly seem to accept the same outlook, the Rambam indicates
that the Sages actually view things differently.
However, when we examine the view of the Sages in this matter, it appeared to be
different, for they have said: The greater the man, the greater his evil
inclination (Sukka 52a).
This indicates, on the contrary, that the great man is the one whose evil
inclination is great but who can control and rule over it.
The Rambam adds that the rabbinic dictum that Ones reward is commensurate with
the amount of suffering (Avot 5:23) seems to indicate that one who has a
desire to transgress the word of God but nevertheless fulfills it has a greater
reward than one who has no negative inclination.
However, the major proof-text that the Rambam brings to express that the ideal
is to overcome ones desire for the forbidden in order to fulfill the will of
God is the Sifra (quoted by, Rashi Vayikra 20:26):
One should not say, "I am disgusted by pig's meat; I have no desire to wear
clothing containing shaatnez (wool-linen blends)." He should rather say,
"I would like to do these things, but what can I do? My Heavenly Father has
forbidden me from doing them!"
How do we know that this is the proper attitude to adopt? Because it states (Vayikra
20:26), "I have separated you from the other nations to be Mine," which implies
that our separation from these other nations should be solely for Gods sake.
One should refrain from the forbidden act in such a manner that he accepts the
yoke of Heaven upon himself.
From this text, the Rambam deduces that man ought to have a desire to transgress
which he conquers in order to fulfill the word of God. The Rambam continues by arguing that,
in fact, there is no contradiction between the philosophers and Sages; indeed,
both are correct, but under different circumstances. The Rambam distinguishes between more
rational mitzvot (mishpatim), which one should have no desire to
disobey, and non-rational mitzvot (chukkim; singular, chok),
concerning which the ideal is to refrain only because of Gods command. Those unethical acts which the Torah
prohibits, such as murder, theft, cheating, etc. are obviously to be rejected
and repulsed, as the philosophers have indicated, and we must develop within
ourselves a strong aversion to these actions. The individual who craves such
things has a deficient soul and a defective character, as all these commandments
belong to the category concerning which our Sages have said that had they not
been written in the Torah, they would still be worthwhile.
For those Torah prohibitions which are non-rational -- i.e., they have no
independent logical basis other than the fact that they are the Torah's
commands, such as the dietary restrictions, not wearing shaatnez, etc. --
we are told that we should not condition ourselves to despise these acts, but
rather we should refrain from them solely for the sake of Heaven. It is here
that our Sages stress the attitude that despite the fact that one might want to
violate, he should restrain himself based on the word of God.
This is the simple understanding of the Rambam, who appears to address our
quandary. Yet, while the Rambam
stresses that observing chukkim should be characterized by
self-restraint, his position regarding mishpatim is not agreed upon by
all. Rav Yaakov Emden, the Yabetz,
in his commentary on the Rambams Eight
Chapters, points out that while the Rambams position is logical, he cannot
accept it. After asking forgiveness
of the Rambam for disagreeing with his position, he writes:
Consider the opinion in the Talmud (Berakhot 34b) that states In the
place where penitents stand, even completely righteous individuals cannot
stand
We must say that when the
soul desires to violate even logical mitzvot, but the individual takes
hold of himself and withstands the temptation, one is deemed greater than the
righteous individual who has no desire to sin.
The dictum Ones reward is commensurate with the amount of suffering is
stated without restriction or distinction, and it certainly applies to the
logical mitzvot, which one has tremendous desire [to violate], such as
stealing or forbidden relationships, though they are logical mitzvot.
The Yabetz continues to explain at length that in essence, man will always
desire to violate Gods commandments, and the one who garners strength to
fulfill the will of God is always to be preferred to the one who follows His
laws without qualms. In conclusion,
he writes:
In fact, the opinion of the philosophers [quoted by the Rambam] is not the way
of the Torah, for the one who does the just and the good by performing obviously
righteous acts for the reason that they are good for the world and rationally
obligatory will not find favor in the eyes of God, nor will he receive a reward
for the just and the good in the eyes of God, though he will be rewarded for
his actions. In any case, the one
who overcomes his desires in order to fulfill the word of God is certainly
greater.
