Melakha She'eina Tzerikha L'Gufa and Davar She'eino Mitkaven
THE LAWS
OF SHABBAT
By Rav Doniel Schreiber
Shiur
#17: Issur Melakha and the Shabbat Day of Rest
Part II
In the
previous shiur it was mentioned that one does not violate a melakha min ha-Torah
unless the eight conditions of melekhet machshevet (craftsmanship) are
simultaneously satisfied. If any one
of these eight conditions is not fulfilled, then no Torah violation has
occurred. In many instances, though,
one's actions may be sufficient to violate rabbinic law even in the absence of
these conditions. The following is a
discussion of instances in which one has failed to meet the requirements of
melekhet macheshevet.
1.
Melakha
she'eina tzerikha le-gufa
Typically, according to halakha, one is forbidden to
perform any prohibited act, regardless of one's motivation for accomplishing the
act. For instance, the Torah
prohibits eating non-kosher food even if one were to eat the food in order to
hide it from someone. But what is
the rule on Shabbat, where there is a requirement for "craftsmanship?" Is there
a Torah violation if a person performs one of the 39 melakhot on Shabbat for a
purpose other than the goals of that act in the building of the mishkan? Can a
melakha, that occurs as a byproduct of trying to accomplish that which is not a
melakha be defined as melekhet machshevet?
Tannaim (Shabbat 93b) are divided in this case. R. Shimon rules that there is only a
rabbinic violation, while R. Yehuda considers it to be a Torah violation. The vast majority of poskim accept
the lenient view of R. Shimon, and thus the halakha is that such an act is
considered a rabbinic prohibition (Tur OC 278, 316, 334, OC 316:8, and MB 316:34
and MB 278:3). However, Rambam
Shabbat 1:7 and Yeraim no. 274, among others, rule stringently in accordance
with R. Yehuda. Rishonim equivocate
as to what is the ruling of the Rif (see Ramban and Rashba on Shabbat 93b).
For further analysis: The Vilna Gaon (OC 340:1)
feels that Shulchan Arukh rules stringently like R. Yehuda, since Shulchan Arukh
(OC 340:1) asserts that it is a Torah prohibition to cut one's fingernails on
Shabbat, and Tosefot understands this case as eina tzerikha le-gufa. But many rishonim understand that
cutting one's nails is tzerikha le-gufa, and thus one cannot bring a proof from
Shulchan Arukh's ruling.
Furthermore, elsewhere (OC 316:8), the Vilna Gaon understood that Shulchan Arukh
rules leniently like R. Shimon, since Shulchan Arukh asserts that trapping for
no purpose is a rabbinic prohibition.
The Biur Halakha (340:1 s.v. ve-chayev) points out this apparent
contradiction within the Vilna Gaon, and explains that the Vilna Gaon was
actually of the opinion that it is difficult to tell what Shulchan Arukh rules,
and was merely highlighting the differing emphases in Shulchan Arukh. This seems to be also the approach of
Eliyahu Rabba (OC 301:29) and Arukh ha-Shulchan (OC 316:19, OC 334:2,3,4, OC
340:6). Yet, Magen Avraham (OC 316:
17, and 340:1) and Mishna Berura (MB 316:34, MB 334:84,85, and Biur Halakha
316:8 s.v. ve-ha-chovel) seem to
take for granted that melakha sheina tzerikha le-gufa is merely a rabbinic
prohibition.
For
further research: See gemara Chagiga 10b and Rashi, Shabbat 93b s.v. ve-R'
Shimon.
Although a melakha she'eina tzerikha le-gufa is
considered merely a rabbinic prohibition, it is the most stringent rabbinic
prohibition of Shabbat. For example,
although certain rabbinic prohibitions may be performed during bein ha-shmashot
for the needs of Shabbat (OC 342), a melakha sheina tzerikha le-gufa is
prohibited (MB 342:1). See also MB
278:3 with regard to extinguishing fire for one who is sick with a non-life
threatening illness.
What is an example of a melakha she'eina tzerikha
le-gufa? There are many opinions in
Rishonim as to the definition of this concept and the cases included therein. Three basic positions are:
1.
Subjective - It is
when one is not entirely happy, satisfied, or reconciled with the outcome, e.g.
taking a dead body out of the house which involves the melakha of carrying
(hotzaa); you do not want it in the house, but you do not want it outside either
- Rashi (Shabbat 93b, s.v. ve-rav
shimon poter).
2.
Objective - It is
when the purpose of the act is not the same as the purpose in the mishkan. Thus, Tosefot rule that cutting nails
and hair is a melakha she'eina tzerikha le-gufa, since the in the mishkan the
wool was cut in order to be used, not to be discarded (Shabbat 94a, s.v. rabi
shimon poter). (Rivash thinks that
cutting nails and hair is asur min ha-Torah because in the mishkan there was
also a value in merely shearing the wool, inasmuch as this assisted in the use
of the skins of the sheep.
3.
Subjective/Objective
- It is when the act has a purpose in the positive sense, as opposed to an act
which merely removes or prevents damage - Ramban and Chachmei Sefard, ibid. Some
Geonim rule that removing a dead body which has created a foul odor in the house
is a melakha she'tzerikha le-gufa.
Perhaps they understand that preventing damage is eina tzerikha le-gufa, whereas
removing present damage is tzerikha le-gufa.
Poskim appear to differ on how to rule.
The Taz (OC 278) cites Rashi's explanation, whereas Magen Avraham (ibid.)
cites that of Tosefot. Nonetheless,
all poskim agree that digging an unwanted hole in the ground in order to have a
mound of dirt is a melakha she'eina tzerikha le-gufa, as this satisfies all
definitions. The same can be true of
extinguishing a fire, capturing a dangerous animal, or carrying an unwanted item
from a private domain to a public one.
