Remittance of Loans
Bein Adam Le-chavero: Ethics
of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin Zimmerman
Shiur #24: Remittance of Loans
The Responsibility of the Recipient of a Free
Loan
In last weeks lesson,
which discussed the mitzva of extending interest-free loans, we touched on the
responsibilities of a person who receives tzedaka or a loan. We also
noted that it is easy for the recipient to overlook this responsibility due to
the fact that the loan is given without interest. On the other side of the
dynamic, providing interest-free loans is an extremely difficult mitzva. One is
essentially requested to forego the use of his money and give it to another
person who may not be able to return it, while collecting no charge in return.
As we saw in previous
lessons, there are two different mitzvot to give loans. One involves
giving money to the poor in lieu of an outright gift; the second is that of a
loan to a person who, though not poor, requires additional money at the moment,
perhaps for a business venture. Although there is a mitzva to lend to him,
unlike in the previous case, the Torah is specifically concerned that the loan
be repaid, and provides mechanisms to ensure that this happen.
Here, having discussed
the responsibilities of the lender at length, we will address the
responsibilities incumbent upon the recipient in greater detail. On the most
basic level, the must repay the sum in full and punctually. Because the Torah
provides for two different types of loans, a person who receives an
interest-free loan may be inclined to view it incorrectly as a gift. In the
absence of interest, the recipient lacks a powerful incentive to return what he
has borrowed as quickly as possible.
True, we already have
seen that lending money that may not be repaid is an ultimate act of kindness.
However, this is true only when the money is given to a needy person. Only in
such a case does the Torah allow a person to receive a loan but not return it
until he has the wherewithal to do so. In such a case, buoyed by the lack of
interest, the recipient is truly aided by the funds and will not be driven
further into debt by interest. However, in instances where the lender does not
view the money as charity, but as a very temporary loan (and where he
potentially cannot afford to give it as a gift), the lack of interest may cause
damage by dampening the borrowers eagerness to return the loan.
Just as a borrower might
take advantage of the lack of interest, he might take advantage of other
mitzvot meant to prevent abuse by lenders. If in fact he feels that he can
avoid payment without incurring severe ramifications, then his behavior will not
only hurt the lender, but also impact detrimentally on society by discouraging
people from lending money. Further, this behavior might result in severe damage
to the character of the recipient.
Certain chesed
organizations that work to teach responsible financial behavior have developed a
method for preventing such a development: when a person gives a loan to a
recipient who does not seek charity, the means of reimbursement should be made
clear at the onset. One should think twice before providing a loan to someone
who is not in need of charity without receiving postdated checks and agreement
to a strict schedule of reimbursement.
True, it may feel as
though doing so cheapens the act of kindness. Yet setting down such guidelines
helps the borrower to feel his responsibility to return the loan. Additionally,
having a reimbursement schedule allows people to lend more, because they feel
secure in the knowledge that they are almost guaranteed to receive their money
in return.[1]
Not Withholding Loans
A certain difficulty with
our perspective on the borrowers responsibility is posed by the mitzvot
associated with the remittance loans, which can free borrowers of the obligation
to return money they have borrowed. At the moment that the year following a
sabbatical year begins, all loans that are due but have not been paid are
cancelled, as described in the Torah:
At the end of seven years you shall perform a release [shemitta], and
this is the substance of the release: that every creditor release his hand from
that which he has lent to his friend. He shall not exact from his friend or from
his brother, because he will have declared the time of the release for the Lord.
(Devarim 15:12)
In commenting on this
mitzva, many stress the great obligations of the lender, who not only must
forfeit interest on a loan, but must forfeit the loan itself if it is not repaid
by the close of the sabbatical year. Even beyond absolving borrowers of the need
to return loans, the Torah prohibits Jews from refusing to extend loans when the
sabbatical year approaches out of fear that the loan will not be returned.
However, there is more to
be said. To obtain a better understanding of these concepts, we will now delve
into some basic sources regarding the remittance of loans.
The reality of remittance
consists of three mitzvot: two forbidding loan collection, and one that
concerns withholding loans. Namely, one positive mitzva (release) requires the
creditor to cancel the loan, one negative commandment (he shall not exact)
forbids him to demand payment, and another prohibition (several verses later)
bars one from refusing to lend as the sabbatical year approaches. In the context
of this last mitzva, the Torah goes so far as to refer to one who withholds a
loan as lawless (beliyyaal), a harsh term used for idol worshippers (see
Lesson 20):
Beware lest there be a
lawless thought in your heart saying, The seventh year, the year of remission,
approaches, and you begrudge your destitute brother and do not give to him
You shall surely give to him, and let your heart not feel bad when you give to
him, for in return for this matter, the Lord, your God, will bless you in all
your deeds and in all your endeavors. (verses 910)[2]
This mitzva, we understand, is directed at a
person who would be willing to extend a righteous, non-interest-bearing loan,
but is afraid that if he does so at the moment, he will not recoup his money.