Rav Emdens position seems to be that though one will be compensated for all
righteous actions that he performs, the highest reward goes to the one who
performs them amidst temptation to sin.
Therefore, performing them because one feels they are proper and
righteous will be rewarded to a lesser extent.
At first glance, this approach of the Yabetz seems to be stressing the
element of commandment even regarding obviously logical
mitzvot. This approach would seem to be
reinforced by the principle of Gadol ha-metzuveh ve-oseh, as discussed
in the previous lesson.
The idea of the Yabetz seems to find expression in an extreme manner in
Sanhedrin 76b and Rashis comments there.
The Talmud states that God takes a harsh view of a Jew who returns the
lost object of a non-Jew, and Rashi (s.v. Ve-hamachazir) explains:
He equates and associates the non-Jew with the Jew, and he shows that he himself
does not believe that returning lost objects is a commandment of the Creator,
for he returns objects even to non-Jews, concerning whom he has no such
commandment.
This statement of Rashi finds further expression in Siddur Rashi (348). There, the students of Rashi express
their teachers disgust over those who give the special Purim gifts to the poor
to non-Jews along with Jews (although general charity must be shared with both). At length, they describe the severity
with which Rashi views this act, concluding that Rashi sees this not as giving
charity for the sake of Heaven, but rather as a foolish act of wasting money.
Though providing for the poor is clearly necessary, Rashi wants us to realize
that we must do so according to divine principles, for otherwise it reflects a
humanistic outlook, detached from God.
Should the Logical
Mitzvot be Natural?
The proper attitude for the performance of rational mitzvot may in fact
be at the heart of the dispute of two great sages about the Jewish people
accepting the Torah at Mount Sinai.
The Ten Commandments are introduced with the verse (Shemot 20:1): And
God spoke all these words, saying (lemor). The sages note that the word lemor
is generally used to mean to be repeated, and implies that the Jewish people
required verbal acceptance of the commandments, which would have to be confirmed
by Moshe and the Jewish people.
However, the sages (Mekhileta ad loc.) argue about the exact wording of
this acceptance:
Lemor
they said Yea for each positive commandment, and they said Nay for each
negative commandment; this is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.
Rabbi Akiva says: for both positive and negative commandments, they responded in
the affirmative, Yea.
At first glance it seems as if this dispute focuses on a minor point; however,
Rav Soloveitchik expounds on its significance and explains that the two Sages
are presenting their opinions on the proper motivation for performing mitzvot. When one accepts the message and
heeds the call of another, they can do so in obedient acquiescence, saying
yea, or with an inner urge to act in harmony with moral and religious norms,
saying nay.
Rabbi Yishmaels view of the response of the Jewish people is quite
understandable based upon the sources we have presented. When it comes to the not easily
understood chukkim, the focus of our fulfillment is the command, the
essence of being a metzuveh ve-oseh, a commanded being. However, with logical mishpatim,
such as interpersonal mitzvot, which contain an easily understood
rationale, their implementation is motivated not by normative coercion but by
existential need of lonely man created in the image of the Infinite to do
mitzvot. By practicing morality,
man senses his drawing nearer to his Creator.
(Derashot Harav, p. 234)
For this reason, according to Rabbi Yishmael, the negative commands, those which
forbid us to murder or steal etc., require a response in the negative, No, we
will listen, we accept the message dutifully and wholeheartedly. For instance, the people respond to
You shall not murder, with No, we reject murder on our own, for we hate to
extinguish life.
However, Rabbi Akiva understands this differently and maintains that the Jewish
people respond affirmatively to all of Gods pronouncements, even the negative
ones, implying that all precepts require commitment and surrender to God, even
the logical ones. They accepted all
mitzvot as a command, essentially saying, Yes, we surrender to Your
will; we accept the norm; we shall comply with it.
