YESHIVAT HAR ETZION

ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)

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**PIKUACH NEFESH**

**Rav Avihud Schwartz**

**Shiur #41: National Resilience – The Activity of the Home Front Command on Shabbat and the Festivals[[1]](#footnote-1)\***

**I. Preface**

For approximately the last ten *shiurim*, we have studied several fundamental issues relating to the laws governing military and security matters: "matters of hay and straw," "until it falls," and morale of the soldiers. Starting with this *shiur*, we will discuss more focused army-related questions, which require new halakhic decisions regarding what is permitted or prohibited on Shabbat – all in light of principles we have discussed. At times, it is possible to reach a halakhic conclusion based on the laws of "communal *pikuach nefesh*," but not infrequently we must make use of broader concepts related to the significance of national security and ensuring the well-being, security, and independence of the State of Israel.

**II. Introduction: The Halakhic Questions Regarding "National Resilience"**

Several years ago, I had the privilege of publishing a set of halakhic guidelines that regulate the activities of the Home Front Command on Shabbat and the festivals. This set of guidelines was written in the *beit midrash* of the Military Rabbinate and was professionally and authoritatively approved by the Chief of Staff of the Home Front Command (an officer at the rank of brigadier general), as part of a series of halakhic guidelines published in recent years that discuss what is prohibited and what is permitted during operational activity on Shabbat in the various IDF units: regular security activity on Shabbat, protection of settlements on Shabbat, maintaining tanks and cannons on Shabbat, the activity of medical clinics on Shabbat, the activity of the combat collection corps on Shabbat, and more.

However, the set of guidelines dealing with the Home Front Command is unique. Generally speaking, the halakhic challenge we face is to thoroughly learn and familiarize ourselves with the operational reality on the ground, and from there to issue decisions on "classical" halakhic questions. For example, the guidelines regarding maintenance of tanks on Shabbat in the course of operational activity require an examination of the labors of building (*boneh*) and striking the final hammer blow (*makeh be-patish*), the laws of Shabbat domains, and the like; the established law in these matters served as a basis upon which we formulated halakhic guidelines for soldiers in the field.

In contrast, a discussion of the activities of the Home Front Command required a halakhic examination of a new issue, which has no clear precedent in previous halakhic literature – the issue of what is referred to as "national resilience." Many of the tasks assigned to the Home Front Command involve matters that clearly fall into the category of *pikuach nefesh*, e.g., rescue activities, handling the leakage of dangerous substances, activating the system that warns about a missile attack, and so on. However, during a period of emergency, the Home Front Command is also charged with another task: preserving and strengthening "national resilience." The “parent command” of the Home Front Command defines this task as follows:

The mission of the Home Front Command is to strengthen national resilience… Resilience consists of the functional behavioral ability and the mental ability to deal with the situation. The resilience of the home front supports the ability to sustain the war effort and bring about the rout and defeat of the enemy.

In order to realize this mission, Home Front Command teams are required to perform various tasks on Shabbat and weekdays, including: patrolling population centers to demonstrate presence (known in professional jargon as an "orange signature," an allusion to the confidence-inspiring appearance of the teams’ orange uniforms); distributing leaflets providing information on ways of protection; operating a website and other social media with accessible and up-to-date information on what is happening; providing civil assistance to those residing along the line of conflict, which includes, among other things, visiting shelters and protected areas; and other such tasks.

Naturally, the various actions taken to strengthen national resilience are not all equal in value. There are actions whose primary goal is to strengthen national resilience, but that also have a life-saving dimension. For example, the presence of Home Front Command teams in a heavily populated area may be critical during a true alarm, because the teams will be able to help people enter protected areas in a quick and safe manner. In similar fashion, digital activity that includes providing details about defense may turn out to be a lifesaver.

There are, however, certain actions whose sole purpose is to strengthen national resilience, and these involve more uncertainty. I will offer examples of three concrete questions:

a. During Operation Oferet Yetzuka (*Tevet* 5769), there were synagogues on the line of conflict where it was difficult to gather a *minyan* for Shabbat services. *Hesder* soldiers called up to the Home Front Command during the operation were asked to travel on Shabbat to complete *minyanim* in these places, with the aim of strengthening the spirits of those residents who remained in their homes in the Gaza Envelope. The soldiers asked whether this would be permitted.