Why is such a thought so bad that it is described in the same manner as idol
worship?
Lawlessness: Who and When?
In truth, although this
prohibition applies most immediately to the period before the sabbatical year,
it is interspersed with various other mitzvot of tzedaka (see
Lesson 19). Based on the context, most commentators understand that the
prohibition applies to any inappropriate act of withholding tzedaka.
Indeed, most of the rationales they offer for the use of the word lawless for
a person who hesitates to lend seem applicable to tzedaka in general.
Maharal
explains that the term is germane because the person in question fails to
recognize the bond of brotherhood that is emphasized in these verses. One who
refuses to help other Jews who are in need expresses alienation from his
brothers and a failure to recognize the kinship and shared responsibility of all
Jews. His refusal, then, is essentially an act of rebellion against the Jews as
a people.
Yismach
Moshe, meanwhile, attributes the refusal to lend to arrogance. Based on his
understanding, the use of the word lawless can be understood through the prism
of the dictum that equates arrogance with idolatry. In a word, one who is
excessively proud and therefore unwilling to assist the needy is comparable to
an idolater.
Others attribute the
would-be lenders insensitivity to a sense of predetermination believing that
the needy are unworthy of money which is akin to idolatry. Similarly,
Nachshoni quotes Rav Shmelke of Nikolsburg as explaining that the prohibition
let your heart not feel bad when you give to him refers to a person who
refuses to help the poor because he believes that their sorry lot is a result of
their bad deeds.[3]
Ha-ketav Ve-hakabbala seeks to prove, based on the flow of the verses,
that the prohibition is directed at a person who has lent on collateral so
that the loan will not be remitted and yet still refuses to lend, on the
pretext that the poor will have equal access to his produce during the
approaching sabbatical year and do not deserve a loan on top of that.
Rav Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo 1:47), meanwhile, notes that the prohibition has
limits. It does not apply when one has legitimate reasons to fear that the
borrower will not repay the loan, he explains. Instead, it pertains only to one
who entertains the lawless thought that a trustworthy Jew will not repay a loan
only out of the would-be lenders fear of the sabbatical years approach, not
due to any justified concern regarding the would-be borrower. This mitzva, then,
addresses a person who would stop himself from performing an act of kindness due
to ungrounded fears.
Based on the Torahs
placement of this prohibition in the context of the sabbatical year, despite its
more general applicability, we may conclude that the remittance of loans is an
important part of the Torahs model of how to show concern for others. Why is
this? Why should the remittance of the sabbatical year be characterized as an
act of profound kindness rather than one where lenders are sold out and
borrowers are let off the hook?
The Borrowers Obligation
Notwithstanding our
initial impression of the remittance of loans, the Mishna (Sheviit 10:8)
clarifies that it applies only to lenders. Borrowers are not in fact freed of
any and all obligations:[4]
[If a borrower wishes to]
return a loan after the sabbatical year, [the lender] should say to him, I
release the obligation. If the borrower replies, Nevertheless [I wish to repay
it], then the lender should accept the repayment, as it states, this is the
word[5]
of the release (Devarim 15:2)
The
Mishna thus derives
from the Torahs terminology that remittance of loans is substantially a matter
of words: the lender is required not to refuse repayment, but merely to state
that he releases the obligation.
The next mishna
further clarifies that not only may a borrower
repay his loans, but such
behavior is praiseworthy:
One who repays a debt
after the sabbatical year the Sages are pleased with him.
If the sabbatical year cancels loans, though, why
should one be encouraged to return a loan subsequently? The reality is that
there still is good reason to return the money, as
Rabbeinu Bachya (Devarim 15:2) comments:
If the borrower does not
repay his debts even though he is legally in sound financial condition, he risks
that the lender will shame him by spreading the word that his borrower took
advantage of the lenders good nature and simply ate up his money.
On a practical level, since the lender
borrowed the money with intent to repay it, it is in his best interest to do so
if he can. Only if the borrower cannot afford repayment does he stand to benefit
from the technical cancellation of the obligation.
