Work Done on Shabbat or Yom Tov by a Gentile for a Jew

 

Translated and adapted by Rav Eliezer Kwass

  

Question:

 

            In many instances, the Sages prohibited benefiting from work done by a Gentile for a Jew on Shabbat and Yom Tov.  Under which circumstances is such work prohibited, and why?  When is it prohibited, and how long is the duration of the prohibition?  We will focus here on the approaches of Rashi and the Rambam.

 

Basic Sources:

 

            The Talmud (Beitza 24b):  "Rav Papa said, 'The following is halakha:  Concerning a Gentile who brings a present [apparently produce] to a Jew on Yom Tov, if the same species exists still connected to the ground, it is forbidden on Yom Tov, and after Yom Tov for the amount of time it takes to do the work ("bikhdei she-ya'asu").  If the species does not exist connected to the ground, then if it is within the domain ("techum") it is permitted, but if it is outside the domain it is prohibited.  Something brought for one Jew is permissible for another Jew.’"

 

            Rashi (s.v. Ve-la'erev assurim bikhdei she-ya'asu") comments, "So that he should not benefit from work done on Yom Tov ... this is true as well after the first day of Yom Tov, even though the next night is Yom Tov sheni [the Diaspora's second day of Yom Tov].  If he waits “bikhdei she-ya'asu”, then he is protected either way: if the night is not Yom Tov, he has waited the proper amount of time, and if it is Yom Tov, it turns out that the produce was not picked on Yom Tov at all."

 

            One can conclude from Rashi that:

1.  The reason for the law of "bikhdei she-ya'asu" is to avoid deriving benefit from work done on Yom Tov.

2.  There is no need to prohibit use of something made on the first day during the entire second day of Yom Tov; "bikhdei she-ya'asu" immediately following the first day of Yom Tov is sufficient.

 

            The Tosafot differ with Rashi on both of these points:

1.  The reason for the law of "bikhedi shhe-ya'asu", according to the Tosafot, is to prevent a person from telling a Gentile to do work for him.  If we prohibit him from benefiting from the work "bikhdei she-ya'asu", he will not be tempted to tell a Gentile to do work for him, because he stands to gain nothing by such a request.

2.  It follows that work done by the Gentile on the first day of Yom Tov is prohibited on the second day also, until the requisite amount of time after the holiday has elapsed.  This is to discourage a Jew from telling a Gentile on the first day to do work for him, planning to utilize it on the second day.

 

A Contradiction Within the Rambam:

 

            We find an apparent contradition in the Rambam's approach to this subject. In one place he seems to rule like Rashi and in another like the Tosafot!  In Hilkhot Yom Tov (1:24) he writes, "Something connected to the ground that was picked up on the first day can be eaten on the second."  The Maggid Mishneh understands this to mean that if a Gentile pulled it out on the first day, it is permissible for the Jew on the second - like Rashi's opinion (see Lechem Mishneh there).  On the other hand, in Hilkhot Shabbat (6:8) Rambam writes, "They only prohibited it after the holiday until after the time it takes to make it ("bikhdei she-ya'asu") ... lest he tell a Gentile to do work for him."  According to this stated reason, he should have ruled like Tosafot and not like Rashi.  Rambam's opinion is internally inconsistent.

 

A Difficulty with Rashi

 

            To arrive at a better understanding of both the Rambam's and Rashi's approaches, we must ask another question regarding Rashi.  When explaining the fact that when a Gentile brings a Jew a gift from outside the city boundary ("techum shabbat") it is permissible for another Jew, Rashi comments, "It seems to me that there is another reason to prohibit something brought from outside the boundary: perhaps the Jew will send for something.  Something brought for one Jew is permissible to another, because he will not come to send for something [from that Gentile]; after all, he does not know him." (See Rashi for his first reason.)  According to this reason, why should we not prohibit use of the object for the entire second day also?  Rashi's "either-way" logic (if the first was the real day of Yom Tov, he waited bikhdei she-ya'asu; if the second was the real day, it was actually brought on a weekday) does not apply according to this second reason.  Since on the second day work is still prohibited for the Jew, he might come to send for something from the Gentile.  One cannot even say that Rashi is retracting here the explanation he gave at the opening of the sugya, because if that were the case, he would have had to permit use by another Jew of ANY work done for one Jew, not just objects brought from outside the "techum".

 

A Resolution for both Rashi and the Rambam:

 

            It seems, therefore, that both Rashi and the Rambam believe that there are two legitimate reasons to prohibit the use of work done by a Gentile for a Jew on Shabbat and Yom Tov:

1.  So as not to benefit from work done on the holy day.

2.  To prevent one from telling a Gentile to do work for him. 

            The argument between Rashi and the RAmbam is when to apply each of the reasons.  We will deal with each reason individually.

 

I.  Not benefiting from work done on Shabbat or Yom Tov

 

The Rambam:

            The Rambam believes that benefit from work done on Shabbat or Yom Tov is only banned on the day itself, that is, during the actual time of the prohibition, but not after.

 

            It seems that the Rashba, in his commentary on Chulin 15, quotes a similar position.  Rav Yehuda's opinion is that food cooked unknowingly on Shabbat is prohibited so that one does not benefit from work done on Shabbat, but it is prohibited only on Shabbat itself.  Rashba comments, "Rashi z"l permitted use after Shabbat only after the time it takes to cook it.  This makes sense, since the whole reason for the prohibition is so that he should not benefit from his evil actions.  If we were to permit use immediately after Shabbat, his actions would have been effective.  Some, however, permit use IMMEDIATELY after Shabbat."  Although the Rashba affirms that Rashi's position is sensible, he still is open to an opinion which would permit use immediately after Shabbat.  Waiting "bikhdei she-ya'asu", then, is because of "lest he come to tell the Gentile to do it for him," and the ban on deriving benefit from the work only exists during the time of the original prohibition.

