Regarding Libbun Kal that is Treated Like Hag'ala
TOPICS IN HALAKHA
Shiur #12:
Regarding
Libbun Kal
that is treated like
Hag'ala
HaRav Yehuda Amital, zt"l*
In certain situations, performing hag'ala (kashering a
utensil by immersing it in boiling water)[1]
poses difficulties: for example, when a pot or its lid is too large to fit into
any available utensil.
The Gemara in Avoda Zara 33b states:
Rabbi Yochanan said: Flasks of pagans which had been placed back in the furnace,
as soon as the pitch thereof has dropped off, are permitted. Rav Ashi said: You
need not say "until it has dropped off;" if it has only been loosened, ev1.27en
though it has not dropped off [it is enough]. [Where the pitch is removed by
means of] lighted chips this is a matter of dispute between Rav Acha and Ravina,
the one forbidding [the use of the flask], while the other permits [it]. The law
is in accordance with the one who forbids.
Rashi in his commentary (ad loc.) writes:
"Lighted chips" if he put lighted chips inside the flask until the pitch was
removed. "The law is in accordance with the one who forbade" and it is not
similar to a case where he placed them back in the furnace, because there where
he heated them from the outside to the point that the pitch fell off, the clay
already underwent libbun (whitening, kashering a utensil by
bringing it into direct contact with fire and heating it until it is white hot).
But here as soon as he puts in the fire, the pitch is immediately removed. From
here we learn that barrels or flasks which are used for storing [non-kosher
wine] it is not enough to kasher them from the inside, whether by
burning them or by filling them with boiling water, since he forbids with a
lighted chip, i.e., with fire itself, and all the more so with something heated
with it. But if he can burn them from the outside, it is permitted.
Tosafot (ad loc., s.v. kinsa) infer the following from
Rashi:
It follows from his explanation that if he would heat it from the inside to the
point that if there were pitch on the outside it would be removed, this
suffices.
And in the continuation, Tosafot add:
And Rav Moshe of Coucy wrote that even though we rule that the law is in
accordance with the one who forbade, nevertheless, inverting a barrel over a
fire - if the fire is so hot and strong on the inside that his hand is
spontaneously withdrawn on the outside, it is permitted, and it is treated like
hag'ala.
The source of this is the Semag, negative command 145. The Sefer
ha-Teruma writes similarly in the name of Ri ha-Zaken, as does the Ran in
his name, as well as the Mordekhai that if a person lights a fire
inside the utensil that heats it to the point that he cannot touch the utensil
from the outside, it is like hag'ala. The Ran writes that the words of
Rashi incline in this direction as well. A similar ruling is found in Hagahot
Maimuniyot (Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Asurot 11) in the name of the Ri; in
the Or Zaru'a (Piskei Avoda Zara, 167; and cited in his name in
Hagahot Oshri. And this ruling is codified as Halakha by the Tur and
the Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh De'a 135:14).
It may be asked: When these Rishonim say that if a utensil is heated to
the point that a person spontaneously removes his hand from the outside of the
utensil, it is regarded as hag'ala what type of hag'ala do they
have in mind? Is it regarded as hag'ala in a keli rishon, a
pot that is sitting on the fire, or is it like hag'ala with water poured
from a keli rishon? (In certain cases, we require hag'ala of the
first type, whereas in other cases, hag'ala of the second type suffices,
depending upon the manner in which the prohibited matter was absorbed into the
utensil.)
It would seem that this depends on the law governing the hag'ala that
must be performed on barrels that were used for storing non-kosher wine which
type of hag'ala do such utensils require? According to the Ri, pouring
boiling water from a keli rishon suffices (see Tosafot, s.v.
kinsa). According to this, you cannot prove that heating a utensil to the
point that a person spontaneously removes his hand from it is any better than
hag'ala with water poured from a keli rishon. But from the words of
Rashi, cited above "it is not enough to kasher them from the inside,
whether by burning them or by filling them with boiling water" the implication
is that he agrees with the Ramban and Rabbeinu Chananel, who require hag'ala
in a keli rishon; see the Ran, ad loc. And according to the Ran cited
earlier that the words of Rashi incline to the view of the Sefer Ha-teruma,
it follows that Rashi maintains that such libbun is not like hag'ala
in a keli rishon.
