Iyun Masechet Sota: 32a

Sources:

 

We will begin by learning the mishna (32a), and continuing with the gemara until 33a - "... dichtiv vehayu."

 

The opening Mishna of the perek deals with the recital of texts, specifically the need to recite the text in the Torah's original Hebrew as opposed to a vernacular translation.  Rather than resolving the issue uniformly, the Mishna divides the various texts into two groups - those that require the Hebrew text and those for which a translation may be substituted.  The former group includes the texts recited during the bringing of the Bikurim to the Beit HaMikdash, the passages used during the Chalitza ceremony, the priestly blessings of Birkat Kohanim, the blessings of the Kohen Gadol after Kriat HaTora on Yom Kippur in the Beit HaMikdash, the address of the specially anointed kohen (Mashuah Milchama) on the approach to the battlefield, the declaration of the Bet Din in the event of an Eglah Arufa, the portion of the Torah read by the king during the Hakhel ceremony at the conclusion of every Shemitta cycle, and the blessings and curses/damnation's pronounced by the Kohanim on Mt. Grizim and Mt. Eival when Bnei Yisrael entered into Eretz Yisrael at the time of Yehoshua's conquest.  All these require the use of Hebrew (lashon ha-kodesh).  One may not recite them in any other language, even if he or she understands the foreign language and do not comprehend the Hebrew text.

 

The other group that appears in the first half of the Mishna (everyday prayers, Kriat Shema, Birkat HaMazon, the oaths of Shevouat HaEidut and Shevouat HaPikadon, the confessional of Viddui Ma'aser and the section of the Torah addressed to the unfaithful woman (sota) by the Kohen during the Sota ceremony) may be recited in any language.

 

The obvious issue that arises from this Mishna is the difference between these two categories.  What Halakhic principle enables the use of the vernacular in texts such as Tefila and Kriat Shema, and what criterion or criteria separates the various texts mentioned in the Mishna into these two groups? If Hebrew is necessary, why not require it across the board? Conversely, if we rely upon translation, why not allow their use for all texts?  Clearly, there is a difference between these two groups that is more basic than the trustworthiness of translation.  Indeed, if the issue of vernacular is reduced to accuracy alone, there would be no room for any distinctions between reciting the portion of Bikkurim or confessing the Torah section of Ma'aser, nor to claim that Chalitza requires Hebrew but that Sota doesn't, etc.  Therefore, we must assume that we are dealing with two distinct categories of text that utilize their respective passages for different purposes and in diverse forms.  The first category can express itself in the vernacular as well as Hebrew, while the latter group's aims can be achieved only through the use of the original Hebrew text. 

 

The Gemara provides source texts for most of these rules, deducing from the various drashot those that require Hebrew and those that don't.  However, it is the instance of Tefila, which is explained by the logic of a sevara and not derived from a drasha (textual extrapolation) that will best serve to highlight the issue of vernacular usage and clarify these categories.

 

The reason that prayer can be said in any language, explains the sugya, is that Tefila is considered "Rachmi," man's pleading for mercy from the Kadosh Barukh Hu, and one may request his needs from the KBH in whatever manner he desires.  Simply put, the Gemara claims that the idea of prayer is not to recite a text or make a formal presentation to the KBH but to convey a message (in this case, from Man to God).  Since communication is possible in any language, there is no need to insist upon Hebrew.

 

Thus, in essence, the division within the Mishna is not simply an issue of language.  Rather, what's at stake is the very nature of these Halakhot.  Do they demand the recitation of a particular Biblical text, or are they designed to communicate a message and convey content?  If it is the latter, then it should be obvious that any form of communication is legitimate and that no particular vehicle of communication would be necessary.  Therefore, petitioning for one's needs can be conducted in any language, as can the expression of gratitude and thanksgiving that are due to the KBH for providing our sustenance.  Man can speak to God in Yiddish (or Italian or Norwegian) and is not limited to Hebrew. 

 

On the other hand, if the mitzva is to recite a Biblical text (or to engage in certain forms of formal halakhic activity), it is quite reasonable to assume that the original text is required and that a paraphrase or translation will not suffice.  For if the critical element is not the content but rather the power of the text that is being employed, then the original text of the Torah is necessary.  If what's needed is not a general message but rather a metaphysical empowerment, then approximation or transmutation into other languages lack this power and the actual text must be used.  This is the reason that Lashon HaKodesh is required whenever it is not the message but the text that is crucial.  A good example of this is Birkat Kohanim.  Since the Kohen is perceived as the metaphysical channel through which the KBH bestows a Heavenly blessing upon us (see Rambam, Hilkhot Nesiat Kapayim 15:7), the exact formula must be preserved.

