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Iyun in Sota -
Lesson 11

Iyun Masechet Sota: 8a

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The sugya (8a) quotes a beraita that the sota ceremony is individual to each sota and cannot be performed upon two sotot together. Different reasons are given to explain this halakha. Chakhamim explain that it is a precaution designed to ensure that the woman not be prevented from confessing if she is guilty, while R. Yehuda cites a textual source, "otah – levadah," that determines that each ceremony must exclusively relate to a single sota. In addition, the gemara points out that there is also a problem of ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot, if two sotot are bundled together into one ceremony.

 

Let us begin with R. Yehuda's opinion that the Torah disallowed a combined ceremony for two sotot. What is the rationale of this halakha? A gemara in Nedarim (73a) provides us with the key to understanding the logic of this derasha. The gemara asks whether a husband can annul the vows of both his wives with a single annulment or not, and it quotes our sugya as proof that it cannot be done (see Ran). Although it is possible to limit the comparison between the two cases to a semantic dilemma regarding the exclusivity of the word "otah" (that is written in both instances – "yani otah" "vehishbia otah"), it is also possible, and hence more reasonable, to isolate a common denominator that exists in both cases.

 

As we have previously seen in past shiurim, the sota drama can be understood either as the resolution of an intimate personal relationship that has been called into question or as an attempt to abolish tum'a and preserve the kedusha of Am Yisrael. In the same manner that we have evaluated previous elements vis a vis this question (see the shiurim that dealt with kinui and setira), we must also address this issue in the context of the shtia. As we shall see in much greater detail in the sugyot of the third perek, the practical application of this question is the significance of the erasure of the text of parashat sota in the water. The text is written and then dissolved in the water that the woman drinks. From the perspective of the personal relationship, the primary element is the written text that contains a message that is delivered from the husband to his wife. The water is a delivery system that conveys the message to the woman whose reaction is a response to this message. The alternate approach, that eradication of tum'a and establishment of kedusha is the goal of the ceremony, reverses the hierarchy between the two stages. It considers the text a vehicle to charge the water with kedusha (as explained last week), so that the written text is essentially a preliminary to its absorption into the water.

 

Let us now return to our sugya. The common factor in this case is the personal element. Both sota and hafarat nedarim require an individual ceremony for each woman since they are a function of the interpersonal relationship that exists between them. The husband's prerogative to annul his wife's nedarim is due to the personal aspect of their marital relationship, as is the husband's option to bring his wife as a sota to the Mikdash. Therefore, neither hafarat nedarim nor sota can be performed en masse, as this would eliminate the personal element involved in each of the cases. (An analogous halakha is the need for individual lishma in a get.) The gemara's comparison of these two cases is now revealed to be rooted in a common dilemma - whether a personal act can be directed to two separate individuals without losing its personal character. Having proved from sota that this is impossible, the gemara concludes that it is disqualified by neder as well.

Thus, R. Yehuda's halakha that two sotot cannot share a joint ceremony is not simply a gzeirat hakatuv of "otah" but is due to the essence of the ceremony that is directed to the individual.

 

Chakhamim's opinion would seem to be a seyag (hedge) midrabanan that is due to our concern that the Name of God not be unnecessarily erased. However, the gemara makes it clear that we are dealing with a de'oraita, as it interprets Chakhamim in the context of R. Shimon's approach to utilize the rationale of the pesukim ("darshinan ta'ama dekra"). However, the rationale that the gemara presents for Chakhamim is not the idea of the personal relationship that requires an individual ceremony; rather it is our concern that she drink the water if guilty. Though this can be understood as an issue of kedushat HaShem, it is also possible to view it as a judicial concern, since the presence of the second sota prevents the creation of the necessary awe and dread that are an integral part of the sota ceremony. The rites in the Mikdash, accordingly, are not considered an attempt to deliver a personal message but a process of submitting the sota to the judgment of the KBH.

 

Although the above presentation seems convincing, the gemara's claim that the machloket revolves around R. Shimon's concept of ta'ama dekra seems to imply that Chakhamim and R. Yehuda agree upon the underlying logic and only argue about its application. As the sugya spells out its interpretation of Chakhamim's position, the assumption that R. Yehuda basically agrees with them would force us to reinterpret R. Yehuda as disqualifying a double ceremony because of the lack of fear and trembling rather than the need for a personal message. This, though, would render the comparison of the sugya in Nedarim incomprehensible, unless we were to view it as a issue of derasha technique that is rooted in the midrash semantics of the word "otah." Moreover, R. Yehuda's statement that emphatically denies the reason offered by Chakhamim ("lo min hashem hu zeh") is quite clear that he disagrees with their basic principle.