We must still consider the matter according to the view cited as "those who say"
in the Tur (no. 121, which is the view of the Ramban at the end of
Avoda Zara, which seems to have been accepted as law; see Mishna Berura
451:36). According to this view, a distinction is made with respect to
hag'ala between a keli rishon that is still sitting on the fire and a
keli rishon that has been removed from the fire, even if it is still
boiling hot. According to this, if a person used a utensil for non-kosher food
while the utensil was sitting on a fire, the hag'ala must also be in a
utensil that is sitting on a fire. If so, there is room to ask about libbun
kal, regarding a utensil heated up to the point that a person spontaneously
removes his hand from the outside of the utensil whether or not this is
treated like hag'ala in a keli rishon sitting on a fire. For with
respect to this matter, it is not clear whether for the kashering of
barrels Rashi requires the hag'ala of a keli rishon sitting on a
fire, or whether he maintains that any keli rishon suffices, provided
that the water does not reach the barrel by way of pouring.
Rabbeinu Chananel (Avoda Zara 74b) writes: "This tank (na'ava) has
no allowance save through boiling water on a fire." This implies that he
requires a keli rishon that is still sitting on a fire. From the words of
Rashi, however, there is no conclusive proof (see Chiddushei Anshei Shem
on the Rif).
Now if we accept this distinction that libbun kal, where a utensil
is heated up to the point that a person spontaneously removes his hand from the
outside of the utensil, suffices for kashering a keli rishon which
had been used for non-kosher food after it had been removed from the fire, but
not for kashering a keli rishon which had been used for non-kosher
food while it was still on the fire this fits in with the viewpoint of the
Peri Megadim (451), who distinguishes between libbun kal where a
piece of straw ignites when it touches the utensil from the outside and
libbun kal where a person spontaneously removes his hand from the outside of
the utensil. He writes there in his "Abridged Laws of Hag'ala," that
there are three types of libbun:
1)
Until the outermost layer is removed, or sparks fly. This is the ultimate form
of libbun.
2)
Libbun
where a piece of straw ignites when it touches the outside of the utensil
which is treated like hag'ala, and is better than hag'ala, as is
proven from the words of Hagahot Maimuniyot in the name of Rabbeinu
Avigdor, as cited by the Beit Yosef.
3)
Libbun
which heats the utensil to the point that a person spontaneously removes his
hand if it touches the inside or the outside of the utensil, but a piece of
straw does not ignite when it touches it. This libbun is treated like
hag'ala and is slightly worse than it, for if a piece of straw ignites upon
contact, the libbun works even for a keli rishon that became
non-kosher when it was sitting on the fire, but if it is only hot enough that a
person spontaneously removes his hand, the libbun only works for a
keli rishon that became non-kosher after it had been removed from the fire.
The words of the Peri Megadim, however, require further examination, for
according to the Mordekhai at the end of Avoda Zara [cited by the
Beit Yosef (451) and the Taz (ad loc. no. 8), and so too it seems
from the words of Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi in his responsa, cited by the Magen
Avraham (ad loc. no. 97)] it turns out that there is no room for the
Peri Megadim's distinction. The Mordekhai writes that a utensil that
absorbed a forbidden ingredient requires removal of the outermost layer, whereas
a utensil that absorbed an ingredient that in itself is permitted, e.g., milk or
meat, does not require removal of the outermost layer, but only that the utensil
should be so hot that a person spontaneously removes his hand from both sides.
The common test for this involves placing a piece of straw on the outside and
seeing whether it will ignite.
The Mordekhai adds at the end: "That libbun is no worse than
hag'ala, and that libbun removes [the non-kosher] food more so than
hag'ala." It is clear from what he writes that "spontaneous removal of
the hand from both sides" and "igniting a piece of straw" are the same. And it
is also clear that such libbun kal works even for a keli rishon
resting on a fire, for no distinction is made between different utensils.
Now, while the Mordekhai does not mention here the position of the Ri,
and there would have been room to say that when he equates the two types of
libbun kal, he is presenting his own position the words of Rav Eliyahu
Mizrachi in his responsa (I, no. 43) cited in the aforementioned Magen
Avraham imply that this is how he understood the Ri, that libbun kal
which causes the spontaneous removal of a person's hand is treated like
hag'ala and works for any keli rishon. This also seems to be the
position of the Peri Chadash on the words of the Rema in 451:4.
