Torah Study - Creation or Revelation (2)

 

2. CONTROVERSY

 

The approach that I presented last week opens the way to a new understanding of Halakha's attitude towards controversy.  This is a complex and lengthy topic, requiring separate treatment. Here we shall only touch upon the topic to the degree that it is relevant to our discussion. There is a school of thought, led by Rambam, which views controversy as a negative phenomenon. According to these authorities, in every controversy, one of the opinions must be false; ideally that there should be no disagreements whatsoever. Others, however, relate to controversy as a desirable phenomenon. For example, this is what is implied by the famous Gemara regarding the controversies between the schools of Shammai and Hillel:

 

The school of Shammai and the school of Hillel disagreed for three years. This side would say: The Halakha is in accordance with us, and the other side would say: The Halakha is in accordance with us. A heavenly voice went forth, declaring: Both this and that are the words of the living God, but Halakha is in accordance with the school of Hillel. (Eruvin 13b)

 

In actual practice, the Halakha must be decided according to one opinion; but on the fundamental level – "both this and that are the words of the living God." What is the meaning of this expression? Many explanations have been offered over the course of history. Some have suggested that uncertainty and controversy are the best means of clarifying the truth, even though one of the opinions must be false. Others have argued that neither position is entirely right or entirely wrong. Truth is complex; each position represents one side of the truth.

 

According to the approach that I am trying to develop here, the expression, "both this and that are the words of the living God," may be understood in its plain sense: since there is no single halakhic truth, both opinions are equally legitimate and "true." Both are considered a legitimate development of Halakha. According to this understanding, controversy is an extremely desirable phenomenon, as it follows from the words of Rabbi Yechiel Epstein, author of "Arukh ha-Shulchan":

 

On the contrary, this is the glory of our pure and holy Torah. The entire Torah is called a song, and the splendor of a song is when there are different voices; this is the essence of harmony. Anyone who sails the sea of the Talmud will discern the harmony rising from all the different voices. (Introduction to Arukh ha-Shulchan, Choshen Misphat)

 

If, however, any development of the Torah in any direction whatsoever is deemed legitimate, how then is it possible to decide between two conflicting opinions? Here is the point to clarify that abandoning the criterion of a binding and absolute truth does not legitimize every stub of an idea or patch of a thought. A well-based and organized halakhic argument is preferable to one that is flimsy and dubious. "Truth" is replaced by a different criterion: coherency, that is, presenting a construct enjoying solid internal consistency. This standard allows us to rate arguments and ideas according to the internal compatibility of the halakhic system that they present. And again, this is without arguing that one suggestion is "true" and all others false.

 

What we have said here relates not only to specific ideas and explanations, but to methods of study as well. Any approach to Torah study must be internally consistent and logical. Thus, for example, the Tosafists assumed – in contrast to Rashi – that, as a rule, the various talmudic passages are in total agreement one with the other. This harmonistic working assumption was the focal point of their approach and shaped their attitude to halakhic study. We have already mentioned that there is ample room in the world of Torah study for different approaches. When we come, therefore, to assess the Tosafist approach, we will not investigate whether this assumption is "true" or "false." We will only examine whether the approach in and of itself presents a solid and well founded halakhic structure, with no internal faults. The considerable space enjoyed by the Tosafists in Torah libraries answers the question in the clearest manner. This was not the fate of some of the other approaches to Torah study, which were rejected by later generations of Torah students.

 

Obviously, this is not the only limitation. There are additional requirements that any approach to Torah study must fulfill in order to be accepted as legitimate. We shall mention two of the basic requirements: 1) Any method of study must extract from those who adopt it the educational and spiritual results which we expect Torah study to yield; 2) any method of study must continue the dynamics of the Oral Law and not sever itself from it (and this too for, among others, educational reasons).

 

3. Wild growth?

 

In conclusion, let us consider one more point regarding the topic under discussion. In this context, some have pointed to a problematic point: surely, the mitzvot have reasons; every mitzva has a certain objective that it serves. If we allow free and unhindered development of Halakha and assume that whatever the Sages agree upon is the truth, we shall come to rulings that veer from the Torah's intentions and fail to yield the positive effects of the mitzva. Even if all the doctors in the world agree that a certain poison is harmless, someone who ingests it will still die.

 

In order to answer this question, we must first distinguish between theoretical study and practical halakhic decision-making. Theoretical Torah study is free and unlimited. When dealing with practical halakhic rulings, however, the original intention and the value of "truth" are of great significance. This is because of the concern that if the mitzva is applied in a manner that significantly deviates from the Torah's original intention, the positive effects of the mitzva will not be actualized. Another reason, as my revered teacher Rav Aharon Lichtenstein often says in this context, is that regarding halakhic rulings, great significance is attached to the personal authority of the particular decisor, as well as to his original intention. The question of the relationship between theoretical study and practical halakhic decision-making is a complicated one, regarding which there were various approaches over the generations. Today, the distinction between theoretical study and practical Halakha is widely accepted, as it was also in earlier periods.[2]

 

In addition, an important principle raised by Rambam should be cited here. Before beginning to explain the rationales for the mitzvot, Rambam argues that neither does he see the need nor is he able to explain all the details of a mitzva:

 

But no cause will ever be found for the fact that one particular sacrifice consists in a lamb and another in a ram and that the number of the victims should be one particular number. Accordingly, in my opinion, all those who occupy themselves with finding causes for something of these particulars are stricken with a prolonged madness. (More Nevukhim III, 26)

 

Following Rambam, it may be suggested that a mitzva's rationale is concealed in its general principles, those which comprise the kernel of the mitzva. Since, however, the halakhic details are arbitrary, changes made in those details should not have any adverse effects on the benefit to be derived from the mitzva. As long as the kernel of the halakha remains stable, the halakha may develop in any direction, without neutralizing the positive effects of the mitzva.

 

It should also be remembered that even the details that are determined in arbitrary manner have value. Though they may not match the original intent of the mitzva, they have tremendous value: the value of any deed that reflects the will of God. When we observe some halakhic detail solely because God commanded us to do so, we perform the noblest possible religious act. The particular detail may not advance us from a spiritual perspective, but its observance turn us into true servants of God.

 

Thus, we have answered the objections raised against the idea that the Oral Law involves a creative human act rather an uncovering of the Divine truth.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[2] See Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Ma Dodekh Midod," in Divrei Hagut ve-Ha'arakha (Jerusalem, 1992). Regarding a different period, and in a different context, see I. Ta-Shema, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-Kadmon (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 13.

 

(Translated by Rav David Strauss)

 

 

Chag kasher ve-sameach.