 

Therefore, it seems that Chakhamim and R. Yehuda do indeed disagree about the basic nature of this halakha, along the interpersonal – judicial procedure divide, and the nafka minah that the gemara suggests (a trembling sota) is to be understood along these lines. However, as Chakhamim express their opinion in the form of a speculative reason for a de'oraita and do not utilize a derasha, the gemara understands that they are subscribing to R. Shimon's theory of ta'ama dekra and draws the implications of this position for the suggested nafka minah. Otherwise, even though they would conceptually disagree, there would not be any nafka minah. R. Yehuda, though, is not arguing the well known machloket of ta'ama dekra here – he is arguing the sota issues that are the base of Chakhamim's claim.

 

Having dealt with the machloket of Chakhamim and R. Yehuda regarding the de'oraita of two sotot, we must now turn our attention to an additional concern that the gemara introduces, the problem of "ein ossin mitzvot chavilot chavilot." Tosafot in our sugya and the Rashbam in Pesachim (102b d.h. chavilot) explain that the reason for this halakha is to prevent the appearance that mitzvot are a burden that must be disposed of as quickly and conveniently as possible. Tosafot in Moed Katan state that the purpose of the rule is to prevent distraction and to allow the mitva-doer to give each mitzva his full and undivided attention.

 

Tosafot also state that it is midrabanan. This is the overwhelming consensus amongst later poskim (although the Sdei Chemed did not consider it as self evident or obvious – see Sdei Chemed vol. 1 p.327), who base themselves upon our Tosafot and the fact that the only possible pasuk that is a candidate to serve as a source for a de'oraita – the pasuk of otah that limits the sota ceremony to a single sota – is viewed by the gemara as an independent halakha and not as source that establishes a general rule of ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot. The lack of a source, on the one hand and the logic that mitzvot should appear to be burdensome, on the other, both combine to establish that the rule is a derabanan.

 

The halakha of ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot appears in two other sugyot: a. Pesachim 102b that rules that one cannot combine two separate berakhot on one cup of wine. Thus, the gemara prohibits the recitation of kiddush and birkat hamazon on the same cup of wine and requires a separate cup for each. b. Berakhot 49a similarly rules that two ideas cannot be expressed in one berakha, because of the halakha that ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot. In both cases, these halakhot are qualified by the stipulation that two berakhot of a similar nature can be combined (e.g. kiddush and havdala when Yom Tov follows Shabbat.)

 

Actually, it seems that a distinction should be drawn between our sugya and these cases. In our sugya, the bundling of the mitzvot does not impact upon their content. Although it is unseemly or distracting to combine mitzvot, the ceremony itself is unaffected. Compressing two sota or metzora ceremonies into an assembly line configuration reflects upon the kohen's attitude to mitzvot and is, therefore, prohibited. The sota or metzora who undergo the ceremony, however, receive standard treatment. In contrast, the attempt to combine two berakhot into one chatima is not only an attitude problem (if at all); rather it changes the nature of the berakha, since the formula of the berakha itself is changed. So, too, in Pesachim, the kos shel berakha is redefined and altered if it hosts two berakhot instead of one. Therefore, if the two are conceptually related, they may be combined to form a composite berakha that is legitimate. Although he is saving wine and discharging his obligation rapidly, it is not prohibited as exhibiting a burdensome weariness with mitzvot, since this is not the issue in this case. The issue is the formulation of the berakha or the relationship between the cup of wine and the berakha. If the second berakha cannot be integrated into the first, it affects the format of the berakha and is prohibited, but if it can be integrated into the other berakha, there is no problem. In other words, the ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot in our sugya is an issur gavra, while in the other two sugyot, the focus of the problem is the definition of the cheftza.

 

This distinction forces us into dividing the rule of ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot into two independent categories that require separate discussions. Thus, the reason of the issur must be reconsidered nor can Tosafot's statement that chavilot chavilot is derabanan be automatically transferred to other cases or the rules of one category be transferred to the other. For example, the Magen Avraham (147:11) quotes the conclusion of our sugya that there is difference between one and two kohanim in regard to ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot and applies this distinction to sheva berakhot. Other Achronim attempt to infer from the sugya in Pesachim whether there is a problem if one mitzva is de'oraita and the other is drabanan or if two mitzvot that are similar are included in the rule or not (see Sdei Chemed vol. 1. p. 276, 327), without distinguishing between the two categories. However, if our suggestion is correct, the rules of one class cannot be indiscriminately projected onto the other and vice versa. Each is dealing with a different problem and its rules and exceptions are formed accordingly.

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