 

The claim that any mitzva that is message-oriented does not require Hebrew seems self-evident and wholly supported by the Gemara's explanation of prayer.  The practical implication of this is not only that the vernacular may be used, but also that if used it must be understood by the user, wheras its legitimization is as a message and not as a text.  Simply reciting the vernacular without understanding the words is worthless, since the recitation is neither a text (for if it was, Hebrew would be required) nor a message.  Surprisingly, however, Tosfot (32a s.v. Kriat) suggest that a non-Hebrew text may be used for certain purposes, even if the speaker does not understand what he is reciting.  Puzzled as to why the Mishna omitted Kiddush, Hallel and Berakhot from the lineup of texts that do not require Hebrew, Tosafot claim that these three may be recited in any language, even if the person doesn't understand what he is saying! They concede, however, that the other cases in the Mishna are halakhically worthless unless understood.  This is in line with our claim that the use of vernacular assumes the conveyance of a message and must therefore be comprehended.  The notion, though, that Kiddush can be said in any language regardless of comprehension is quite baffling.  For if we follow the logic that was presented above, the vernacular is meaningless if it is not understood; there seems to be no point to the mere chanting of words.  Expectedly, most later authorities [1] disagree with Tosfot and deny that Kiddush can be recited in a language one does not understand [2].

 

The same idea emerges from the Gemara's discussion of Kriat HaMegila.  The Mishna in Megila (17a) establishes that Megila can be read to non-Hebrew speakers either in the vernacular or in Hebrew.  The Gemara explains this halakha by claiming that the mitzva of Megila has a dual nature.  First, is a formal obligation to read ('mitzvat kria') that requires Hebrew but not necessarily the understanding of the listener or reader.  Secondly, there is a mitzva of "pirsumi nisa" that does not require Hebrew but is contingent upon the listener's comprehension [3]. 

 

Thus, our classification of mitzvot into those that are to be recited in Hebrew and those that can be repeated in any language is essentially a determination as to the nature of these Halakhot.  As such, our discussion of the sugya must proceed accordingly.

 

A close analysis of the Gemara's discussion regarding Kriat Shema will illustrate this point.  While the Mishna stated that Kriat Shema can be recited in any language, the Gemara introduced a disagreement among the Tana'im regarding this issue.  Rebbe insists upon the original text ("the text should be as it is"), while Chakhamim counter that "Shema Yisrael – in any language that you hear."  It seems clear that the argument does not surround the actual derivation from the verse ("drash").  After all, Chakhamim could just as easily have understood the verse as, "Shema Yisrael – in Hebrew" and thus concluded that the Torah requires hearing the text in its original form.  The dispute, therefore, does not revolve upon the technique of 'drasha,' but rather constitutes a conceptual argument regarding the nature of Shema.  Is Shema a mitzva to recite a certain portion of the Torah daily as a text, or is the essential mitzva the undertaking and acceptance of the values expressed therein in it.  If the mitzva is the recitation of the text, as Rebbe apparently thought, then the original Hebrew is indeed crucial; however, if Shema is designed to serve as an acceptance of God's yoke ('kabalat ol malchut shamayim') or an act of Talmud Torah, then the actual text is unimportant, as long so the individual is aware of its meaning.

 

In truth, this dispute revolves around the very meaning of the word "Shema."  Does it refer to the physical act of hearing or to comprehension?  In other words, should, "Shema Yisrael be translated as 'Hear O Israel,' or as 'Israel, understand that HaShem is our God..."?

 

The two options presented here seem to correspond to the categories of "mitzvat kriah" and "mitzvat kavana" employed by the Gemara in Brachot (13b) Any comprehensive discussion of this topic requires a full treatment of that sugya (and many others in masechet Berakhot, as well); we will limit ourselves to a discussion of the cases in our sugya.

 

Having presented the machloket, in which Chakhamim focus upon the individual's comprehension while Rebbe emphasizes the need to preserve the integrity of the text, the Gemara inquires as to Rebbe's response to Chakhamim's drasha.  The Gemara explains that Rebbe derives from "Shema" the requirement that Keriat Shema be recited loudly enough to be heard.  Chakhamim, by contrast, deny such a requirement.  Following the logic of the overall argument, it is clear that this second disagreement between Rebbe and Chakhamim follows from the issues previously debated.  Since Chakhamim understand "Shema" as related to comprehension and not text, there is no need to require an audible Keriat Shema; 'kabalat ol malchut shamyim' in the mind and heart of the person is the critical element.  As long as the person understands his acceptance, the decibels are meaningless.  Rebbe, though, perceives of Shema as a 'mitzvat kriah,' which obligates the recital of a text.  Therefore, he requires that the text be heard, as otherwise it is not considered to have been proclaimed.