Rabbi Akiva maintained that morality is not based on mans cognitive abilities,
even in regard to mishpatim, rational mitzvot, since certain
aspects are inaccessible to human moral exploration and illumination
One must
teach the people how to surrender their intellectual pride and arrogance, and
commit themselves to the Almighty, even when we are unable to comprehend the
moral necessity and practical utility of the chok. Secular ethics have
failed because the concept of chok is not acceptable to secular man. If the integrity of the moral law is
to be preserved, then one must accept the chukkim, to abstain from acts
that seem to hold great promise, and conversely, to act in ways that may seem
illogical and even painful. (Derashot Harav, ibid.)
This understanding seems to assert the importance of the divine command, even
for logical mitzvot. Rav
Soloveitchik comments that though this disagreement is not one of Halakha, he is
still tempted to apply the principle The law accords with Rabbi Akiva when he
argues with one disputant here. In
other words, Rav Soloveitchik is taken by the idea of the importance of
accepting the divine command even in the ethical realm.
However, inculcating this idea seems
rather difficult. Should we really
be walking around saying to ourselves, I would love to kill this individual who
just fell, but what can I do? God has
said You shall not murder, and on top of that, He requires us to be kind to
others, so instead of killing him, I will help him up! Is that what Rabbi Akiva and the
Yabetz mean to imply?
Why We Must Honor Our
Parents
A short analysis of the mitzva will hopefully make this a little more clear. On the simplest level, honoring ones
father and mother is a direct outgrowth of the logical norm of showing
gratitude. As the Chinnukh (Mitzva
33) writes:
At the root of this mitzva lies the thought that it is fitting for a man to
acknowledge and treat with loving-kindness the person who has treated him with
goodness, and he should not be a scoundrel, an ingrate who turns a cold shoulder
for this is an evil quality, utterly vile before God and mankind. It is incumbent upon a person to
realize that his father and mother are the cause of his being in the world;
hence, in the truest sense, it is proper for him to give them every honor and
benefit that he can, since they brought him into the world and then, too,
labored through many troubles over him in his early years.
The Chinnukh goes on to indicate that while there are uniquely Jewish elements
to honoring ones parents, the base mitzva is clearly logical and equally
applicable to all nations. In fact,
the Talmud (Kiddushin 31a) relates a fascinating story of the extent that
a non-Jew went to honor his parents.
They asked of Rabbi Eliezer: How far does the mitzva of honoring ones father
and mother extend?
He answered them: Go and see what one idolater in Ashkelon did for his father! His name was Dama son of Netina, and
it once happened that the sages wanted to stones for the Ephod from him, for a
profit of six hundred thousand [gold dinars] Rav Kahana says: eight hundred
thousand but the key was under his fathers head, and he did not disturb his
father.
The Talmud uses a non-Jew as the model for honoring ones parents, even to the
extent of losing a great business deal in order not to wake ones father. But if the Talmud can prove from a
non-Jew the extent of the mitzva, is there anything unique about a Jews
obligation?
The Approach of the
Netziv: Dual Nature of Interpersonal Obligations
The Netziv, in his approbation to the Chafetz Chayims work Ahavat
Chesed, goes to great lengths to try to explain the delicate balance of
recognizing the necessity of chesed without a divine imperative, while at
the same time appreciating the command.
The Netziv explains that from the dawn of
mankind, the Torah refers to people as brothers (see Bereishit
4:2) , for part of the framework of man, who was created differently than all
other creatures and animals, is the brotherhood which is supposed to exist
amongst humans. This is reflected
in the makeup of the earth as a world of kindness (Tehillim 89:2), which
obligates all human beings to be kind to each other.