b. During the lull at the end of one operation, and after an extended period in which schools along the line of conflict had been shut down, a senior officer in the Home Front Command was summoned to the office of the head of the Southern Command to assess the situation and determine whether it was possible to resume schooling. The discussion took place on Shabbat morning, so that if it would be decided that studies could be resumed as usual, the students would be able to return already on Sunday. Here too, the officer asked whether he would be permitted to travel on Shabbat in order to participate in such a discussion.

c. In recent conflicts, there have been several cases in which indirect fire caused significant destruction and damage. The operational position of the Home Front Command states that the ruins must be cleared and the site restored as quickly as possible. This is because even when there are no physical casualties, the scenes of destruction in themselves severely impair national resilience, and create a sense of Israeli defeat and the superiority of the enemy. Here too, one may ask whether it is permissible to engage in the restoration of such a site on Shabbat.

As mentioned, these are but three examples out of many. The common denominator of all three cases is that they do not involve life-saving tasks in the narrow sense of the term. It is clear that praying with a *minyan* on Shabbat or closing schools on Sunday are not matters that involve direct or indirect *pikuach nefesh*.At the same time, it is clear that national resilience is severely damaged when the "ordinary citizen," and especially one living along the line of conflict, feels that the home front is not holding up in the face of the situation – a feeling that could certainly arise in response to the lack of *minyanim* on Shabbat, the shutting down of the school system for an extended period of time, or the presence of visible sites of destruction at every corner.

**III. New Questions**

These are the same type of questions we explored in the introductory *shiur* to the laws governing the army and war (*shiur* no. 28), and they clearly express the great challenge of issuing halakhic decisions on matters that have no clear precedents. *Chazal*, the *Rishonim*, and the *Acharonim* hardly dealt at all on a practical level with questions of this type, which relate to broad concepts of what "national resilience" is.

One might ask: How do you know there is no explicit discussion in the Talmud or in the *Rishonim* regarding "national resilience"? Indeed, after one meeting with senior officers of the Home Front Command, I went back to our *beit midrash* in Yeshivat Har Etzion, and I found my revered teacher Harav Aharon Lichtenstein *ztz"l* engrossed in learning in his usual place in the *beit midrash*. I immediately approached him, and asked: Could the *rav* refer me to some source that deals with the issue of national resilience on Shabbat? Are they any halakhic precedents for this? He thought for a moment, and replied that while it is sometimes possible to compare one thing to another, he does not remember an explicit source dealing with this issue.

The answer given to me by Rav Lichtenstein, who was fully fluent in every aspect of the Torah, clarified for me the magnitude of the challenge in our times, when we are required to decide on halakhic questions with no clear sources and precedents.

As we have already learned, there are various approaches to dealing with this challenge, including by searching for precedents in the wars of Israel that are described in Tanakh. I would like to proceed from the Biblical verses to the *poskim*, that is to say, to open with several Biblical passages, and then to try and clarify whether it is possible to find more distinct halakhic sources by comparing cases.

**IV. National Resilience in the Bible**

In my humble opinion, it is possible to point to at least three Biblical examples that indicate the importance of the national mood and mindset in the pursuit of victory in war:

a. Moshe responds very harshly to the request of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven that they should receive their tribal territory on the east bank of the Jordan. He compares this request to the sin of the spies, and focuses his criticism on a single point:

And why do you turn away the heart of the children of Israel from going over into the land which the Lord has given them? (*Bamidbar* 32:7)

Moshe is mainly concerned about the request's impact on the mood of the people and on national resilience. It stands to reason that as far as the military order is concerned, the army of Israel under the command of Yehoshua bin Nun could overcome the people of Canaan even without the "reserve forces" of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven. But Moshe believes the national spirit will fall if some tribes remain on the east bank of the Jordan, casting doubt on the rightness of Israel's cause and their ability to emerge victorious in battle. In the name of national resilience, Moshe demands that the children of Gad and the children of Reuven go out to battle at the head of the camp.

b. Before entering the land, Yehoshua bin Nun sends spies to Yericho. Typically, spies are asked to fulfill a military role, to know "the entrance of the city" (*Shoftim* 1:24) and to look for access and escape routes. It seems, however, that the spies sent by Yehoshua are looking for something completely different. Rachav tells them of her people’s reaction to the stories of Israel’s experiences so far:

And as soon as we had heard it, our hearts did melt, neither did there remain any more spirit in any man, because of you; for the Lord your God, He is God in heaven above, and on earth beneath. (*Yehoshua* 2:11)

