Tokhacha II
Bein Adam Le-chavero: Ethics of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin Zimmerman
Shiur #22:
Tokhacha II
In last week's lesson, we analyzed the Torah's description of
how to give tokhacha, how to constructively criticize another who has
transgressed. In this week's lesson, we will deal with the important questions
of what types of actions require rebuke and whether this tokhacha should
always be given. If there is a legitimate reason to believe that one's comments
may not change the behavior of the perpetrator and may even be
counterproductive, is tokhacha still called for?
What
Situations Obligate Rebuke
The verse obligating tokhacha is not specific as to
what types of violations require comment. The commentators on the verse
speak of two different scenarios: either one has been affected by the actions of
another or one who has witnessed another transgressing. Being offended by
another's actions is seemingly dependent on the particulars of each case,
whatever causes one to feel hurt; but it is the definition of a transgression
which must be defined more concretely. Is it only severe violations that require
rebuke, or does any transgression occupy this level?
While logic might limit the need for rebuke to outright
violations, the sources seem to expand the obligation beyond that level. The
Talmud in Arakhin (16b) speaks of unseemly behavior.
From where do we derive
that one who sees something reproachable about his companion should rebuke him? It is said, You shall certainly
rebuke your comrade.
The Talmud
doesn't speak of an outright violation, but rather unseemly behavior.
Furthermore, the Talmud Berakhot (31a) analyzes Eli's rebuke of Channa
thusly:
He said to her: How long will you be drunk...' (I
Shemuel 1:14) Rabbi Elazar said: From here we derive that when one sees
something improper about his fellow, he should rebuke him."
It is
important to note that the source of obligation here is Eli's interaction with
Channa; it is not explicitly learned from an imperative in the verse. Thus, it
remains unclear as to whether this obligation is an explication of the biblical
mandate "You shall certainly rebuke or a separate post-Sinaitic obligation
taught by the Prophets. Nevertheless, Tosafot in Berakhot (ad loc.
s.v. Davar) are explicit in stating that this source includes any
unbefitting conduct, even if it is not an explicit violation:
This refers to a case in which there is no violation of a
Torah prohibition, for in any case in which there is a violation of a Torah
prohibition, it is obvious, as it is written: "You shall certainly rebuke."
According to
Tosafot, the Talmud is not talking about a case in which there is a clear
violation of Torah law, as this is governed by "You shall certainly rebuke your
comrade."
Similarly, the Rambam explicitly states in Hilkhot De'ot
6:7 that tokhacha is required even for one who is setting out on a
bad track:
If one observes that a person has committed a sin or is
pursuing a path which is not good, it is a duty to bring the one in
error back to the right path and point out to him that he is wronging himself by
his evil actions, as it is said: "You shall certainly rebuke your comrade."
The phrase "a
path which is not good" is a bit vague, but considering the case of Elis
berating Channa for public intoxication, despite the lack of an explicit
prohibition against this, it would seem to include actions that might lead to
sin.
Requiring tokhacha even for implicit violations would
seem to be in line with our lesson of last week. Tokhacha is an
expression of care for a fellow Jew's wellbeing. One who really cares about
another is called to action whenever the other is slipping or beginning to
behave in a manner not in consonance with his or her spiritual potential.
In truth, this discussion, as well as all of the difficult
questions involving when rebuke is called for, may relate to an inquiry of HaRav
Aharon Lichtenstein regarding the nature of the mitzva of tokhacha.
Nature of the
Mitzva
In a fascinating article, HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein (see
http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/halak57/01rebuke.doc) deals with an
important question regarding the nature of the obligation. Is the mitzva
of rebuke an interpersonal mitzva, bein adam le-chavero, or an obligation
bein adam la-Makom, between man and God? Is it rooted in one's desire to
save his or her fellow Jew from destructive behavior, or in the obligation to
defend God's honor whenever His word is violated?
Certainly, the requirement not to embarrass the recipient of
rebuke takes into account the feelings of the sinner. However, this does not
mean that the impetus is not actually God's honor; the interpersonal aspect
would enter into the picture not as the source, but as an additional component.
