Siman 9 - Tzitzit

 

1. THE MITZVA OF TZITZIT

TZITZIT COMPARED TO ALL THE COMMANDMENTS

 

The mitzva of tzitzit is compared to all the commandments because it comes to remind us of all the commandments.  It is often likened to a string tied around the finger to remind oneself of an important errand; in fact, there are many stories of people who were dissuaded from straying from the way of Torah by noticing that they were wearing tzitzit.

 

The fringes are also compared to a special badge which we wear to show OTHERS that we are servants of Hashem, and this is related to the first idea.  The garment reminds us as well as others of our unique Jewish identity and dissuades us from un-Jewish behavior.  Not only do the tzitzit remind us of our obligation to keep the commandments, but they also remind us that others, even non-Jews, have certain expectations of us which we should strive to fulfill.

 

There is an additional reason that this mitzva is so beloved.  Our clothes, as we explained in siman 3, are an extension of ourselves.  (Even in secular law, causing damage to the clothes worn by another is not considered assault - a mere threat - but battery, a violation of person.)  Thus, this is a mitzva performed on an extension of our bodies.  We could even liken it to the mitzva of berit mila, which is performed on a man's body proper.  The mila, too, is a visible, but modest, reminder of our Jewishness. (1) 

 

ASSUMPTION OF THE MITZVA

 

A man is not obligated to wear tzitzit unless he chooses to wear a four-cornered garment, and even then, there is no requirement to wear the tzitzit in a conspicuous way.  Nonetheless, a committed Jew should be enthusiastic about this opportunity to reinforce his commitment to himself, and - if custom permits -  to demonstrate it to others.

 

WOMEN AND TZITZIT

 

Women are exempt from tzitzit, from tefillin, and from wearing a kippa.  These accessories constitute a kind of "uniform" for the observant Jew.  It has been astutely observed that women tend to eschew uniforms of all kinds.  Because of their more inward orientation, they tend to place much more emphasis on the expression of their individuality and its vicissitudes, while conspicuous demonstration of their affiliation is less important to them.  The demands of the halakha seem to conform to this observation.

 

Historically, there have been women who have worn tzitzit, as indeed women are able to assume any time-dependent commandment.  However, our analysis (as well as consensus of authority) suggests that any woman desiring to fulfill this mitzva should put the emphasis on reminding herself, and not others, of her commitment to Torah.  Modesty also suggests that we should avoid conspicuous performance of customs which, for whatever reason, are usually associated with members of the opposite sex.  A woman wearing tzitzit could conceivably be considered cross-dressing. (2)

 

TEKHELET

 

The third paragraph of the Shema, which contains the commandment of tzitzit, admonishes that we should gaze at them "so that you should perform ALL of My commandments."  It is ironic that this very act of gazing at the tzitzit reminds us that we are NOT performing all of the commandments - there is a conspicuous omission in the fringes themselves!  This is because for over a thousand years it has been impossible to fulfill the commandment of "tekhelet" - that the fringes should include not only white fringes (or those dyed with regular colors) but also "tekhelet" ones, which are dyed with the blood of the "chilazon."

 

Recently, the research of many Torah scholars has come to concur with the near-consensus of secular scholars who have identified the chilazon with a particular species of conch.  (3)  While it is too early to assert that a definite identification has been made none that would carry with it a definite obligation, in the meantime thousands of Jews are doing their best to "perform ALL of My commandments" according to the best information they have.  This explains any sky-blue fringes you may have seen. 

 

2. THE TALLIT (se'ifim 1-3)

 

MATERIAL

 

While the Kitzur recommends a wool tallit, the mitzva can be fulfilled with a garment of any woven material.  Among Ashkenazim, the customary ruling is that any such fabric is fully equivalent to wool.

 

Non-woven fabrics present a problem.  Leather clothes are not considered "garments" in the Torah, and this may be because they are not woven. (4)  For this reason it is better not to make a blessing on mesh tzitzit.  For the same reason, it's better not to wear them outside an eiruv on Shabbat - a common situation for soldiers who particularly favor mesh tallitot.

 

DIMENSIONS

 

While the Kitzur requires a garment half an "ama" wide (about 25 cm or ten inches) many authorities are "stringent" to require tzitzit on narrower garments - meaning that they are lenient to allow fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit on such garments.