Once the spies hear this, they are ready to head back to the Israelite camp and deliver the information to Yehoshua. Indeed, already at the beginning of that chapter, the Radak writes:

He only sent them because he knew they would succeed in their mission and expand the hearts of Israel with good news. (Radak, *Yehoshua* 2:1)

Thus we learn that the role of the spies was to instill a spirit of hope in the people and to strengthen national resilience. Apart from that, they had no other military role.

c. The prophet Yeshayahu speaks about the attack of Sancheriv, king of Assyria, on Jerusalem. Sancheriv's soldiers were laying siege on the city, and King Chizkiyahu sent three of his men to negotiate with Ravshakeh, the emissary of the Assyrian king. Ravshakeh draws near to the wall and delivers a long speech, with one central message: No one can save the kingdom of Yehuda from the great king Sancheriv. Chizkiyahu's representatives respond:

Then said Elyakim and Shevna and Yoach to Ravshakeh: Speak, I pray you, to your servants in Aramaic, for we understand it; and speak not to us in the Jews' language, in the ears of the people that are on the wall. (*Yeshayahu* 36:11)

Chizkiyahu's representatives have one request: Please, refrain from psychological warfare! Chizkiyahu's men knew very well that if all the inhabitants of besieged Jerusalem heard Ravshakeh's threats, they would give up and surrender. In order to preserve national resilience, they beg Ravshakeh to speak in Aramaic so as not to be understood by the general public. Ravshakeh, on his part, also understands the power of psychological warfare, and therefore insists on continuing to speak in the Jewish tongue:

Then Ravshakeh stood, and cried with a loud voice in the Jews' language, and said: Hear you the words of the great king, the king of Assyria. Thus says the king: Let not Chizkiyahu beguile you, for he will not be able to deliver you. (*Yeshayahu* 36:13-14)

Here, too, it is evident that both sides well understood the importance of national resilience for achieving victory in war.

Do these three sources solve our questions regarding national resilience on Shabbat? In my humble opinion, the answer is no. It is impossible to extract from them a systematic halakhic position. However, they certainly help sharpen the understanding that national resilience is an integral part of victory in war, and that we must therefore carefully examine its halakhic status. I will try to clarify the foundation of the matter based on principles we saw in the recent *shiurim* concerning"peace of mind" and preserving soldiers’ morale.

**V. Anxiety Victims**

As we have seen (*shiur* no. 39), a high level of anxiety is defined as a situation of *pikuach nefesh.* The source for this is a passage in tractate *Yoma* (84b) dealing with an infant in a locked room. Rabbi Shmuel Wosner (*Shevet ha-Levi*, vol. 8, no. 75) extended the Gemara’s ruling there to adults suffering from "great shock." It may be suggested that "great shock" refers here to a post-traumatic reaction that is liable to lead to insanity, and in certain situations even to suicide. It is clear that saving a person from causing harm to himself and his surroundings is permitted on Shabbat.[[2]](#footnote-2) But even a level of "shock" that does not reach the point of fear of suicide may be considered a situation of *pikuach nefesh*. Indeed, Rabbi Yitzchok Zilberstein issued an explicit ruling on this matter, which is connected to the activity of the Home Front Command:

Due to the state of emergency (the first Gulf War), the Ministry of Health ordered mental health clinics to operate telephone centers that provide counseling and psychological help to people suffering from distress, fears, and mental stress… How should one behave on Shabbat?

We find that fear is considered a danger to life, and that one may desecrate Shabbat on its account… States of fear can cause mental illness, and we find that mental illness is defined as a danger to life… In light of all this, if the doctors decide, in light of the cases that ended in death, that in our day there is concern for the lives of those people who are overcome by fear, it is permissible to desecrate Shabbat in order to save them…

With regard to the community, we are more concerned about danger to life, and since there are many who are overcome by fear, there is greater concern about the danger… When a hit occurs [a missile falls], it may be assumed that many people will need help, and the fear of danger is greater, and so perhaps it is possible to permit travelling on Shabbat. (*Shiurei Torah le-Rof'im* [5772], vol. 2, no. 102)

In the course of his words, Rabbi Zilberstein refers to anxiety victims who may go insane, or harm themselves, as a result of a post-traumatic reaction. But it seems from his words as a whole that even in less serious cases, an extreme level of fear and panic may in itself be defined as a situation of *pikuach nefesh*, similar to the panic of an infant trapped in a locked room. It further appears that this is especially true when we are dealing with a matter of public-national significance.