On this matter, I find perplexing what Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes in his
hagahot regarding the words of Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi cited in the Magen
Avraham: "I have a difficulty, the fact that he cannot touch it, i.e., that
he spontaneously removes his hand, is not called libbun kal, since a
piece of straw does not ignite when it touches it." I do not understand how he
knows this, as he himself says about what the Rema writes in par. 4 that
according to the Taz and the Magen Avraham, even spontaneous
removal of the hand suffices. And it cannot be suggested that he maintains that
the Rema disagrees with the Mordekhai, and that according to him only
libbun that causes a piece of straw to ignite is considered hag'ala,
for the Rema notes as his source the Mordekhai cited above and the
Hagahot Maimuniyot (Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot, chap. 17).
As for the Mordekhai, we already saw that "spontaneous removal of
the hand from both sides" and "igniting a piece of straw" are the same. And as
for the Hagahot Mordekhai, though he insists on "igniting a piece of
straw," that is because he wants to be lenient and use this type of libbun
for things that require actual libbun. The Peri Megadim has
already proven from his ruling that "igniting a piece of straw" is better than
hag'ala and that it sometimes works even for utensils that are used with
fire and require libbun. But as for utensils that that require hag'ala
and not libbun, there is no discussion here as to whether they require
"igniting a piece of straw" or less than that.
As for the normative law, Shulchan Arukh Ha-rav writes (451:10):
But metal utensils which do not crack from the heat of fire, one can fill with
coals from the inside and leave them there until [the utensil reaches the heat]
that if a person touches the utensil from the outside, he will spontaneously
remove his hand because the utensil has become hot from the coals. By then
certainly all the chametz that had been absorbed within is burnt, even
though it has not become that hot that sparks fly from it, for surely metal
utensils are kashered through hag'ala, and libbun kal like
this is no worse than hag'ala.
It should be noted that in the course of his explanation (beyond the segment
cited here) he addresses the positions of the Mordekhai, Beit Yosef,
Magen Avraham, Peri Chadash, Sefer Ha-teruma, Ri, Tosafot, Semak, Rosh,
and Tur and Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh De'a 135) cited
above.
As for what he writes that "by then certainly all the chametz that
had been absorbed within is burnt" refutes the argument put forward by the
Peri Megadim from what is stated in Shulchan Arukh 452 that
hag'ala doesn't work with water that has not reached the stage of boiling,
even if it is hot enough that one spontaneously removes one's hand, which
indicates that "spontaneous removal of the hand" is not regarded like hag'ala
because water which causes the forbidden food to be discharged cannot be
compared to fire that burns the forbidden food.
See also Shulchan Arukh Ha-rav (ibid. par. 19) regarding
chametz found in the cracks of a pot, that "spontaneous removal of the hand"
on the other side works, only that the common practice is to be stringent and
insist on "igniting a piece of straw." See Arukh Ha-shulchan (451:5) who
brings these words of the Shulchan Arukh Ha-rav as normative law.
In light of all that has been said above, it is clear that we can rely on
the Shulchan Arukh Ha-rav and on the Arukh Ha-shulchan, both with
respect to chametz and with respect to other forbidden foods, as is
explicit in the words of the Rishonim, the Ri and the Mordekhai,
for they speak about other forbidden foods.
Therefore, when there is a difficulty performing hag'ala with
boiling water, or there is concern that as soon as the utensil will enter the
water, the water will no longer boil, and it will be impossible to detect this
visually, and when there is a difficulty performing libbun that would
cause a piece of straw to ignite, or there is concern that the utensil would be
ruined through that there is room to permit libbun by way of a
blowtorch in such a way that the outer side becomes so hot that a person would
spontaneously remove his hands from it, and such libbun is treated like
hag'ala.
All this applies, of course, to utensils that absorbed the non-kosher food
through water, and not directly with fire, for in the latter case we require
libbun which causes sparks to fly.
(Translated by David Strauss)
*
This article originally appeared in Alon Shevut 3, no. 1.
[1]
The notion of kashering" a utensil is based on the verse in Bemidbar
(31:23) that utensils that had been used by gentiles need to be cleansed
Every thing that passes through fire, you shall make it go through fire and it
shall be clean
and all that does not pass through the fire shall you make to go
through water. This is understood by Chazal to teach the following
principle: As it absorbs [the forbidden substance] so it discharges it (Pesachim
30b et al). This principle means that in order to expunge prohibited matter
from a utensil, the same intensity of heat must be applied as was applied when
the prohibited matter was introduced to the utensil in the first place. Thus, if
the prohibited matter was absorbed by direct exposure to fire (such as
roasting), then it must be discharged through direct exposure to fire, which is
known as libbun. If the prohibited matter was exposed through water (such
as in a pot that contains liquid that is cooking on a stove) then it can be
expunged through immersion in a pot of boiling water (hagala). ed.
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