The Jewish people, though, are endowed with an ingrown disposition toward
chesed (based on Yevamot 79a; see our third lesson); therefore, God
requires of the Jews higher standards of ethical behavior. Nevertheless, explains the Netziv,
the Torah repeatedly seeks to clarify its position: even though being part of
humanity requires ethical standards of behavior, God commands the Jewish people
specifically to maintain these values and requires that the Jews remain
cognizant of these commands.
Essentially, beside the general interpersonal requirement to be nice to ones
friend, one also must be beneficent due to a divine imperative.
The Netziv explains that the idea interpersonal mitzvot being divinely
commanded reflects itself in the standards of the law as well as its reward. As a divine imperative, the
parameters of the law are defined by God, not by ones inner feelings of
kindness. While providing a loan
with low interest might be considered kind, Gods command determines a different
level of chesed, requiring lending ones fellow money at no interest at
all. The second ramification of the
divinely ordained elements of the mitzva is reflected in the reward one receives
for fulfilling the mitzva. Any
mitzva which is commanded has an extra reward for being fulfilled in the land of
Israel, while any obligation which is purely rational would be treated equally
everywhere in the world.
The Netziv continues and illustrates his position using the mitzva of honoring
ones father and mother. The basic
obligation is rational and logical, for one must show gratitude to ones
parents, as expressed in the explanation of the Chinnukh. This rational element makes the
mitzva incumbent even upon non-Jews, as the Talmud cites regarding Dama Ben
Netinas exemplary act of honoring his father.
However, the Netziv writes that the Torah goes out of its way to indicate
that the Jews fulfillment of honoring ones parents is unique, in that the
Godly command gives it its special system of laws as well as a exceptional
reward. It is for this reason that
in the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:11), the Torah stresses the land of
Israel in connection to the reward for honoring ones parents, for the divine
imperative is always rewarded more extensively in the land of Israel, even if
the mitzva is logical as well.
Honoring Parents and
the Red Heifer:
With this in mind, let us return to the Talmudic passage for the conclusion of
Dama Ben Netinas story, in which we discover something astonishing. What is most surprising regarding
Damas tale is his reward. The
Talmud details that after losing the opportunity to sell his stone for the Ephod
due to his unwillingness to wake his father, he is blessed the next year with a
cow that could make him much more wealthy: a
para adumma (red heifer), which is
extremely rare and worth a fortune.
The ashes of the para adumma are needed for purifying one who has come into contact with
a corpse.
The next year, the Holy One blessed be He, gave Dama his reward, and a para
adumma was born in his herd. The
Sages went to him to purchase the heifer. Dama said to them I know that if I
would ask of you all the money in the world, you would give it to me. However, I ask you only for the
amount of money that I lost as a result of honoring my father.
Rabbi Chanina said: Now, if this is true of one who is not commanded, all the
more so for one who is commanded, for Rabbi Chanina said, A person who does
something being commanded is superior to one who does it without being
commanded.
What is the message of the Talmud?
Is it to be viewed as mere coincidence that after honoring his father dutifully,
of all the ways to earn a fortune, Dama is blessed with a red heifer? It has been noted that one would be
hard-pressed to find two mitzvot discussed in the Talmud which are more
in opposition: honoring ones parents is one of the most logical mitzvot,
while the purifying power of the para
adumma is one of the most difficult to understand, the prototypical chok.
Damas reward for honoring his father, in the form of the inscrutable
para adumma, is a lesson for the Jewish sages who are prepared to pay
top dollar for his cow: the two requirements are, in fact, not so different. For the Jews, unlike the non-Jew
Dama, honoring ones parents is not merely logical but divine, and it has
special parameters, similar to the para
adumma. In fact, in a future
lesson on honoring ones parents, we will investigate whether Dama acts properly
by not waking his father under these circumstances.
Conclusion
Where does this leave us? What seems
to be one contradiction after another may in fact be complementary. The element of command is essential,
as Rabbi Akiva maintains and as is later stressed by the Yabetz and the Netziv;
it is this command that gives properties of the inscrutable para adumma
to the obvious mitzva of honoring of ones parents. As Rav Moshe Feinstein explains (see
our previous last lesson) it is specifically by logical mitzvot that
recognizing the divine command is essential for insuring that the act performed
is a mitzva, and not just a nice gesture.