 

EXTENT OF THE OPENING

 

While the Kitzur rules that one should not close the open part of the garment (which makes the protruding angle a true halakhic "corner") even with a hook, it is generally accepted that  even if the open portion is closed by buttons or hooks, it still is considered a kosher tallit as long as the buttons or hooks are easily opened.  This explains the current fashion for wearing fringed tallitot made of quality shirt fabric as an upper garment similar to a vest; the sides of these garment are closed by loose buckles. (5)

 

ARRANGEMENT OF THE CORNERS

 

It is accepted custom that no obligation for tzitzit exists unless the garment is commonly worn with two corners in front and two in back.  Otherwise, an ordinary man's shirt would require fringes - two on the front shirt-tails and two on the collar! (6)

 

3. PLACEMENT OF THE FRINGES (se'if 3)

 

As the Torah demands, the fringes are placed on the CORNER of the garment - and not on the garment itself.  The garment itself, as we pointed out, is an extension of the body.  This placement exemplifies that our spirituality has extension - it succeeds in dwelling in the material world while fully expressing the unique identity of the individual human spirit in which it originates.

 

Even so, the tzitzit should not be too close to the edge of the garment.  They can not serve as an adequate conduit of our spirituality unless they are firmly anchored in their source.  This same idea can help us understand why the garment itself requires certain minimum dimensions.  If it doesn't provide some minimal covering then the garment itself can not adequately embrace the human spirit it clothes.

 

This is one more aspect of tzitzit which reminds us of the mila, which is performed on an extension of a limb (the foreskin) which is itself located on the "end" of the body (as it is referred to in the Midrash - "rosh ha-gevia"). (7)

 

4. T'AASEH - VE-LO MIN HA-ASUI: Do - don't take from the done (se'if 6)

 

The Torah commands us to make fringes on our garments and to make a sukka.  Our sages inferred that we must MAKE them - we can't use ready-made.  Tying fringes on a garment, or placing thatch on a dwelling, is meant to be a transforming act: an ordinary garment is made into a testimony of God's dominion; an ordinary structure is transformed into a symbol of God's protective providence.  Tying fringes on a three-cornered garment or placing thatch on a haystack are insignificant acts; cutting a garment to add a corner or hollowing out a hay-stack to create a structure are not mitzva-acts in themselves and can not retroactively give the tying or the placing a transformative character.

 

This requirement of "ta'aseh - ve-lo min ha-asui" is particularly interesting because, in fact, there is no mitzva TYING tzitzit or MAKING a sukka.  A kosher tallit or sukka is only a means to fulfill a commandment. 

 

Many commandments require us to perform acts on ordinary material objects.  Through these acts we elevate and sanctify the material.  However, we are not indifferent to which elements of the physical we perform mitzvot on.  On the contrary, there are many requirements which dictate that the objects we use for commandments, even if they have no special sanctity, have been given a certain spiritual charge - charge in the sense of a load and in the related sense of mission. One of these requirements is "ta'aseh ve-lo min ha-asui."  Another one, relevant to our siman, is that in general mitzvot can not be performed with stolen objects, and indeed the Shulchan Arukh rules that a tallit made with stolen tzitzit is disqualified.

 

5. IF ONE'S TALLIT FALLS OFF (se'if 10)

 

The Kitzur adopts a stringent ruling (regarding berakhot) that if one's tallit falls off almost completely, one should not make a new berakha when putting it back on.  But there are many authorities who rule that one should make a berakha in this case, since after all one is not fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit with a tallit which only slightly remains on the body. (8)

 

6. NICHA LE-INISH LE-ME'ABED MITZVA BE-MAMONEI - "A person is happy to have a mitzva performed with his property" (se'if 11).

 

In general, the Halakha is extremely strict with regard to use of another's property, even for a good cause.  A few authorities forbid stealing even in a case of danger to life.  Their reasoning is that even though all Torah prohibitions are suspended to save life (except for idolatry, licentiousness and bloodshed), in this case one is transgressing not only against God but against one's fellow man as well.  (Most authorities allow unauthorized use to save life, but require restitution.) (9)

 

And many authorities forbid taking someone's property even if one is completely certain that he would allow it - for example, taking candies from a dish in the living room without asking permission. (10)  Here the opposite reasoning applies: it's true that my friend doesn't mind, but stealing is not only an interpersonal sin, but also a transgression against God.  (However, many permit this, especially in a case where most people are accustomed to allow use of their property, and not only this particular owner.)

