SALT | Tzav 5785

MOTZAEI

You will recall from Erev Pesach 5754 (1994), the last time Erev Pesach occurred on Shabbat, that on this Shabbat we schedule prayer services for early in the morning. We do so in order to allow for the completion of the Shabbat meal before the latest time for the consumption of chametz sets in. (The Mishna Berura mentions this practice in 444:4.) However, it can (and I imagine did) happen that one will oversleep Shabbat morning. What should he do if not enough time remains to recite shacharit before the onset of the prohibition of chametz? Does such a circumstance call for overriding the general prohibition against eating before tefilla? If so, then he should first eat his Shabbat meal and then recite shacharit. Or, should the requirement of bread for Shabbat meals override in this case the prohibition against eating chametz on Erev Pesach? Alternatively, should he simply forego on the requirement of bread with his Shabbat meal?

Rav Shraga Feivish Schneebalg (Shraga Ha-me'ir 4:62) rules that if the individual has time to recite birkot ha-Torah, barukh she-amar, yishtabach, birkot keri'at shema and the shacharit shemoneh esrei with enough time to eat the required amount of bread, he should do so. If one does not have time even for this abridged service, he nevertheless may not eat before shacharit. Although the mitzva of eating Shabbat meals may constitute a Biblical requirement (see Mishna Berura, beginning of 242) while the prohibition against eating before shacharit is rabbinic in origin, one may nevertheless not eat his Shabbat meal before praying. The reason is simple: the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 289:1) rules that the obligation of the Shabbat meal does not set in before the recitation of shacharit. Therefore, no obligation as yet exists before shacharit to override the prohibition against eating before praying.

So, what should the individual in this situation do?

The general consensus among the poskim appears to forbid eating matza on Erev Pesach even in such a situation. Some authorities allow using matza for Shabbat meals on Erev Pesach, but they do so only in light of one position in the Rishonim (Ba'al Ha-ma'or; Rosh) that delays the prohibition of eating matza on Erev Pesach until the moment when chametz becomes forbidden. In our case, however, the individual wishes to eat matza after this point, something that the authorities do not allow.

Therefore, in our case the individual faces two options: he may either forego on bread entirely, or, according to some poskim (Shut Kinyan Torah 3:105), he may use egg matza. Although Ashkenazim do not eat egg matza past the fourth hour on Erev Pesach, in such a situation, an Ashkenazi may perhaps rely on the position of the Sefaradic authorities who permit the consumption of egg matza before the tenth hour on Erev Pesach.

(Based on Piskei Teshuvot, 444:4)

SUNDAY

When Shabbat falls on Erev Pesach, one must exercise special care to either eat or dispose of all chametz that had been left for Shabbat. For this reason, many people use specifically "pita" bread for their meals on Shabbat Erev Pesach, as they generally leave fewer crumbs than do regular rolls. In any event, one should certainly make an effort to leave for Shabbat as little chametz as possible (so long as a "ke-zayit" of bread is available for each person at each meal) so as to minimize the risk of leaving behind crumbs and the like. This concern has given rise to the idea of using a matza and a chametz loaf for "lechem mishneh" on this Shabbat. Meaning, rather than fulfilling the requirement of two loaves for Shabbat meals with two chametz breads, some people considered using a matza for one of the two "loaves." Since one need eat only one of the two loaves, one could perhaps include a matza as the second, uneaten bread. This attractive measure helps minimize the amount of chametz left around for Shabbat Erev Pesach. Needless to say, this practice requires utmost care not to allow the matza to come in contact with the chametz bread, so as not to render the matza chametz. This problem is easily solved by keeping the matza wrapped while on the table near the chametz.

However, other issues may call the halakhic propriety of this practice into question. Specifically, one may not eat matza on this Shabbat. Can it serve the function of "lechem mishneh" if it cannot be eaten?

A particular problem exists concerning the use of "matzot mitzva," matzot that have been specifically earmarked for the fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza on Pesach eve. According to some authorities, including the Peri Megadim and Ben Ish Chai, the designation of these matzot for the seder render them "muktza," set aside for a specifically non-Shabbat activity, and hence forbidden to be handled on Shabbat. However, an argument to the contrary is cited in the name of the Shut Peri Ha-sadeh 2:85. Generally, an otherwise useful item becomes "muktza" on Shabbat only if it cannot serve any purpose on this day. Once we can identify some purpose it may serve, we can no longer consider it "muktza." Now as we will see, many (though not all) authorities maintain that a loaf of bread that, for whatever reason, cannot be eaten nevertheless qualifies for use as "lechem mishneh." As such, even matza unfit for consumption on this particular Shabbat can serve as "lechem mishneh." Therefore, we cannot consider it "muktza," as it is suitable for some use on this Shabbat!

