The Need for a Divine Command (Part 1 of 2)
Bein Adam Le-Chavero: Ethics of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin Zimmerman
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This weeks shiurim are dedicated by Mr Paul Pollack
in honor of Rabbi Reuven and Sherry Greenberg
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Shiur
#04: The Need for a Divine Command (Part 1 of 2)
Introductory
Questions
In the
last two lessons, we described the universal elements of morality that are
incumbent upon all humanity and rooted in the supernatural creation of man in
the image of God. Beyond the
universal elements of natural morality, the Jew has an innate disposition to do
chesed, inherited from the Patriarchs, beginning with Avraham.
Taking
this all into account, we might imagine that the Torah need not specify any
obligations within the interpersonal realm.
After all, if all mankind has been endowed with an inner moral calling,
and the Jewish people have a heightened sense of this, why does the Torah not
assume that everyone will act properly?
One
possible explanation is that, despite mans natural sense of morality, the Torah
replaces any internal conscience and dictates a code of behavior for one to
follow. God has determined that the
Jewish people require commandments to replace natural morality. On the other hand, one might contend
that the Torah does not supplant and replace natural morality; rather, it
supplements it and adds on mitzvot we would not have known on our own. However, if this is so, then we are
left to wonder about the mitzvot that are logical. Why does the Torah need to command
behavior that should be self-evident?
Wouldnt mans innate rational nature allow one to arrive at many of the
mitzvot independently? What
is added to the interpersonal realm by their being commanded?
One last
point arises: mitzvot are often classified in one of two categories (to
which we will attempt to add a third category in lesson 6); mitzvot bein adam
la-Makom, ritual commandments between man and God, and mitzvot bein adam
la-chavero, commandments regarding behavior towards ones fellow human
beings. However, if we think about
it, since God is the One commanding us to behave in a certain manner to our
friends, doesnt this indicate that even the interpersonal commandments are
obligations to God as well? What
purpose then does this distinction serve?
To
address these questions about interpersonal mitzvot, let us look into the
nature of the Torah in the wake of natural morality. Doing so will hopefully enable us to
see the fascinating model of Jewish ethical observance and what makes it so
unique and powerful.
Why the Need for a
Command?
The idea
that we could have determined the boundaries of proper interpersonal behavior on
our own seems to arise from the Midrash:
You
shall keep My statutes (Vayikra 18:4) these are the laws written in
the Torah which, had they not been written, would have deserved to be included
regardless. For example, theft,
forbidden relations, idolatry, blasphemy, and murder had they not been
written, it would have been proper to write them. (Torat Kohanim, Acharei Mot
9, 13)
The
examples cited by the Midrash do not depict acts of kindness, but rather
restrictions of grossly harmful behavior.
Yet, the question remains, if these laws would have been proper for
mankind to implement even had they not been codified in the Torah, why did they
need to be written at all?
Indeed,
certain commandments are self-evident for the simple reason that mans natural
morality, rooted in the supernatural divine image that God has instilled in man
(see Lesson 2), dictates standards of behavior.
For this reason, Rav Saadia Gaon (in his introduction to Emunot
Ve-deot, sec. vi) and later commentators distinguish between two types of
divine commands: rational laws and revelational laws; the latter group became
binding at Sinai when we accepted the Torah by declaring Naaseh ve-nishma,
We will do and we will listen (Shemot 24:7).
If, as
the Midrash and commentators declare, these rational mitzvot could
easily have been developed through mans innate sense of reason, then what is
gained by Gods making them commandments?
Seemingly, they are logical because they emanate from our natural sense
of morality. In the final analysis,
does our rational conscience obligate us at all in the interpersonal realm?
Unique Application
to the Jew
The
question is, essentially: what is the role of this natural morality after the
Torah has dictated a specific set of principles governing our behavior? As Rav Lichtenstein poses it:
Does the Torah supplant or supplement universal values? ...Subsequent to the Jewish Nations
formulation of a covenant) with God, are we still bound by the more general
norms that preceded it?