The late Rabbi Israel Rosen wrote in a similar vein in his article (cited in the previous *shiur*) regarding the permissibility of a social worker or public leader traveling to a locality where a terrorist attack took place, for the sake of the community's "peace of mind" and to prevent "mental confusion."[[3]](#footnote-3) The common denominator between the words of Rabbi Zilberstein and those of Rabbi Rosen is the concern for an individual who is liable to be at risk due to tension, panic, or fear. Of course, when a large community undergoes such a disaster, the likelihood that someone in the community will need help is not negligible, and therefore they permitted desecrating Shabbat and travelling to the site of the attack to provide assistance to those who need it. The set of guidelines mentioned above also states that Home Front Command teams are permitted to arrive on the scene on Shabbat, even when it is clear that there are no trapped people there. The reason for this is that the assistance provided to anxiety victims at the various levels is defined as *pikuach nefesh*, especially when there were many people involved in the incident.

However, even in such situations, there is no blanket allowance to do whatever it takes to strengthen national resilience on Shabbat. Most people are able to "contain" stress and pressure, and it is difficult to say that anyone who lives in a conflict zone should be treated like a dangerously ill person or an anxiety victim whose treatment is permitted on Shabbat. Indeed, the fact that panic and worry are a consideration regarding *pikuach nefesh* may be of importance when we have to determine a halakhic perspective regarding the national resilience of the country at large. But we have not yet succeeded in permitting actions whose sole purpose is to strengthen national resilience in the general public, rather than specifically in a community that was directly involved in a disaster. Therefore, we must also base ourselves in this context on the broader principle regarding the morale of the soldiers.

**VI. The Morale of the Soldiers on the Home Front**

As has been clarified in detail in previous *shiurim*, the morale of soldiers is certainly a significant consideration in a time of war. What is unique about the Home Front Command is that it addresses the civilian population, not the soldiers at the front. However, we have learned from recent conflicts that the enemy will direct its main efforts against the civilian population, in order to break their spirit and force the Israeli leadership to stop the fighting. The resilience of the civilian population is significant for the continuation of the fighting until the enemy is defeated, and therefore defending the home front is an integral part of the war effort.

Furthermore, if families on the home front were anxious in the past about the fate of their loved ones on the battlefield, in recent times there have been cases in which it was the soldiers on the battlefield who were anxious about their families whom they left behind. For example, during Operation Amud Anan (Kislev 5773), which did not include a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, not a single soldier was killed during combat, but to our misfortune there were casualties on the home front as a result of falling missiles.

Moreover, regardless of the practical results on the battlefield and the feelings of the soldiers, it seems that a strong and firm home front means victory in the war, whereas a beaten-down home front means victory for the enemy. A firm stand is undoubtedly an integral part of the fighting and of the mindset of victory.

On the modern battlefield, the home front has become a second front. As we have already learned (*shiur* no. 32), Rabbi Goren and other *poskim* extended the various allowances regarding "matters of hay and straw," which ostensibly apply only to border towns, to the entire State of Israel. It is possible that there is also room to extend the fundamental position regarding soldiers on the front lines to cover the civilians in the rear as well. That is to say, just as the morale of the soldiers on the battlefield is extremely important, and extensive allowances have been granted to strengthen their morale or to prevent their morale from being damaged, so it is possible to consider applying such allowances to civilians on the home front. In the parent command of the Home Front Command cited at the beginning of our discussion, it is stated explicitly that the tasks of the Home Front Command are an integral part of the war effort to rout and defeat the enemy.

I will mention one example. As we have already learned (*shiur* no. 28), the allowance to evacuate casualties from the battlefield is based in large measure on the need to maintain the morale of the combatants. In light of what we said above, should it be permissible to evacuate casualties from a civilian area on the home front, in order to maintain national resilience? Rabbi Yitzchak Kofman, in his book, *Ha-Tzava ke-Halakha* (chap. 20), discusses in detail the allowance to remove the bodies of fallen soldiers from the battlefield. Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl wrote comments on the book, including the following:

There is room to discuss whether harm to the spirit of the people on the home front should also be a consideration regarding the evacuation of casualties. (*Ha-Tzava ke-Halakha*, p. 440, note 15)

Rabbi Nebenzahl is unsure whether a distinction should be made between the morale of the soldiers on the frontline, which is liable to be damaged as a result of failing to remove the bodies of their fallen comrades from the battlefield, and the morale of civilians on the home front.