In any event, it rarely happens that one has available only "matzot mitzva" on Shabbat Erev Pesach. It therefore behooves us to examine the permissibility of using standard matzot as "lechem mishneh" on Shabbat Erev Pesach. We already encountered one authority who allows doing so, since one need not have two edible loaves for "lechem mishneh." This issue will occupy us in tomorrow's edition of "S.A.L.T."

MONDAY

Yesterday we noted the value in minimizing the amount of chametz left in the home for Shabbat Erev Pesach, given the requirement of disposing of all chametz by midmorning on Shabbat. One possible method of accomplishing this involves using a matza for the uneaten "loaf" for "lechem mishneh" at the Shabbat meals. Since one need not eat both breads used for "lechem mishneh," one could, it would seem, use a matza for the second bread.

However, this practice assumes that one may use for "lechem mishneh" a bread not readily available for consumption. Is this presumption halakhically valid?

We may perhaps consider this issue in light of the discussion among the authorities concerning frozen challot. Rav Shmuel Wosner, a prominent, contemporary posek in Bnei-Brak, rules stringently in this regard in light of the view among the Rishonim (Rashba) and Acharonim (Maharshal, Shela, Vilna Gaon) that one must break both loaves of bread at the Shabbat meal. Although most people do not adopt this position, Rav Wosner argues that at very least both loaves must be edible (Shut Shevet Halevi 6:31). Seemingly, the same would apply to matza on Shabbat Erev Pesach; since one cannot eat it at this point, it is disqualified for use. Other authorities, however, allow the use of frozen challot for "lechem mishneh." Rav Yitzchak Weiss (Minchat Yitzchak 9:42) and many others argue that since in due time the frozen roll will become edible, we may already consider it a valid loaf of bread for this purpose. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Shemirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhata, chap. 55, note 39) issued a ruling falling in between these two positions: if one plans to extend his meal for a period of time in which the bread can defrost, he may use it for "lechem mishneh."

At first glance, however, it would appear that even these lenient positions will not help us permit the use of a matza as "lechem mishneh" on Shabbat Erev Pesach. These authorities build their leniency on the future defrosting of the frozen challa. Clearly, no such parallel exists regarding matza on Shabbat Erev Pesach; it remains "off-limits" until late Friday night, at the seder!

Nevertheless, as we will iy"H see tomorrow, several prominent poskim have allowed the use of matza for "lechem mishneh" on Shabbat Erev Pesach.

TUESDAY

In the last two editions of "S.A.L.T." we have looked at the halakhic propriety of one tactic devised to minimize the amount of chametz in the home on Shabbat Erev Pesach. (In light of the requirement to destroy all chametz by midmorning on Erev Pesach, people are encouraged to keep as little chametz as possible for Shabbat.) This technique involved using a matza for the second, uneaten loaf of "lechem mishneh" on Shabbat. Although one may not eat matza on Erev Pesach, perhaps it may be suitable for use as "lechem mishneh." We compared this issue to another case of an inedible loaf fulfilling the requirement of "lechem mishneh" - frozen bread. As we saw, even those authorities allowing frozen loaves for use as "lechem mishneh" do so only due to the natural defrosting process that it undergoes, rendering it edible after a period of time. Clearly, this reasoning would not yield a similar lenient ruling regarding matza on Shabbat Erev Pesach.

Yet, many authorities have nevertheless allowed matza for "lechem mishneh" on this Shabbat. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach draws a distinction between practically inedible and halakhically inedible bread. The prohibition preventing one from eating matza on Erev Pesach cannot strip the matza of its status as edible food. Thus, despite Rav Shlomo Zalman's own ruling that one may include frozen challa as "lechem mishneh" only if it will defrost by the end of the meal, he rules leniently in our case. Since matza retains its quality as edible food even on Erev Pesach, it cannot be disqualified for "lechem mishneh."