Nevertheless, while this acknowledgment is an essential element of
recognizing the word of God and the divine framework, allowing the command to
remain like the inscrutable para adumma is almost criminal.
It is on the basis of this that the Rambam states his opinion in his
introduction to Avot. The
objective of the ethical command in not mere action, but a mindset as well. Its goal is not just doing chesed,
but ahavat chesed, loving kindness, a personality defined by an affinity
for performing acts of kindness. The
divine imperative seeks to impart an attitude, instructing us to internalize the
religious guidelines, while at the same time focusing on the Godly ideals
transmitted. Even the Rambam may
agree to the Yabetz that praiseworthy is the one who fulfills even the most
basic of commandments with desire not to, but only at the beginning. After seeing the divine command in
the ethical area, one is supposed to undergo an attitude adjustment; one must
inculcate the norm into ones personality, developing an aversion to the
forbidden and a love for the required ideal.
The disputes we have seen may be partly based on different stages of the same
outlook. As the Netziv maintains,
the bottom line is that all mitzvot are commands, but there is also a
logical element. The command
provides the framework and guidelines for the rational mitzva. One is called upon to act not only in
accordance with ones instincts and intuitions, but to identify with what God
wants. Initially, ones
understanding may not be in sync with Gods, but ones spiritual existence
cannot be realized through inner tension and struggle, but rather only through
inculcated appreciation. Gadol
ha-metzuveh ve-oseh mi-mi she-eino metzuveh ve-oseh, A person who does
something being commanded is superior to one who does it without being
commanded.
A person indeed should enjoy his Avodat Hashem and feel fulfilled by
itbut not because these were initially his own desires and intuitions. These
started as being Gods will, which you are commanded to fulfill. But you have
molded yourself in such a way that you find joy in responding to command; your
self-fulfillment comes from living the life of one who is called, rather than
the life of one who is guided solely by his own inner feelings.
(By His Light, p. 58)
In other words, a mitzva always begins as bein adam la-Makom, between man
and God. Whether one is actively
cognizant of the command during his actions depends upon his stage of
development. When one is still
learning to comprehend and appreciate the various aspects of the mitzva, the
command is essential, gadol ha-metzuveh.
One is obligated, one is not merely quieting the conscience but in fact
fulfilling the will of the Almighty, who leaves one no other option. The only choice is to be nice and
considerate. At this stage, one is
also bidden to remove humanistic inclinations, as Rashi stresses, and to try to
focus on the mitzva itself.
After further study, one comes to appreciate the benefits ones fellow can
experience, specifically based upon the divine guidelines with their unique
element of bein adam le-chavero, aimed at providing for others in the
most effectively kind way. As long
as one has begun with the divine calling, one can focus now not on the
obligation as much as the internalized caring for ones neighbor.
Nevertheless, the ultimate goal is developing the personality of which the
Rambam speaks. Though one is not
expected to develop this overnight, the goal is to form an attitude in which one
is completely in sync with the command, to the point that one does not even feel
it. One who has reached this level
is kind to others because this is the person one has become. In being honest to oneself, bein
adam le-atzmo, one is simultaneously honest to Gods vision of what man can
and should become.
The individual described at the end of last weeks lesson, who gave charity
twice, may have done the right thing, because he indicated that he was only at
the beginning of his moral development.
Providing charity to silence ones conscience is nice, but if one is
unaware of the charitable obligation and does so merely because one is
embarrassed to see a pauper, then one is not fulfilling the mitzva, and it makes
sense to give charity once again, the right way.
However, if one develops ones personality to the point of recognizing
the Godly mandate of caring and providing for the unfortunate, then the initial
giving of tzedaka need not be because God commanded this action, but
rather, because I have developed the personality of living a life of inculcated
commands.
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