 

In a case of borrowing that does not cause any loss, there is more room to be lenient.  The language of the Kitzur here suggests an additional leniency: the misappropriation is not only with the owner's approval but for his own benefit.  Therefore, there is an additional reason to permit unauthorized use.  The Kitzur's ruling that one may borrow and return someone's tallit without permission derives from the assumption that the owner is actually happy to have his property used for a mitzva.  It's as if the borrower is acting on the owner's behalf! (11)

 

7. KEVOD HA-BERIOT - Human dignity (se'if 20)

 

The inherent dignity of the human being, who was created in God's image, is a supreme value in halakha.  In general, preserving human dignity overrides any rabbinical prohibition, and overrides even a Torah prohibition in a case of omission.  That is, one may refrain from doing an act which the Torah commands if this act compromises fundamental human dignity, even if the act is required to avoid a prohibition.  (However, one may never actively transgress a Torah prohibition, nor actively transgress a rabbinic one unless the loss of dignity is extreme.)

 

The gemara expresses this principle by saying, "How great is human dignity, which supercedes even a Torah prohibition."  Even though the gemara then goes on to qualify this statement as explained above, the strong language expressing a fundamental value equivalence is not without significance.  Perhaps we could even reconcile the wording with the halakha by pointing out the great dignity and nobility embodied in the very act of enduring humiliation in order not to compromise one's ideals - in this case, the ideal of upholding the Torah and refraining at all costs from doing an act which controverts its dictates.

 

8. ORDINARY GARMENTS WITH FOUR CORNERS (se'if 21)

 

In biblical times a four-cornered garment was customary garb; today a special garment is worn to fulfill the mitzva of tzitzit.  Still, some fairly commonplace clothes have four corners - for example, a poncho or tails with a long slit.  To avoid all doubt, it is prudent to round one corner of such apparel.

 

 

Endnotes:

 

(1) Perhaps there is basis for this comparison in the Arizal.  I heard in the name of the Ari that there is a proof that we should wear a tallit at night from a famous story about David Ha-Melekh - that one day in the bathhouse David suddenly worried that he was naked of mitzvot, until he noticed his mila (Menachot 43b).  The Ari asks, why wasn’t David worried when he went to sleep too?  It must be that he slept in a tallit.

 

(2) Mentioned in the name of Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik by several of his students.

 

(3) Including Rav Herzog who was inclined to this view except for the fact that the color was wrong.  Now that it is shown that dying in daylight gives the right color, he can be added to the consensus.  Article of Yehuda Rock in Techumin 15.

 

(4) Igrot Moshe OC II:1.

 

(5) Magen Avraham citing Terumat Ha-Deshen 296 (not 297 as printed).

 

(6) This is pointed out by Beit Yosef OC 10:12, see also Rema on OC 10:12.

 

(7) Sifra Tazri'a.

 

(8) MB 8:41.  BY compares this to the question in 97d if putting one’s tallit back on is a hefsek in tefilla; according to this we should rule like the Kitzur.

 

(9) See sources in Pitchei Choshen Geneiva 1:9.  He cites a Yerushalmi (Shabbat end of ch. 14) which seems to include  stealing together with idolatry, licentiousness and bloodshed among the prohibitions which can not be transgressed even to save life.

 

(10) This is discussed in Pitchei Choshen, Geneiva 1:15.  The author explains that Tosafot are stringent even when people are in general permissive.  The Ran is permissive when it is usual to allow.  And the Shakh permits even when it is usual to be strict but the user is sure that the particular owner in this case would allow.

 

(11) We would compare this to the dispute regarding selling deposited chametz without permission before it becomes forbidden.  Some forbid, some permit, and some require - so much so that the bailee is considered liable if he does not sell. SA OC 443:2, and MB and BH there.

The case of tzitzit is not mentioned in the gemara (the main case is bedikat chametz Pesachim 4), but many Rishonim are lenient based on this principle.  See BY and SA OC  14:4.