What happens to
more universal elements? Do these fall
away because of the exclusivity of the new relationship? Or do we regard the new
relationship as being superimposed upon the old, but not at odds with it?
[1]
An analysis of the gamut of Jewish sources creates a
strong case that, in fact, the Torah does not come to replace this natural
morality, but rather to elevate it and transform it. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 59a)
states that it is inconceivable that there are mitzvot that are binding
upon Noahides but not Israelites: There is nothing that is permitted to a Jew,
but forbidden to a non-Jew. Rashi
(ad loc., s.v. La-zeh Ve-lazeh) explains:
For when [the Children of Israel] were removed from
the category of descendants of Noach, they were removed in order for them to
become sanctified, not in order to make it easier for them.
The
Gemara seems to make it clear that the Torah seeks to elevate the naturally
moral divine nature within man.
Being that the basis of natural morality is the supernatural composition of
man, it would make sense that this obligation remains intact even after the
giving of Torah. Mans rational
morality is a divine calling, which still has relevance. Rav Kook seems to express this idea
in explaining the dictum Derekh eretz kadma la-Torah.
Indeed, moral behavior preceded the
Torah, for it acts as its anchor, as he writes:
Morality in its natural state, with all its profound
splendor and might, must be fixed in the soul, so that it may serve as a
substratum for the great effects emanating from the strength of Torah
Every element of Torah must be preceded by derekh
eretz [natural ethical behavior]. If it is something agreeable to natural
reason and uprightness, it must pass in a straight path, with the inclination of
the heart and consent of the pure will implanted in man, like theft, illicit
sexual relations, and modesty which are learned from the ant, the dove, and the
cat, and all the more so those things which are derived from the internal
cognition of man himself and his spiritual sense.
[2]
It seems that God purposely ensured that man have
this moral bedrock before the Torah was given.
Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk relates that there are specific parts of
the Torah which are written upon the hearts of the Jewish people and to a
certain extent, mankind as a whole.
These intrinsic ideas serve as the guidebook for our actions even after the
Giving of the Torah. Analyzing Gods
words to Moshe (Shemot 24:12) at Sinai,
"Come up to Me, to the mountain, and remain there; then I will give you the
tablets of stone and the Torah and the commandments which I have written, that
you may teach them, he explains:
"Which I have written" cannot refer to the Torah and
the commandments; see Rashbam. It seems
that [we can understand this in light of the rabbinic dictum:] "Had the Torah not been given, we would have learned
modesty from the cat, [aversion to] theft from the ant, [aversion to] sexual
immorality from the dove, and [conjugal] derekh eretz from the fowl (Eruvin
100b). Therefore [God] said, "Which I
have written" in the book of nature that I have created, which is the book of
the Blessed One who created it. (Meshekh
Chokhma, ad loc.)
At Sinai, then, "the book of nature" remained as one
of the sources of obligation in mitzvot and morality. As Rav Lichtenstein (Does Jewish
Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakha, p. 66) concludes: The religious and the ethical are inextricably interwoven; one cannot
divorce Halakha from morality.
In fact, for the Jew, the Torahs elevation of ones innate morality is doubly
true. Beyond the natural inborn
morality common to all humanity, the Jew possesses a unique soul from our
ancestors, in which a merciful nature and a pull to kindness are inherent. With this in mind, we can revisit the
Maharals view of Derekh eretz kadma la-Torah (cited in lesson 2),
wherein he explains that the Avot, the Patriarchs, exemplify derekh
eretz, the proper way to act, before the Giving of the Torah. The Avot bequeathed to us
their nature and exemplary behavior without a divine command, and it is upon
this foundation that the Torah was given to us, to elevate our natural
tendencies.
However,
if natural morality is expected of the Noahide nations and is obligatory for all
of mankind to some degree, what makes the Jew and Judaism unique? What exactly does the Torah add, and
what remains of our natural moral calling in our singular Jewish nature?