Loans: Voided or Silenced?
Whereas Rabbeinu Bachya
understands the mishna on a practical level, the Gemaras treatment of it
calls into question the basic assumption of our initial question: that the
sabbatical year truly cancels loans.
In Gittin (37b),
Rabba is quoted as stating that if a lender says that he releases an obligation
and the borrower decides to take advantage and not repay the loan, the lender
can tali him until he agrees to pay. The definition of tali is
debated by the commentators, but Rashi understands it to mean that the lender
may hang the borrower up high until he acquiesces. The obvious question then is,
what right does a lender have to pressure a person who seeks to take advantage
of the cancellation of his debt?
The simplest
understanding of the Gemara is that remittance consists of a verbal obligation
by the creditor not to exact a loan from anyone incapable of paying it. This
remittance is a remarkable kindness by the Torah and the lender that allows the
borrower an opportunity for a new financial beginning. However, though he bears
no legal obligation to repay the money, he does have a moral obligation if he is
in a position to reimburse his benefactor. Therefore, a solvent individual not
only can repay a loan after the close of the sabbatical year, but even may be
pressured to do so.
Rav Hirsch (Devarim
15:2) makes this argument very clearly:
One who releases a debt
in the seventh year allows the debt to be released from his hand, but this
release is strictly a one-sided action. The creditor, the baal, who
holds the legal claim to the debt and thereby has become the debtors master,
renounces forever his right to exert this claim. The debtor, however,
remains forever morally in his debt
Moreover, it is not the Torahs intention
to exempt people who can pay from the moral obligation of paying their debts,
and from such people the creditor is entitled to expect that they will not
exploit the privilege granted to them by the sabbatical year.
The Torah requires that
the creditor declare a remittance, but this does not exempt the debtor from his
duty. In this respect, the law of the seventh year differs from that of
interest, as there the debtor is forbidden to pay interest just as the creditor
is forbidden to accept it
At the end of each
sabbatical-year cycle, the repayment of every previously contracted debt remains
only as a moral obligation: payment of the debt is left to the discretion of him
who incurred it. Because of the trust that the Torah thus places in him, the
debtor, instead of feeling weighed down by the burden of his debt, feels morally
uplifted. Repaying the debt of his own free will now be a matter of personal
honor for him.
A similar view finds
expression in the opinion of the Yereiim (in old editions) that
remittance entails only ceasing to demand repayment:
It appears to me that
remittance does not mean forgiving [a loan]. Rather, the Holy One commands
that one release i.e. leave it alone, not demand it, until he returns it of
his own accord as it is written, release
he shall not exact, for whenever
the Torah uses the word shemitta, it means to leave alone, not to
relinquish altogether, as it is written, and during the seventh [year], you
shall release [the land] and abandon it meaning, you shall leave it alone.[6]
Thus the above mishna and the fact that
the verses speak only of release give credence to the understanding that the
sabbatical year does not in fact cancel loans at all. This idea is stated
beautifully by Rav Kook (Ein Ayyah on Peiah):
The purpose of the
sabbatical year is not prevention of repayment of the loan and swaying of
property rights, for the foundation of the Torah and its laws is the upholding
of the property rights of every individual with respect to what is truly his.
Rather, while ownership rights are upheld, there must be a spirit of generosity
to prevent society from incurring damage due to wealth. Thus the main purpose of
the remittance of loans is that the loan not be demanded
The consensus of the
opinions we have cited is that loans are not cancelled so much as creditors are
forbidden to force repayment, so that insolvent borrowers can have a fresh
start. If a loan is originally intended as charity, but given only as a loan to
avoid offending the recipient, then even the lender can be happy when it is
cancelled. If the lender intended that the loan be returned, then he has a new
mitzva: to display the tremendous courage of stating, I release the
obligation, recognizing that the borrower is incapable of returning the loan.
As the lender utters his
release of the loan, the borrower is given the feeling that no one will pressure
him to repay it. Yet at the same time, when he is capable of doing so, he is
morally bidden to return it. By doing so he earns the approval of the Sages, and
shows that he understands not only his rights, but his responsibilities as well.
Based on this analysis,
the Rabbinic prozbul, which is so often seen as a legal maneuver
uprooting the original intent of the Torah, is not in fact so. The Torah knows
that being able to lend depends upon the knowledge that ones money will again
be accessible when one needs it; therefore the Torah itself provides means (such
as taking collateral) of ensuring that a loan be repaid even after the
sabbatical year. The same reasoning so that people do not lock the doors on
those who seek to borrow stands behind Rabbinic institutions such as
prozbul.