One ramification of this question might be the previously
posed query of what actions require rebuke. If the obligation is to react to
sin, it may only apply to an act that has the status of an actual sin. If,
however, we are obligated by this mitzva to set others on the right path
in life, one must help another correct even improper behavior (like drunkenness)
and character traits.
A second related issue may be the all-important question of
whether one is obligated to rebuke one's fellow when there is reason to believe
the admonishment will be ignored. If it is an interpersonal obligation, then
logic may dictate that one should refrain from commenting if it will not be
heeded. After all, besides possibly putting a strain on one's friendship, making
the other aware of the nature of the act will change the individual from an
ignorant perpetrator to a deliberate one.
Let us take a look at the sources.
When One May
be Ignored
Regarding one's obligation to rebuke another under
circumstances in which it is not clear the latter will listen, there is a great
confusion amongst the sources. A number of the Talmudic texts seem to equate the
need and desirability of tokhacha with its successful results, while
others seem to require tokhacha under all circumstances in which
wrongdoing is found. Making sense of the texts is left to the Rishonim, while
the halakhic authorities codify the practical law. We will trace the basic
discussion but focus on the implications for understanding the nature of
tokhacha.
The Talmud (Shabbat 55a) states:
Rav Zeira said to Rav Simon, The master should rebuke the
household of the Exilarch.
He replied, They will not listen to me.
He answered, Even if they will not accept rebuke from you,
rebuke them nevertheless."
Though Rav
Simon initially thinks it unnecessary to rebuke the Exilarch, the political head
of Babylonian Jewry, when his call would not be heeded, Rav Zeira teaches him
otherwise. This means that one who is capable of rebuking must continue to do so
even when it is ineffective. Who knows if it will be effective? As for when a
person may cease rebuking another, the early Amoraim (Arakhin 16b) argue,
but the point is very far.
To what point must one rebuke? Rav says, Until one is hit;
Shemuel says, Until one is cursed; Rabbi Yochanan says, Until one is
scorned.
The simple
meaning of the text is that one is obligated to continue rebuking until one is
hit, cursed or reprimanded.
These sources seem to make clear that one should always
rebuke, even though there is no possibility that the words will be accepted; one
may only cease if physically assaulted or cursed.
In contrast, the Talmud in Yevamot 65b states
that one is actually obligated to refrain from tokhacha if it will not be
effective:
Rabbi Ilaa further stated in the name of Rabbi Elazar son of
Rabbi Shimon: Just as one is commanded to say that which will be heeded, so is
one commanded not to say that which will not be heeded.
Rabbi Abba said: It is an obligation, as it is said (Mishlei
9:8), Reprove not a scorner, lest he hate you; reprove a wise man and he
will love you."
Along the
same lines, the Talmud in Beitza 30a sets down a principle that one
should allow those unknowledgeable in their actions to continue if they won't
accept rebuke. It is mentioned in the context of the rabbinic prohibition of
dancing and clapping on Shabbat.
Yet today we see people doing this, and we do not take them to
task
Here also: Let Israel go on their way; it is better that they should err
in ignorance than deliberately.
The Talmud
continues there with a discussion regarding the cases in which this principle
applies, originally entertaining the idea that withholding rebuke in this
context is limited in scope to a rabbinic prohibition, while a biblical
violation would obligate one to rebuke the sinners. However, it concludes
otherwise:
But it is not so, for whether it is biblical or rabbinical, we
do not tell them anything; indeed, the additional time of Yom Kippur is a
biblical requirement, yet people eat and drink until dusk and we do not say
anything to them.
This Talmud
deals with three different cases to which the principle applies: the rabbinic
prohibition of clapping or dancing on Shabbat, a rabbinic prohibition to sit at
the edge of an alleyway which has a side post on Shabbat and the biblical
requirement to start one's fast on Yom Kippur before sunset. This source would
seem to indicate that at least when a person sins unintentionally and is
expected not to accept rebuke, one should prefer not to confront the sinner, as
this may lead to intentional sin.
As we saw last week, ineffective rebuke often leads to the
exact opposite result, reinforcing within the sinner the desire to continue in
sinful ways. Understandably, that might be the rationale behind the principle
not to rebuke if it won't be effective.