Mitzvot Bein Adam
La-Makom: The Command
Evidently, God feels that man must not rely on natural morality, with all of its
importance; one must be commanded in the realm of ethical action. Jewish ethics is a divine mandate. This idea is expressed by a number of
commentators at the beginning of the Mishnaic tractate of Avot, named for
the Jewish Patriarchal tradition and often referred to in English as Ethics of
the Fathers. Avot contains
many of the moral teachings of the sages.
Of all
the tractates in the Talmud, it is specifically Avot which begins by
describing the transmission of the Torah to Moshe from Sinai, establishing the
chain of tradition. It starts (1:1):
Moshe received the Torah from Sinai and transmitted it to Yehoshua, Yehoshua to
the elders
Rav Ovadya Bartenura
(ad loc.) explains the reason for beginning Avot in this manner:
For this
tractate is not founded on the interpretation of a specific commandment from the
Torah like other tractates; rather, it consists entirely of musar
(ethics) and middot (moral traits).
Now, non-Jewish scholars have also produced works on similar topics,
based on the ethical teachings they have developed by their own rational
analysis, regarding how one should treat his fellow. Therefore, the author of the Mishna
begins with the introduction, Moshe received the Torah from Sinai, to teach
you that the ethical and moral teachings contained herein are not mere rational
innovations: they were received at Sinai.
The same
idea of the divinity of the ethical commandments within Jewish tradition is
expressed in many other areas as well.
Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik comments that the Torahs introduction to the
Ten Commandments seems to go out of its way to express how our ethical calling
is divine. The Ten Commandments (Decalogue) are given on two tablets, seemingly
divided into five mitzvot bein adam la-makom, and five bein adam
la-chavero. The Torah introduces
the Decalogue with the verse, And God spoke all [kol] these words,
saying (Shemot 20:1). Rashi
explains the unique usage of the word kol:
This
teaches us that the Holy One, Blessed be He, pronounced all these words in a
single utterance, which is impossible for human beings.
Rav
Soloveitchik explains that this singular utterance is significant in that it
teaches us that all Ten Commandments constitute an indivisible, organic unity. We have not ten commandments, but
one, with ten aspects
all in this context means
a totality, an interdependent
oneness of all its seeming parts.
Faith and morality are integrally one and inseparable. (Reflections of the
Rav, p. 193)
Rav
Soloveitchik goes on further to explain how the Torahs message of the
indivisibility of the whole of the Ten Commandments serves a dual purpose. Not only does it impress upon us the
necessity of a morality based on divine commandment, it also stresses the
inconceivability of separating ones ritual fulfillment from the ethical message
of Judaism. People who are
ritualistically observant but ethically deficient distort Judaism. Their self-righteousness and presumed
piety are hypocritical
It is moral
schizophrenia to separate ethics from God. (Reflections of the Rav, p.195)
The
message seems to be clear: there is a religious imperative to be moral and
ethical, and it is inseparable from ones ritual observance. However, again we may ask, had the
Torah not explicated what one would have logically determined on his own, what
would have been insufficient in the laws one could develop based his innate
sense of logic?
The Torahs Approach
vs. Secular Humanism
Secular
humanists believe that man can be induced and motivated to pursue ethical norms
without the absolute imperative of the divine.
The teachings of rationalists throughout the centuries indicate that
goodness can be learnable through the intellect.
Contemplating proper behavior, one arrives at an understanding that
naturally leads one to its fulfillment.
The source of obligation of ethical principles is reason itself, natural
morality. In a different context,
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein (By His Light, p. 208) notes that Mathew Arnold
defines culture as the study of perfection and literature, high culture, as
the best that has been thought and said in the world. It is this that is
supposed to refine man.
However,
Rav Lichtenstein declares, the dismal record of human performance in this area
testifies to mans most tragic failure in history.
[3] The
rationalist thinkers throughout the centuries have never succeeded in creating a
culture of upstanding morality.
Modern contemporary culture, in particular, has moved perceptibly away from many
values it once cherished, becoming increasingly vulgarized and inundated by
permissiveness, hedonism, eroticism and violence (By His Light, loc.
cit.).
The Torah
clearly feels that with all the power of reason and with all the influence of
natural morality, commandment is necessary.