Rabbi Shlomo Rosenfeld, head of the Shadmot Neriya Hesder Yeshiva in Shadmot Mechola ruled that it is indeed possible to be lenient in this matter.

Rabbi Goren… established that leaving casualties in a combat zone is liable to impair the fighting ability of the soldiers and their morale… According to this, in the entire country – which is defined today as a "battlefield" or as a "border town" – it is important to clear the casualties from the site of an attack, wherever it happens. After all, our enemies want to impair the defense capacity of the security forces, and sometimes they even try – in all their cruelty – to continue fighting after an attack and even against the rescue forces, as has happened on several occasions. Failure to evacuate the victims from the scene in a controlled manner will hinder the security forces from operating in the area. So too, from the perspective of the soldiers' morale, this will impair their fighting ability, as was mentioned above in the words of Rabbi Goren. (Rabbi Shlomo Rosenfeld, "*Hitnahagut be-Shabbat be-Figu'ei Teror*," in *Tzohar*, vol. 15)

In my humble opinion, the words of Rabbi Rosenfeld resolve Rabbi Nebenzahl's uncertainty. That is to say, the concept of "a front in the rear," and relating to the civilian population as an integral part of the campaign, allows us to use the same halakhic definitions in this context. This is the case with respect to the clearing of casualties, and the same applies to other actions that strengthen national resilience.

**VII. "Until it Falls"**

At this point, we can also integrate into the discussion the principle of "until it falls." As we have already learned in detail (*shiur* no. 34), what this law means is that everything necessary to ensure victory in a campaign is permitted. We have known for decades that the question of whether or not we won a battle is decided not only on the battlefield. Thus, the Yom Kippur War and the Second Lebanon War were marked by brilliant victories on the battlefield, and yet the general feeling was one of defeat and failure.

Therefore, in my humble opinion, there is no doubt that maintaining national resilience falls into the category of "needs of war." In order to win the battle, it is permissible to do everything necessary on all fronts, including the home front.

In an article about Operation Entebbe in light of *halakha*, Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli wrote that every obligatory war fought by the people of Israel includes an element of the sanctification of God's name. He added:

A campaign fought against Israel is blasphemy towards God, and a war fought for the glory of Israel is a war for the sanctification of the name of heaven, as opposed to the desecration of His name with the blaspheming of the armies of Israel. (*Chavat Binyamin*, vol. 1, no. 17, p. 132)

Rabbi Yisraeli was speaking about operational activities that fell upon IDF soldiers. In my humble opinion, if such an activity involves a war for the honor of Israel, and thus also a sanctification of God's name, then all the more so, protecting the resilience of the citizens of Israel, and helping them to stand firm despite security threats to the home front, involves the sanctification of God's name and is thus an integral part of the war.

**VIII. Caution Against Excessive Allowances**

Before we conclude the discussion, it is important to emphasize that while there is indeed a lot of room to see national resilience as an inseparable part of war, the questions must be considered with caution and responsibility.

In the discussions about this issue in which I have participated over the years, there was often a feeling that the home front is much stronger than the professionals believed, and that national resilience does not necessarily depend on taking this or that action. On one such occasion, when we consulted with Rabbi Asher Weiss, he stated: Even if it is all true, and when the children stay home from school, national resilience is impaired, the activities that are permitted on Shabbat must be limited to those that are vital for strengthening resilience and returning to normalcy. No one would think, the rabbi pointed out, to open the bakeries on Shabbat, so that the children returning to school on Sunday will have fresh rolls waiting for them.

Furthermore, on another occasion, when we consulted with Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl, he insisted that we not forget that keeping Shabbat is also an integral part of preserving national resilience.[[4]](#footnote-4) That is to say, there exists a significant fear that if religious soldiers desecrate Shabbat only in order to complete a *minyan* and thus strengthen national resilience, the cost might outweigh the benefit. This is because an atmosphere of Shabbat desecration is liable to produce the opposite result – abolishing all the rules and canceling the foundations of our religious and spiritual world. Without a doubt, this consideration as well must be taken into account.

Alongside these reservations, which are certainly in order, there is much room to see the activities of the Home Front Command as an inseparable part of the IDF's operational array – and thus, as part of the means to achieve the primary goal, which is to resolve the campaign and defeat the enemy.