Many other poskim adopt this position, as well. In fact, in a published letter of the Chazon Ish, the sage urges his family to follow this practice in order to keep the leftover chametz to a minimum.

Others, however, argue on this reasoning of Rav Shlomo Zalman and equate halakhic and practical inability to eat the bread in question. In both instances, they contend, one may not include the bread as "lechem mishneh." These poskim nevertheless allow doing so on Friday night of Shabbat Erev Pesach, based on a distinction between the night and day of Erev Pesach with regard to the consumption of matza. While some Rishonim prohibit the consumption of matza already from the evening of Erev Pesach, we generally follow the view that the prohibition begins only in the morning of Erev Pesach. Nevertheless, the practice developed to refrain from matza already on the evening of Erev Pesach (and some begin already from Purim or Rosh Chodesh Nissan). Therefore, some poskim posit that only by day, when a bona fide prohibition against the consumption of matza exists, can we consider the matza "inedible." On Friday night, however, when we refrain from matza only by force of custom, the matza retains its status as halakhically-edible food. (In fact, some authorities allow eating matza on Friday night when Erev Pesach occurs on Shabbat - see Mishna Berura 471:12.)

To summarize, while many authorities permit or even encourage using a matza as the uneaten bread for "lechem mishneh" on Shabbat Erev Pesach, others allow this only at the Friday night meal.

In conclusion, we should note that many people have adopted the ruling mentioned briefly yesterday requiring cutting and eating from both loaves at Shabbat meals. Rav Simcha Rabinowitz, contemporary author of Piskei Teshuvot, writes that those following this custom must do so on Shabbat Erev Pesach, as well. Obviously, then, they may not use a matza as one of their two loaves for "lechem mishneh."

WEDNESDAY

Today, the 11^th of Nissan, marks the "yartzeit" of the Ramban, who passed away on this day in the year 5030 (1270). We will therefore study a segment from his writings on this week's parasha, Parashat Tzav.

This parasha opens with the mitzva of "terumat ha-deshen." Every morning, the kohen was to dust off the altar from the ashes that had collected thereupon over the previous twenty-four hours. The verse states that before bringing the ashes to their designated location "outside the camp," the kohen would "take off his clothing and wear other clothes" (6:4). According to Rashi, this clause constitutes not a requirement, but rather a measure of "derekh eretz" (proper respect). Given the chance of a kohen dirtying his clothing during this procedure, he should wear different garments that those worn for the actual service in the Mikdash. The Ramban, however, wonders why this concern would not generate a strict obligation for the kohen to change his clothing, and he in fact concludes that the Torah requires, not merely recommends, that the kohen do so. Rav Chayim Chavel, in his notes on the Ramban's commentary (Mossad Ha-Rav Kook edition), calls our attention to a passage in the Yerushalmi (Chagiga 1:1) where the Tanna'im debate how many "kutanot" (long shirts) were produced for each kohen. According to one opinion, each kohen received two "kutanot." This view, Rav Chavel suggests, may support the Ramban's position that the kohen performing the "terumat he-deshen" was required to change into a different garment. Each kohen therefore needed two shirts.

In support of Rashi's position, viewing the change of clothes as recommended but not obligatory, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi claims that the Torah would not institute a bona fide obligation purely on the basis of a general value of respect for the sacred. Approaching the sacred service of the Temple with respect, awe and reverence constitutes an a priori value that must influence the entirety of a kohen's activity accordingly. There would be no need, argues Rav Mizrachi, for a particular imperative in this regard.

(For a different defense of Rashi, see the comments of the Maharal of Prague in Gur Aryeh.)

Tomorrow we will discuss this Ramban further.

THURSDAY

Yesterday we discussed the mitzva of "terumat he-deshen," the daily sweeping of the altar by the kohen. As we noted, the verse calls for the kohen to change his clothing before bringing the ashes outside to their designated area (6:4). Rashi and the Ramban argue as to whether this constitutes merely a general recommendation or an outright obligation.

Today we raise a different issue, the nature of the clothes into which the kohen must change to bring out the ashes. The Ramban infers from Rashi's comments that these garments, too, were sacred "bigdei kehuna" (priestly garments) only of a lower quality than the kohen's other special clothing. The Ramban then writes: "Some of our sages there in Masekhet Yoma say that removing the ashes does not require priestly garments, and 'he shall wear other garments' refers to ordinary clothing. The simple reading of the text follows this interpretation." Thus, according to the Ramban, before removing the ashes the kohen must change into ordinary, laymen's clothing.