The contradictory sources inspire a great deal of discussion
by the Rishonim. There are two primary approaches in the Rishonim: those who
limit the obligation to effective rebuke, with some exception, and those who
stress the obligation to rebuke under almost all circumstances. Understandably,
this dispute may reflect two fundamentally different ways of understanding the
essence of the mitzva, as per Rav Lichtenstein's distinction.
Only
Effective Rebuke
The Semag (11) maintains that one is forbidden to proffer
rebuke if it will not be accepted, in line with the passage in Yevamot.
The Chinnukh likewise writes (Mitzva 239):
Nevertheless, the Sages have also said that if one sees that
his rebuke will not have any effect ... he is not obligated in this mitzva
towards such a person. This is what they meant when they said, Just as it is a
mitzva to say something that will be accepted, so it is a mitzva to stay silent
if his words will not be accepted, because such a situation brings shame to the
one rebuking and no benefit to the one receiving rebuke.
This
understanding would explain Arakhin 16b, obligating rebuke until one is
hit, cursed or scorned, as referring to a situation in which there is still a
possibility that the listener will eventually pay attention to the rebuke.
This approach is readily understandable if the goal of the
mitzva of rebuke is to help others better themselves. In certain situations of
doubt, one may continue to rebuke, but if it is clear that the rebuke will be
ineffective, it is better to be silent.
Opinions
Regarding the Need to Protest
A different approach is offered by the Nimukei Yosef (Yevamot
21b, Rif) and formulated nicely by the Yereim (223), who limits the concept of
refraining from rebuke when it will prove ineffective to those who sin
unwittingly, not those who do so knowingly:
If it is clear to the rebuker that they will not listen to him
and they are sinning unknowingly, it is better to keep quiet, as we say in
Beitza... But as for those who sin willingly, even though one increases his
culpability, for he now sins after being forewarned
one must rebuke him, even
though he will not be receptive.
The Yereim
explains that even when the rebuke will not benefit one's fellow, it is
necessary as an act of protest, indicating that one must not remain apathetic to
sin.
Various Rishonim who comment on the issue offer various
distinctions. Some distinguish between cases in which one knows for certain that
the rebuke will not be heeded and cases in which this is doubtful (see Tosafot
Arakhin ad loc. s.v. Af); others differentiate between the
mandatory first act of tokhacha and subsequent acts (Ritva, Shabbat ad
loc.), or between individuals and the community (ibid.). (For an
extensive discussion of the various opinions, please see Rav Yair Kahns essay,
http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/halak57/01rebuke.doc).
In fact, there is sufficient room to understand that there is
a dual nature to the mitzva of tokhacha. There is certainly an aspect of
tokhacha rooted in helping one's fellow improve his or her behavior, and
this aspect should take into account its efficacy. In addition, at times one
must react to sin, expressing disapproval and even protesting, even though the
rebuke itself may prove ineffective.
The Normative Halakha
The Rema in Orach Chayim (608:2) differentiates between
different instances regarding the obligation to rebuke. He comments on the
statement of the Mechabber that one need not offer reproof to those
unknowledgeable individuals who eat right up to nightfall before Yom Kippur, for
fear that they will continue to do so knowingly. The Rema adds:
The same applies to all forbidden matters: we say that
it is better that they should err in ignorance than deliberately. But this is
only when it is not stated explicitly in the Torah, even though it is by Torah
law. If, however, it is stated explicitly in the Torah, we must object. If a
person knows that his words will not be heeded, he should, in the case of
community-wide wrongdoing, offer rebuke only one time, but he should not rebuke
many times, since he knows that he will not be heeded. In the case of an
individual, however, he is obligated to reprimand until he is struck or cursed.
The Rema
differentiates between explicit sins and non-explicit ones regarding when one is
permitted to remain silent. This distinction can be understood based on the view
of the Rashba (Beitza 30a), who explains that the reason
explicitly-stated commandments are treated more severely is because one cannot
consider them unintentional.