**IX. Summary**

Without a doubt, there is a significant innovation in this *shiur*. But this is the way of the Torah regarding "new" issues in *hilkhot medina*, the laws governing the state, for which there are no precedents in previous halakhic literature. In light of the novelty of the matter, an effort was made in the set of guidelines that I compiled to avoid unnecessary actions which can be postponed until after Shabbat, and to try, whenever possible, not to perform actions that are forbidden by the Torah. Rabbi Asher Weiss made it clear in our meeting with him that even though returning life to its normal course borders on *pikuach nefesh*, since it is difficult to offer precise definitions, one must strive to avoid transgressing Torah prohibitions, though leniency may be practiced regarding Rabbinic decrees.

In this spirit, I will end this *shiur* with a short excerpt from the set of guidelines:

As a general rule, the Home Front Command teams are permitted on Shabbat to support the civil authorities only in life-saving matters, including: 1. Reinforcement of the municipal hotline, which during a time of emergency is a significant tool for delivering self-defense instructions and for assisting those who are physically and psychologically injured; 2. Enforcing the Home Front Command's self-defense instructions; for example, verifying that gatherings and assemblies are taking place only in accordance with those instructions; 3. If a failure is detected in the delivery of the self-defense instructions (for example, if it turns out that in a certain place there is a community of elderly / immigrants / disabled people, who did not properly understand or internalize the instructions), house-to-house visits may be made to brief, explain, and clarify the instructions; 4. Rapid shuttling of forces to the sites of incidents where there is a fear of casualties, together with representatives of the civil authority (the mayor, his deputy, or the security officer)…

However, one should not engage in non-operational matters on Shabbat, including: 1. Accompanying the head of the civil authority or the security officer to events that do not involve saving lives, such as a cultural event or entertainment for the purpose of relaxation; 2. Various administrative activities…

Reinforcement forces located in crowded places, whose mission is to assist in defense during an incident, such as calling for help or directing people to protected areas, may continue their work even on Shabbat. The forces should arrive by motorized vehicles to the centers of activity before the beginning of Shabbat, or on foot on Shabbat from a nearby place, unless there are operational or safety constraints, or weather conditions, that do not allow this. The forces should return to their base after Shabbat.

Random patrols in urban centers, whose sole purpose is to demonstrate presence, are permitted only in exceptional cases – if the commanders in the field decide that there is an important and urgent need for this, including gathering information on the state of the population, exposing life-threatening gaps, or providing an important briefing to the population which cannot be delivered in any other way. Therefore, there is no permit to travel in order to engage in morale-lifting activity or to complete a *minyan* in a synagogue.

It is permissible for a senior commanding officer on behalf of the Home Front Command to be interviewed by the media on Shabbat, if the professionals believe that the public is suffering unusual panic arising from the objective reality on the ground or from publications (even incorrect publications) in the media.

There is no allowance to conduct surveys on Shabbat (by telephone, or by distributing written questionnaires) for the purpose of analyzing the general situation of the population.

Calming activity for children and adults is permitted if it does not involve Shabbat desecration.

The Home Front Command battalions that are deployed in the major cities should make sure to make all the administrative arrangements before Shabbat, including transporting food and water to the soldiers.

As mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, these guidelines were approved both by the Military Rabbinate and by the most senior ranks of the Home Front Command. By fusing Shabbat and festival observance with providing a professional and responsible response where it is needed, may we strengthen and deepen our national resilience.

(Translated by David Strauss; edited by Sarah Rudolph)

1. \* This *shiur* was first published in the periodical *Tzohar*, vol. 40 (5776), and is available on the Asif website ([here](https://asif.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/1-12-125.pdf)). It was re-edited for the present series of *shiurim.* [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See about this in brief in *Responsa Iggerot Moshe* (OC vol. 5, no. 18, s.v. *lo matzinu heter*), and in greater detail in *Responsa Tzitz Eliezer* (vol. 4, no. 13, 10), who cites a responsum of the Rashba (*Ha-Meyuchasot le-Ramban*, no. 281), discussed in *shiur* 39, regarding "peace of mind" in the case of a person who took a vow not to laugh or be happy. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Rabbi Israel Rosen, "*Yishuv be-Eiru'a Pigu'a be-Shabbat*, *Nesi'at Ovedet Sotzialit u-Manhig Tzibbur be-Shabbat*, in *Techumin* 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner wrote similarly in the name of mental health professionals. See: Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, "*Hanchayot le-Tzivtei ha-Cheirum ha-Eizoriyyim*," in *Tzohar* 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)