An example of a practical implication of this law,
that a melakha she'eina tzerikha le-gufa is prohibited merely midrabanan, is
asking a non-Jew to turn off the lights in your bedroom so that you may go to
sleep. The law is that shvut
de-shvut be-makom mitzva (a rabbinic violation within a rabbinic violation for
the sake of a mitzva) within certain parameters is permitted, and this is such a
case. Inasmuch as turning off lights
constitutes a melakha she'eina tzerikha le-gufa and is thus forbidden
rabbinically, and furthermore, asking a non-Jew to perform melakha is a rabbinic
violation (the laws of which will be dealt with in a later shiur), and finally,
going to sleep on Shabbat is a mitzva of oneg Shabbat (enjoying Shabbat), there
exists here a shvut de-shvut be-makom mitzva.
2. Davar She-eino Mitkaven
Tannaim differ in a case where one violates a
melakha on Shabbat without the intention of doing that melakha, e.g. one drags a bench upon the ground in
a situation where this might or might not create a furrow. (Digging a furrow is a Torah
violation of the av melakha of plowing.) Conceptually, this is a case of
performing permitted action "A" which in fact results in forbidden action "B",
although it was unclear that action "B" would be the necessary outcome. According to R. Yehuda, a violation
has occurred in such a case, (see below), while R. Shimon rules that no
violation has occurred at all.
Amoraim, also debate this issue, with Rav accepting the opinion of R. Yehuda and
Shmuel subscribing to the opinion of R. Shimon.
The gemara rules leniently in accordance with R. Shimon, and this is
indeed the halakha. See Beitza 23b,
Shabbat 41a-42a, 46b and 95a, Rambam, Shabbat 1:5,6, and OC 337:1.
For
further research:
A.
Scope of leniency
1.
See Levush (337:1),
who understands that R. Shimon in fact only allows davar she-eino mitkaven with
regard to rabbinically proscribed actions, but forbids it with regard to Torah
proscribed actions. See Mishna Brura
337:1 that this position has been rejected by the poskim, and R. Shimon's
leniency applies to Torah proscriptions as well.
2.
Rishonim differ as
to whether davar she-eino mitkaven is permitted only for Shabbat prohibitions
(Sheiltot cited in Tosafot Shabbat 110b s.v. talmud, and Shita Yeshana in Shita
Mekubetzet Ketubot 5b, p. 28; see also MB 320:53, Kritot 19b, and Torah Temima,
Shemot 35:33) or even for general prohibitions (Ri cited in Tosafot Shabbat 110b
s.v. talmud, Rosh Shabbat 14:9 and Rambam, Kilayim 10:16, Nezirut 5:14; see
Shabbat 81b and Bekhorot 34a). See
also Chiddushei Ha-Grach al Ha-Rambam Shabbat 1:10.
B.
Opinion of R. Yehuda
While
Rishonim appear to agree that according to R.
Yehuda one violates Torah law in cases of davar she-eino mitkaven with
regard to general prohibitions, they differ as to whether R. Yehuda understands
that a Torah violation also occurs on Shabbat in a case of davar she-eino
mitkaven, or merely a rabbinic one.
Those who
understand that according to R. Yehuda there is a Torah violation for Shabbat as
well are: Ramban, end of Milchamot Hashem, Shabbat 124b, Rashba, Shabbat 133a,
and in Shita Mekubetzet Ketubot 6a, Ritva Yoma 34b, Rosh Shabbat 12:1, Meiri
Shabbat 95a, and Maggid Mishna Shabbat 1:7 and 12:2. Those who understand that according
to R. Yehuda there is merely a rabbinic violation on Shabbat in this case are:
Tosefot Shabbat 41b s.v. meicham, Tosefot Yoma 34b, and Rabbeinu Avraham ben
Ha-Rambam, Birchat Avraham no. 19, p. 33.
A difficult opinion to establish is that of Rashi who seems to contradict
himself see Shabbat 121b and Yoma 34b.
While some Rishonim, such as the Sefer Yereim (siman
274), limit R. Shimon's lenient ruling to situations where there was only one
way of performing action "A", most authorities rule that we are lenient even
when an alternative manner of action "A", one which would certainly not lead to
forbidden action "B", exists.
Accordingly, even if one deliberately chooses a manner of performing action "A"
which might lead to forbidden action "B", and forbidden action "B" indeed
occurred, one is completely exempt.
See Beit Yosef, OC 337, and Shulchan Arukh 337:1.
However, where one intends at the outset to benefit from the possible
occurrence of forbidden action "B", rishonim agree that R. Shimon would rule
stringently, inasmuch as action "B" is no longer unintentional. See Rambam, Ma'akhalot Assurot 14:12
and rishonim on Pesachim 26a.
Some practical implications of this law, that davar
she-eino mitkaven is mutar, are:
1.
Unintentionally
backing into a light switch This case, according to the Kaf Ha-chaim (OC
277:4), is precisely one of davar she-eino mitkaven, and no violation has
occurred since the permitted act "A" of backing into a light switch might or
might not cause prohibited act "B", i.e. turning on/off the light. This is of course forbidden to do
with the intent to turn on/off the light, as noted above.
2.
Opening refrigerator
doors Even where one opened a refrigerator door and caused the motor to
immediately turn on, no violation has occurred since the motor of a refrigerator
does not always start immediately upon opening the door, and it is not one's
intention to turn on the motor when opening the door.
The next shiur will discuss the laws of davar
she-eino mitkaven pesik reisha, i.e. unintended forbidden act "B" which will
definitely result from permitted act "A."
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