 

The same analysis explains the Gemara's attempt to understand how Chakhamim deal with Rebbe's drasha, as well.  The Gemara explains that Chakhamim learn from "vehayu" that the correct sequence of the verses is necessray.  Interestingly, Rebbe agrees with the Chakhamim in this regard.  This halakha, agreed upon by both parties, should be understood in accordance with their previous argument.  Both Rebbe and Chakhamim require that the Torah's order of the pesukim be retained, but for different reasons.  Rebbe, as we saw, claims that the mitzva is to recite a portion of the Torah and insists upon the recital of the original text in its original language.  Consistently, he requires the proper sequence of the verses, since otherwise it is not the Torah's text in its original form that is being recited.  Reversing the order, no less than changing the language, invalidates Keriat Shema since the original form has been corrupted. Chakhamim, disagree with Rebbe's basic concept of Keriat Shema, but nevertheless agree to this halakha.  In their opinion, a change in the sequence directly influences the content.  The authentic organization of the parsha is not haphazard, but rather arranged according to the inner logic of commitment to the KBH that is expressed therein.  Therefore, any shuffling of the pesukim invalidates the recitation.

 

This analysis of Keriat Shema, specifically within the context of Chakhamim's view, is further highlighted by a position of the Ravad.  The Rambam claims (Hilkhot Keriat Shema 2:10) that the halakhot requiring linguistic precision in the reciting of Shema apply also to the recitation of Shema in the vernacular.  Therefore, if one recites Shema in English, he must meticulously follow the rules of English grammar and syntax; if he uses Chinese, he must strictly obey the rules of the Chinese language, etc.  The Ravad, however, disagrees.  He argues that these rules apply only to Hebrew, since the recitation of Shema in other languages is not considered the recitation of a text, but rather a declaration of commitment.  In the Ravad's words, "...all the languages are interpretation, so why should anyone bother with their grammar."  [The Rambam's opinion that requires precision even in translation need not be construed as assuming that the translation has the status of text.  Rather, he believes that imprecise linguistic usage in a declaration directed towards the KBH is sloppiness that expresses a lack of respect and is therefore deemed improper behavior.]

 

In summary, we claimed that the legitimacy of translation is dependent upon the nature of the particular mitzva, whether its essence is the recitation of a text that requires the original Hebrew, or the expression of content that can be achieved in any language one understands.  We have not raised  the issue of translation itself and its status.  Theoretically, it could be argued that a translated text could also be considered an accurate reflection of the original.  The recital of such a text, faithfully rendered, should therefore suffice even in mitzvot that require the original text.  Conversely, we could deny the efficacy of any translation even where there is only the need for specific content.  Given the inherent limitations of the vehicle of human language, one could argue that no translation could express the message exactly as the Torah intended.  However, though theoretically possible, these possibilities do not accommodate our sugya, which allows translation in certain cases but disqualifies it in others.  If the vernacular can be considered an authoritative text, it should be recognized as such in all cases; if it cannot be used for all purposes, it cannot be assumed that it is the same as the original.  On the other hand, if its content was considered inherently unreliable (an unlikely claim in any event), it could never be used, even to reflect content that the Torah desired.  The fact that it is valid in certain instances and not others leads us to claim that we are dealing with different categories of mitzvot.

 

Having attempted during this shiur to explain the basic principle of this sugya, the next shiur will focus upon some of the particular examples.  In addition to the cases mentioned in the Mishna, we shall deal with Kriat HaTora and tefilla.  Aside from our Gemara, important sources are Ha'amek Davar, Devarim 1:45 and Teshuvot Chatam Sofer 6:84, s.v. umah, 6:86, s.v. aval, vehenei, veha and vehenei. 

 

FOOTNOTES:

 

[1]  See Be'er Sheva, Keren Ora and others.

[2]   Tosfot's opinion remains problematic. If content is the critical element regarding kiddush, Hallel, and berakhot, then, as we saw, comprehension is indispensable. The alternative approach, that they are formal texts that achieve their effect through mere utterance, is also problematic. The Mishna establishes that texts must be recited in Hebrew to function as official texts and not in the vernacular. Though the claim could be advanced that the Mishna's texts are all sections of the Torah and therefore require the original Hebrew, while these are indeed texts but without any original source that must be repeated verbatim, this very fact itself just serves to reinforce the notion that these obligations involve content, and not text.

[3]The presentation of this sugya is in line with the Ramban's interpretation. Rashi explains the Gemara differently.