 

Rashi:

            Rashi believes that the prohibition of benefit extends until after Shabbat - "bikhdei she-ya'asu".  Otherwise, he has still benefited from Shabbat work.  However, his position that permits work done on the first day of Yom Tov to be used on the second is difficult.  Why is it not prohibited all of the second day?  Since, in practice, he cannot do work on the whole second day, he thereby benefits from Yom Tov work even after "bikhdei she-ya'asu".

 

            One could resolve this by distinguishing between work done on Yom Tov sheni shel galuyot and work done on a regular Yom Tov or Shabbat.  The second day is only prohibited because of a doubt about which day is really Yom Tov.  Without this doubt, work would have been permitted.  Therefore, assuming the person waits bikhdei she-ya'asu, he is not benefiting from prohibited work, but rather because he is ignoring the principle of being stringent in cases of doubt. 

 

            It seems to me that another resolution is possible.  We may suggest that Rashi agrees, in principle, that benefit from work is only prohibited on Shabbat itself.  The reason that it is prohibited after Shabbat "bikhdei she-ya'asu" is because the only way of achieving results during this time period after Shabbat is to have begun the work during Shabbat.  This period of time, then, is included in the prohibition of doing work, and is, with regard to this halakha, an extension of Shabbat.  [We find a similar phenomenon in Tosafot's opinion on Shabbat 36b that the prohibition of returning food to the fire ("hachzara") begins before Shabbat, the amount of time it takes to boil the contents of the pot.  Shabbat has, in effect, been extended to erev Shabbat. However, here is not the place for a lengthy discussion reagrdsing this point.]

 

            According to the Rambam, however, the purpose of the prohibition after Shabbat is to deter people from telling a Gentile to do work for them, not because benefit from Shabbat work is prohibited.  The Rambam only mentions the problem of "lest he will tell a Gentile" in conjunction with Motza'ei Shabbat, not Shabbat itself (as we showed in the Rashba's approach above): " ... lest he will tell a Gentile to do work for him and IT WILL BE READY FOR HIM IMMEDIATELY."

 

II.  Lest He Tell a Gentile to do Work for Him

 

Rashi:

            Rashi's approach maintains that in any situation in which it is prohibited to derive benefit from work, it is not necessary to be concerned lest one tell a Gentile to do work for him.  We are not worried that people will go this far.  The people to which the halakha relates are not those who have no regard for Shabbat observance or for the prohibition of benefiting from Shabbat work, but rather those who might be lax about "telling a Gentile" in a case when there is no such prohibition of benefit.  Furthermore, one is not likely, according to Rashi, to tell a Gentile to do work today which he plans to benefit from tomorrow, after Shabbat.  Rather, the problem of "lest he come to tell Gentile to do work for him" is restricted to cases in which no ban on benefit applies.  Rashi apparently believes, like Rabbeinu Yona (brought in the Rashba's commentary on the 19th chapter of Shabbat), that the prohibition of deriving benefit from Shabbat work does not apply when the work does not physically change the object.  Thus, when a Gentile brings a gift to a Jew from outside the techum on Yom Tov, it is forbidden to that particular Jew, in order to counteract the prevailing laxity regarding "saying to a Gentile."  There is, in this case, no prohibition of benefit from Yom Tov work, as evidenced by the fact that the recipient of the gift need not wait bikhdei she-ya'asu.

 

Rambam:

            Even according to the Rambam, the decree lest a Jew will tell a Gentile to do work for him which he plans to make use of after Shabbat exists only as an EXTENSION of the fundamental prohibition of deriving benefit from Shabbat work on Shabbat.  He agrees with Rashi that it is unlikely that a Jew will tell a Gentile to do work today for his benefit on tomorrow.  When, however, a prohibition to derive benefit from Shabbat work already exists, we are willing to extend it to "bikhdei she-ya'asu" because of this possibility, however unlikely.  There is no independent decree based on "lest he tell a Gentile to do work for him", only an extension until after Shabbat of the existing decree prohibiting the derivation of benefit from Shabbat work.

 

We can now summarize Rashi's and Rambam's approaches.

 

Rashi:

1.  All benefit from work done on Shabbat (by Jews as well as by Gentiles - see Rashi Chulin 15a s.v. Lo Yei'akheil") is prohibited until after Shabbat "bikhdei she-ya'asu".

2.  In cases in which benefit from Shabbat work is prohibited, there is no need for a decree based on "lest he tell a Gentile to do work for him."  We assume that the prohibition to derive benefit is regarded seriously enough so that we do not fear that people will "tell a Gentile."

3.  When benefit from the work is not prohibited (e.g., when the object has not physically changed) we do fear that one may tell a Gentile to do work for him.  This decree, however, only exists on Shabbat or Yom Tov itself.

 

The Rambam:

1.  We extend the prohibition of deriving benefit from a Gentile's Shabbat work until after Shabbat "bikhdei she-ya'asu", only because of "lest he tell the Gentile to do work for him."

2.  On a Yom Tov which lasts two days, we do not extend the prohibition to the second day, for on that day there is no ban on benefit, and the problem of telling a Gentile exists only as an addendum to this general ban.

3.  If a Jew did work on Shabbat, and there is therefore no need to decree "lest he tell", the benefit from this work is only forbidden on Shabbat itself.

 

 

(Adapted from Daf Kesher Kislev 5750 #209, vol.2, pp. 382-385)