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Iyun in Sota -
Lesson 10

Iyun Masechet Sota: 7b

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YESHIVAT HAR ETZION

ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)

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GEMARA SOTA 5761

By Rav Mosheh Lichtenstein

Shiur #10: Sota daf 7b

 

 

The first stage in the process of the sota ceremony is the appearance of the sota in the Sanhedrin in Yerushalayim.  The purpose of this stage and the role of the Beit Din require our attention. 

 

The mishna in the first perek in Sanhedrin presents a list of the various Batei Din and the functions that they perform, including the cases that are dealt with by the Sanhedrin Ha-Gadol.  These include judiciary duties such as hearing cases that involve eminent personages such as a navi or Kohen Gadol or sitting in judgment on an entire shevet, and public functions that require their authority; e.g., going to war or sanctifying Yerushalayim or the Mikdash.  However, as Tosfot (Sota 7b d.h. mah) point out sota (and zaken mamreh) are absent from the mishna, although they, too, require a Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol.

 

There are three separate parashiyot in the Torah that establish the need for a Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol (Sanhedrin).  The first, in parashat Yitro, focuses upon the JUDICIAL capacity of the Sanhedrin.  Moshe Rabeinu, who is engaged in hearing the litigating parties that appear in his court, is told that he should deal only with "davar gadol" and/or "davar kasheh" i.e. the Sanhedrin (that Moshe Rabeinu is perceived as embodying) retains its role in great matters, be it because of their halakhic complexity or because of the status of the involved parties.  A second role of the Sanhedrin is described in parashat Behaalotkha as POLITICAL leadership.  Moshe Rabeinu is told to assemble seventy elders who shall assist him in his dealings with the people.  The Rav zt"l has elaborated upon this function and illustrated its halakhic manifestations and nafka minot in his article on the topic of kiddush hachodesh (reprinted in Kovetz Chiddushei Torah.  See also Rav Goren's sefer, Mayshiv Milchama pp.126-128).  The third parasha (Devarim 17:8-13) describe the Sanhedrin as final arbiters in matters of Torah and their unique position as transmitters and guardians of Torah.  The authority of Chazal to determine the Torah's meaning, to create drashot and establish mitzvot and takanot, is rooted in those pesukim.  Actually, it is not Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol as a court that is the focus of the parasha but the institution of the Sanhedrin as the authoritative body of decision regarding the content of the Torah.  In other words, it is a LEGISLATIVE rather than a judicial function that is the subject of the parasha. 

 

Thus, it is possible to mention three separate roles that Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol fulfils; a judicial, a legislative and a political function.  Thus, we will find that the Rambam divided his treatment of these three elements into hilkhot Sanhedrin, hilkhot Mamrim and hilkhot Melakhim, and that the halakhot regarding the composition of these institutions may differ in regard to personal status and other issues (e.g. semikha, gerim etc.)

 

We must now ask ourselves upon reading our mishna (as in all other cases that a Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol is required), which of the three capacities of the Sanhedrin is necessary for the ceremony.  Intuitively, we might assume that it is the judicial element that we are seeking, as the sota is about to be submitted to a trial whose outcome is capital punishment if indeed the sota is guilty.  This suggestion is reinforced by our reading in the mishna that she is forewarned in a similar manner to the warning that the Beit Din admonishes the witnesses of the gravity of the affair in capital cases.  Therefore, the likely answer is that the appearance in front of the Sanhedrin is a stage in her trial.

 

However, if so, the requirement of Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol in sota should be mentioned in the mishna in Sanhedrin that meticulously records all cases of the Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol's judicial authority.  Actually, that mishna details both the judicial and representative functions of the Sanhedrin, omitting only the aspect of Torah authority and responsibility that rests upon the shoulders of the Sanhedrin as "Chakhmei Ha-mesora" (cf. the Rav's article that claims that the mishna discusses only cases of judicial responsibility).  Thus, if we notice that a particular halakha that Beit Din must perform is lacking from the mishna in Sanhedrin, we should conclude that the reason for the omission is that this element is a function of the Torah guardianship rather than the other roles that the Beit Din is capable of fulfilling. 

 

Regarding the case of zaken mamreh, this line of reasoning is highly convincing.  The need for the zaken mamreh to be taken to the Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol is to argue the Torah controversy at hand and settle the issue of the Torah's proper interpretation.  The recourse to the Sanhedrin is to the institution that is the final arbiter in Torah matters; the subsequent criminal case is then referred back to a court of 23 judges who determine whether the scholar is guilty of being a zaken mamreh or not and sentence him accordingly.  Thus the role of the Sanhedrin is not to sit in judgment on the zaken but to clarify their position on the Torah argument while the lower circuit actually hands down a verdict on the status of the zaken mamreh. 

 

The situation of the Beit Din in sota, though, is far less clear, for there does not seem to be much of a role for the Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol in their capacity as Chakhmei Ha-mesora, while there would seem to be an element of judgment in the process to which the sota is submitted.  Nevertheless, the argument from the absence of the sota case in the mishna in Sanhedrin seems compelling, forcing us to fit the Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol in sota into the Torah paradigm.  Moreover, the gemara derives the need for the Sanhedrin's involvement in sota from a gezeira shava of "torah" "torah" with zaken mamreh! Not only is the parasha of zaken mamreh the source of this halakha, it is also based upon the phrase "torah" as used in the context of zaken mamreh. 