The problem with the Ramban's comments arises from his reference to the Gemara in Yoma. The Mishneh Le-melekh (Hilkhot Temidin U-musafin 2:10) writes that he never found such a view in the Gemara, that the kohen changes into ordinary clothing when removing the ashes from the altar. The Ramban presumably refers to Masekhet Yoma 23b, where a dispute appears regarding the word "other" in the clause "other clothing" in this verse. While the first view understands it, as Rashi explains, to mean lower-quality priestly garments, the other opinion, Rabbi Eliezer, links the word "other" to the following verse: "and he shall remove the ashes to outside the camp." Meaning, "other" modifies the one removing the ashes, teaching us that even a kohen with a physical blemish, whom the Torah generally excludes from the Temple service, may perform this ritual. Where in this Gemara did the Ramban find a position calling for the kohen to change into ordinary garments?

Rav Chayim Chavel answers that we may, indeed, understand Rabbi Eliezer's position as requiring specifically ordinary clothing for this ritual. The Ritva on that Gemara cites one interpretation that once Rabbi Eliezer allows for a kohen with a blemish to perform this service, he de facto considers it outside the framework of the formal Temple service. Hence, the kohen does not wear his sacred, priestly garments, which are designated only for activities considered part of the formal "avoda" (sacred service). Rav Chavel notes that the Malbim adopts this interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer's view, as well. The Malbim further substantiates this claim by citing a Yerushalmi in Yoma (2:1) that suggests that the view allowing a kohen with a blemish to remove the ashes would allow even a non-kohen to do so. Apparently, this position of Rabbi Eliezer effectively considers this ritual of removing the ashes outside the perimeters of the formal "avoda" in the Temple. Quite naturally, then, a kohen taking out the ashes should not wear his priestly garments, a halakha the Ramban considers the simple interpretation of the verse.

FRIDAY

The obligation of marror at the seder requires the consumption of a "ke-zayit." (This amounts to 28 cc according to the stringent position, 19 cc according to the lenient view. The Mishna Berura strongly recommends following the stringent view in this regard.) At first glance, this halakha appears clear and straightforward: the term "akhila" (eating) throughout the Torah refers to a ke-zayit. For example, one is liable for punishment for eating non-kosher food only should he consume this amount; eating less is forbidden but does not render one liable. Likewise, a little "closer to home," the Torah's requirement to partake of the korban pesach mandates the consumption of a ke-zayit. Accordingly, it would seem, the Torah's imperative to "eat" marror refers to nothing less than a ke-zayit thereof.

Surprisingly, however, the Rosh (in the tenth chapter of Pesachim) presents a more technical proof for this required amount: the berakha we recite over the marror reads, "al akhilat marror" - "the consumption of marror." This "consumption," the Rosh writes, implies the eating of a full ke-zayit. The Sha'agat Aryeh and many others have asked the obvious question against the Rosh: why must he run to the text of the berakha for proof? Why would this mitzva require a lesser amount of "eating" than all other instances of such throughout the Torah?

Rav Chayim Brisker explained the Rosh's comment by drawing an interesting distinction between marror and other mitzvot requiring eating. The latter category consists of independent mitzvot, obligations that constitute an end unto themselves. Marror, by contrast, serves merely as accompaniment to the korban pesach. Evidence for this approach emerges from the simple fact that the Torah never writes, "Eat marror." Instead, the Torah issues the command regarding marror by implication only, in the context of the korban pesach: "They shall eat the meat on this night, roasted by fire with matzot and bitter herbs" (Shemot 12:8). As opposed to matza, which the Torah later affords its own, independent imperative (12:18), marror never appears in the Torah outside the context of korban pesach.

Therefore, suggests Rav Chayim, the institution of marror does not necessarily follow the standard rules and regulations governing other mitzvot of eating. Since it constitutes an affiliate of korban pesach, rather than its own, independent obligation, it would perhaps not require a full ke-zayit. The Rosh therefore felt the need to find a specific basis for the requirement of a ke-zayit of marror, as the general guidelines concerning eating in other areas of halakha would not necessary apply in this case.

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