Secondly, the Rema distinguishes between the case of an
individual and that of the community, understanding that the passage in
Yevamot applies only to the community. Rav Lichtenstein offers an
explanation of the Rema's distinction based on the question we posed above. He
explains that one may view the initial rebuke as relating to that element of the
mitzva of rebuke between man and God, whereas the subsequent rebuke stems
from the interpersonal aspect of the mitzva. Since rebuke will not help, there
is no reason to continue reprimanding after the initial rebuke. The initial
rebuke is not meant only to change and reform the sinner, but rather to avoid
remaining silent in the face of the sinful behavior that surrounds one.
One must develop a balance between protesting sin and being an
effective comrade. Understanding modern man's dislike for rebuke requires us to
further understand how to help others improve their ways.
Limitations
of Tokhacha
Despite the explicit obligation codified by the Rema regarding
the obligation to proffer rebuke for a matter explicitly mentioned in the Torah
as a form of protest even if it will not be adhered to, the Chafetz Chayim
points out that we may not be able to act that way in our days.
In Beiur Halakha (OC 608:2), he cites a number
of limitations:
It is reasonable to say that the ruling of the Rema, which
states that for something written explicitly in the Torah we are obligated to
protest, applies only to infrequent sins, but for people who reject religious
observance completely for example, those who violate Shabbat in public or eat
non-kosher food specifically in defiance of Halakha such people are excluded
from the term amitekha, and one is not obligated to give them reproof.
The Chafetz
Chayim understands that even the aspect of protest as part of the mitzva is
limited to those who are in the category of amitekha, your comrade
those who are interested in keeping the Torah but might slip at some point. Even
though they may do so intentionally, they are not interested in being wicked. He
cites support for this ruling from Tanna De-vei Eliyahu (ch. 18), which
is quoted in short by the Vilna Gaon. He explains that one should not rebuke
another who will only hate one for doing so (Adderet Eliyahu, Kedoshim
19):
The word amitekha is meant to include someone who is
your comrade in mitzvot but exclude someone who is wicked and will only
hate you for your rebuke, as the verse states Reprove not a scorner, lest he
hate you; reprove a wise man, and he will love you."
This
understanding essentially limits the concept of tokhacha to explicit sins
committed by those who are liable to accept rebuke. The Chafetz Chayim himself
debates the need to rebuke one who sins out of an inability to control desires
while having no explicit interest to defy the Torah.
If so, one can understand the limited applicability of
tokhacha to certain parts of society. In truth, rebuke in our day and age
raises a couple of other issues as well.
Rebuking
Modern Man
As we noted earlier, in the Talmudic era, some already
considered rebuke anachronistic. The Talmud (Arakhin 16b) teaches:
Rabbi Tarfon said, I wonder if there are any in this
generation who are able to give rebuke
Rabbi Elazar son of Azarya said, I wonder if there are any in
this generation who are able to receive rebuke.
If no one
knows how to give rebuke, should the mitzva still be practiced? If the
obligation is for the benefit of one's fellow, one could imagine forgoing it if
it would only prove detrimental. However, if one views rebuke as an obligation
of protest, one can imagine doing so even with the knowledge that it won't
succeed in changing the others practice; regardless, one will succeed in making
it clear that this behavior is not in consonance with what God wants. This might
explain the statement of the Chokhmat Shelomo (605), who writes:
If [the sin was committed] in public and there is a
possibility that others will learn from the sinner, one should protest the
transgression of even a rabbinic law.
One might
also view the rebuke as beneficial if not for the individual who has sinned,
then at least for the wider audience who witness the actions.
In truth, there might be an alternative form to the mitzva of
tokhacha, the focus of which is not primarily rebuke but rather
education. In the Shitta Mekubbetzet (Beitza ad loc.), we find:
The Ritva z"l said that one of the great Ashkenazic
rabbis testified that his rabbis in France, among them the Ri and the Maharam of
Rothenburg, said that [the rules of tokhacha] only applied in the
generation of the rabbis of the Talmud. However, in this generation, where we
are lenient in many matters, it is fitting to make a fence for the Torah.
[Therefore] we should protest and exact fines even for transgressing rabbinic
mitzvot so that people should not commit either unknowing or willful sins.
Rav Hirsch
and Modern Tokhacha
In our contemporary climate, giving and receiving rebuke are
much more difficult; indeed, the attitude of love which rebuke is supposed to be
viewed with (see Lesson 19) is utterly absent.