 

Therefore, it seems that we must indeed interpret the halakha that requires the appearance of the sota in Beit Ha-Din Ha-Gadol as rooted in their role as pillars of Torah and not due to their judicial function.  Obviously, if we consider the sota ceremony as an attempt to clarify the facts and restore the relationship, it does not have a judicial element and the Beit Din is not functioning as a court of judgment.  However, even if we do perceive the ceremony as a capital punishment, the above considerations remain valid, so that we must still explain the non-judicial function of the Beth Din.

 

The reason that Chazal do not perceive the Beit Din as a court is due to the fact that the trial of the sota is achieved by miraculous supernatural means that bypass the entire human system of justice.  Just as the Beit Din have no role in the execution of the verdict, so, too, are they of no moment in the process that leads up to it.  On the contrary, the human element involved in the administration of the sota is the kohen in his capacity as the representative or embodiment of kedusha in the human world.  The judgment of the sota and the purpose of the ceremony performed upon her are an expression of the need to maintain the requisite standards of kedusha appropriate for machane Yisrael (which is the reason why parshat sota appears in the Torah in the beginning of Bamidbar) and the need to purify it from the tuma with which the sota has defiled it.  Therefore, the entire ceremony revolves around the foci of kedusha in Am Yisroel – Mikdash, kehuna and the Name of the KBH in the Torah.  Within this context of kedusha expressing its potent revulsion to tuma, the judicial Beth Din has no role to fulfill, for essentially, it is not a verdict upon a sinner but a clash between the realization of kedusha within Am Yisrael and the negative elements of tuma that threaten to defile it.  The drama is thereby played out between the elements of kedusha embodied in Mikdash and kehuna and the sota, with the Beit Din lacking any role. 

 

Having explained to us why the Beit Din cannot, and does not, act as in a judicial capacity, the above line of reasoning has also provided us with the key to understanding the role assigned to them in the sota ceremony as guardians of Torah, for Torah is also a basic expression of kedusha and a foundation of Kedushat Yisrael.  Therefore, Torah, just like Mikdash and kehuna, is involved in the confrontation with the sota.  This is achieved by the insertion of parashat sota into the water that the sota drinks, thus "charging" the water with kedushat ha-Torah and activating them as the mayim hamaririm that work upon the guilty sota (more on this in due time, b"n, when we reach the sugyot in the third perek that deal with megilat sota).

 

The added value that the Sanhedrin bring to the table is kedushat Torah sheba'al peh.  While parashat sota is the expression of Torah shebikhtav, "the Beit Din Ha-Gadol in Yerushalayim are the essence of Torah sheba'al peh and they are the pillars of instruction from whom the Law is delivered to all of Am Yisrael; upon them the Torah relied as is written, "according to the Torah that they shall instruct you' this a mitzvat aseh.  Anyone who believes in Moshe Rabeinu and his Torah must base religious practice upon them and rely on them" (Rambam, Hilkhot Mamrim 1:1).  The participation of the Sanhedrin in the sota ceremony is, thereby, rooted in their status as the sages of Torah sheba'al peh. 

 

Thus, the connection that the gemara mentions between parashat zaken mamreh and parashat sota regarding the Beit Din Ha-Gadol is not merely a midrashic technique but rather it is due to a basic common denominator that the two share as halakhot in which the Sanhedrin's role as guardians of Torah sheba'al peh is the source of their authority.

 

Tosfot, who query the exclusion of the two cases from the mishna in Sanhedrin, answer that the verdict (gemar din) does not require the Sanhedrin in either case.  This is a clear-cut indication that their participation is in a non-judicial capacity, for had their juridic authority been required, the most crucial stage is, obviously, the verdict. 

 

In addition, Tosfot and the Rambam apparently disagree whether the requirement of Sanhedrin in sota is only le-khatchila (Tosfot) or bedieved (Rambam).  The Rambam determines that Sanhedrin are necessary for the sota ceremony, yet he doesn't detail which specific stages are included, as he apparently considers their embodiment of Torah sheba'al peh as necessary for the process of her drinking the Torah charged waters.  In his words, the Sanhedrin are required for hashka'at sota, a phrase that indicates that their authority is necessary to perform the hashka'ah.

 

Tosfot, though, rule that it is only le-khatchila and limit their role to warning the sota; therefore, we may interpret their position either as an advisory role that is a non-essential element in the ceremony (though the yalphuta from zaken mamreh would be difficult to reconcile with such an explanation) or we may understand their position, as explained above, that the Sanhedrin are necessary as representatives of Torah sheba'al peh, but their involvement in the early stages that instruct the sota in the severity of her act and the inevitable clash between it and the kedusha of Am Yisroel.  However, since the main role in the drama is reserved for Torah shebekhtav, the element of Torah sheba'al peh of the Beit Din Ha-Gadol is less crucial.

 

If the first (more probable) suggestion is to be accepted, the role of the Beit Din Ha-Gadol and its centrality in the sota saga is revealed to be a machloket between the Rambam and Tosfot.

 

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