The beauty of prozbul
is that it allows a person who has given a loan to decide whether he wishes to
say, I release the obligation and leave repayment to the borrower, or use
legal means to ensure repayment because he feels that his need for the money is
greater than that of the borrower.
Charity Throughout the World
One of the aspects of the
remittance of loans that give us a better appreciation of tzedaka is its
universality. Whereas the verses regarding general tzedaka appear to be
limited to the Land of Israel, the remittance of loans is not thus limited, and
instead applies to all places.
Though the remittance of
loans is chronologically associated with the agricultural sabbatical year, in
which agricultural work pauses and land is left accessible to all, it
nevertheless applies even where the agricultural halakhot of the
sabbatical year do not, i.e. outside of the Land of Israel. Sifrei (Devarim
111112) and the Gemara (Kiddushin 38b) in fact entertain the idea that
the financial halakhot of the sabbatical year have the same geographic
limitations as its agricultural halakhot, but ultimately make clear that
despite the connection between the two, the remittance of loans applies
throughout the world.
Still, as indicated
above, the mitzva of tzedaka that is found in the same chapter of
Devarim as the remittance of loans does make explicit mention of your
land. Rabbeinu Bachya (Devarim 15:10) clarifies the relationship between
the Land of Israel, the mitzva of tzedaka, and the halakhot of the
sabbatical year:
An alternative
understanding of the words in your land is: even when you are in your
land. I.e. even in your land, when you already have demonstrated that you
believe that the earth is the Lords by releasing your debtor from his debts and
allowing all to pick the harvest of your field every seventh year, the Torah
still commands you to perform deeds of charity as outlined in the present
paragraph.
If you must perform
charity even in an environment where you have demonstrated the virtue that
charity symbolizes, then when you are in the Diaspora and cannot demonstrate
this virtue in any other way, you are most certainly obliged to practice charity
even more meticulously
The meaning of the
subordinate clause introduced by the words beware
(verse 9) is that the
Torah must warn that we are urged to be meticulous regarding this commandment
even in the Land of Israel so as to preclude certain thoughts that might occur
in your mind. You might reason to yourself that since you must release debtors
from their debt to you and must relinquish your field for a whole year, how
could you be expected to fulfill the commandment to give charity according to
the standards demanded by the Torah? Surely this would cause you to find
yourself in the poor house! In order to preclude such thoughts, the Torah
promises that on the contrary, God will extend His blessing to you precisely
because you have meticulously performed his commandments not in spite of this.
If you were to leave the needy person to appeal to God instead of to you, having
denied him, this would constitute a sin on your part.
The Torah concludes by
saying in your land, i.e. even in your land, where you have already given up
so much of what you would normally consider yours, you are not to withhold your
generous contributions to the poor. It follows that your duty to be generous to
the poor while you are in the Diaspora is even greater, as you have fewer means
of manifesting this positive virtue.
As Rabbeinu Bachya notes, in the Land of
Israel there are numerous agricultural gifts to the poor that build and express
ones generosity. Outside of the land, it is only through more limited avenues,
most importantly tzedaka and remittance of loans, that one can support
the underprivileged and come closer to God by thus developing his character.
In the next lesson,
following our lengthy discussions of tzedaka that began with the
agricultural mitzvot of Parashat Kedoshim, we will return to
Chapter 19 of Vayikra and discuss additional monetary laws and how they
build the Jewish spirit of holiness.
[1] Also see Rav Aharon
Lichtensteins general discussion of the obligations of a person who receives
charity:
http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/halak67/04halak.htm.
[2] Normally, the Gemara
assumes that each appearance in a mitzva of the word beware or lest
constitutes an independent prohibition. In this case, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach
(in his glosses to Mishneh Kesef) states that though it is improper to
contemplate withholding a loan because the sabbatical year is coming, only
following up on such a thought with action is forbidden per se.
[3] This assumption is
reminiscent of the logic of Turnus Rufus that is refuted by Rabbi Akiva in
Bava Batra (10a).
[4] A thorough understanding of
the remittance of loans requires an appreciation of the agricultural aspects of
the sabbatical year, but here we will make do with an independent analysis of
the former.
[5] Translated above as
substance, the word devar also has the meaning of word or speech,
the implication being that this is the extent of the lenders obligation.
[6] Also see Rosh, who
disagrees with this view.
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