Rav S. R. Hirsch, witnessing the beginnings of Reform Judaism,
points out an important distinction between cases in which one should be silent
for fear others won't listen to and cases in which one must nevertheless speak
up. He explains that the biblical mandate to avoid embarrassing another in the
process of rebuke and the Talmudic principle of ignorance being preferable to
deliberate violation are both limited. In addition to the Rambams
differentiation between interpersonal offenses and ritual sins (for the latter,
one is allowed to embarrass the perpetrator), he adds another distinction:
In our opinion, the ruling applies only to reproof at the time
of the commission of an offense; at most, it applies to special appeals to those
who commit offenses. The ruling does not mean, however, that it is forbidden to
teach Torah to a wide audience and to instruct people in regard to the forbidden
and the permitted. On the contrary, these are the duties that are incumbent at
all times upon all teachers of Torah, especially if adherence to the law suffers
due to widespread ignorance.
He brings
support from the text of the Talmud, which specifically mentions a limitation on
reproof at the time of committing an offense, then continues:
To interpret otherwise is to say that whenever people become
habituated to sin because of ignorance, one may not rectify the situation by
teaching Torah. How absurd! Were this true, the Torah would gradually become
irrelevant.
Then he
quotes the Ritva's remark that this caveat applies only when Torah observance is
widespread and offenders are few; otherwise, one must raise objections.
In a fascinating article, HaRav Yehuda Amital adds (see
http://www.etzion.org.il/vbm/archive/halakha-combined.htm) that the mitzva
of tokhacha is equally inapplicable for unaffiliated Jews, because one
who doesn't accept the divinity of the Torah will not be moved by exhortation,
and specifically regarding them it is "proper to refrain from things which will
not be heeded."
Nevertheless, taking Rav Hirschs lessons to heart, we need
not be silent amidst an ignorant world. Tokhacha must have long-term
goals, rooted in an educational system that will be able to slowly edify those
who are unknowledgeable. One might say that our protest will be accomplished by
being committed to the word of God and uncompromising in our own individual
observance, but in our dealings with others, we will model our actions after
the insightful words of the Rashba (Responsa
5:238):
Be aware that a
soft-spoken word shatters bones, and different ways will clear a path before the
people to remove obstacles from them. Therefore, one must progress from the easy
to the difficult and not attempt the entire package all at once. These words are
directed towards the intentions of the heart
[Our Rabbis] have already shown us
good and clear counsel, as it states in Avoda Zara (15a)
that Rabbi
Yehuda intended to uproot the entire practice, and therefore he uprooted it
slowly, bit by bit.
Furthermore, you should
know that it is impossible to deal with all people equally. Recall that David,
our king, decided to overlook the misconduct of Yoav and Shimi, even though they
deserved death, for to everything there is an appropriate time, and ignoring
something sinful is occasionally a positive commandment, and everything must be
measured by the needs of the hour...
The Rashba states that even though, generally
speaking, it is improper to ignore the behavior of a sinner, at times it is a
mitzva, if the situation so
requires. The Rashba says further:
And if silence, employed
to ultimately yield positive results, is occasionally ineffective, the use of
force will only engender the opposite.
The Rashba seems to be saying that even if the
strict letter of the law requires tokhacha, often a more thought-out,
long-term approach will be more efficacious. This method was employed by Rav
Yisrael Salanter in France, where an extended educational effort about the
importance of Shabbat replaced outright protest.
There is nothing more
difficult than knowing when the mitzva is to say something and when the mitzva
is to be silent. While protest is sometimes called for, at other times we must
develop a more proper and modulated balance.
In our day, many of those who leave the path of Torah are
doing so more to express their lack of connection rather than their lack of
knowledge; they are aware that what they are doing is wrong in the eyes of the
committed. For those who lack commitment, even an act of protest might be
ineffective. If so, then the modern expression of the mitzva of tokhacha
is often not through rebuke but rather through kiruv, drawing others
close by outreach and inspiring others. In the next lesson, we aim to expound on
the basic mitzva to help others in spiritual need, specifically those who are
weighed down by religious confusion.
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