In fact, the majority of the seven Noahide mitzvot seem to serve
to create the basic foundations of an ethical society. According to the Ramban, they include
the commandment of setting up courts, which requires the creation of an ethical
society forbidding theft, kidnapping and the like (Ramban, Bereishit
34:13). We might assume that it is
sufficient that a Noahide perform these commandments out of reason alone. However, the Rambam (Hilkhot
Melakhim 8:11) tells us that non-Jews are obligated to perform their
commandments with the knowledge that these laws are divine directives.
But why
is a divine commandment necessary, when God Himself has included within our
nature the rational understanding to act with certain standards of behavior?
The Torah
clearly feels that reason alone is insufficient, and so it adds a divine
imperative. Offhand, we may suggest
a few understandings of why that would be so, some more technical and some more
fundamental.
Explanations of the
Need for a Divine Mandate
Reason often falls
short.
On the
simplest level, Gods technique of commanding the obvious is based on the fact
that even something that is self-evident may never be realized if one does not
take the time to think about it.
Thus, the divine command might merely be to remind us of what is seemingly
logical, and the divine mandate does not seek to replace or strengthen the
logical requirement, but rather to act as an eye-opener
However,
a deeper look at the divine command seems to reflect a greater purpose. Not only is reason often inadequate
in reaching morality, but it is also sometimes defective. As natural as natural morality is,
it is also subject to re-examination and change.
Reason isnt
sufficiently binding.
Plato
claims that if a person understands proper behavior through logic, there is no
need to command that person. Logic
becomes ones religious requirement. Aristotle
says that pure reason still is not enough to compel one to do something. In fact, the breakdown of Platonic
thought results, in part, from his feelings that intellect alone can breed
behavior, and his detractors witnessing that it could not.
(See Berkowitz, loc. cit.)
We may
wonder, though, why in fact reason does not sufficiently obligate one to act
morally. If man does have a divine
inner urge to do right, what holds him back?
Simply
stated, one often knows the right thing to do, but difficult circumstances or
pure laziness hold one back. Without
a binding command, man may opt to violate his own morals, just because he is too
tired to act properly.
However,
the human mind is very sophisticated, sometimes using its powers to convince one
that given actions are in fact proper.
Instead of allowing one to feel guilt over opting for easy, immoral
behavior, the mind has the power to rationalize, allowing one to choose whatever
feels correct. One might refer to
this as the power of bribery. The
verse (Shemot 23:8) states that a judge is forbidden to take even the
smallest amount of money from a party to a case he is presiding over: Do not
take a bribe, for the bribe will blind those who see and corrupt the words of
the righteous. Despite the fact
that the judge is an educated expert in his field, the Torah is worried that he
might even inadvertently lose his proper sense of judgment. Sometimes, man can convince himself
that something is proper, when his moral sense rationally knows the opposite. This is often expressed in cognitive
dissonance: an individual may know that an action is wrong or harmful, and yet
he may feel compelled to do exactly that.
As the famous ethicist Bertrand Russell exemplified in his life and
expressed openly, knowledge of ethics does not transform someone into an ethical
being. However, a divine command
acts as the bottom line, preventing the rationalization which would otherwise
permit the action which, deep inside, one knows is improper.
Additionally, the Torah is built on a unique understanding of the character of
man in general and the character of the Jew in particular.
From this perspective, man-made moral
systems that are not based upon fear of Heaven are insufficient because they can
be subject to change. Hence the
moral relativism that has taken over contemporary culture and has led society to
accept behaviors and standards that were considered to be unethical or repugnant
in earlier generations.
The Sages
interpret the verse (Vayikra 5:21) When a person sins and commits a
trespass against God by dealing falsely with his neighbor homiletically,
meaning that one who commits a trespass against God will eventually also deal
falsely with his neighbor.
Rabbi
Reuven was asked by a philosopher in Tiberias: Who is the most contemptible
person in the world?
He
replied: One who denies his Creator, because the denial of all norms follows if
one rejects God. No man violates a law unless he first repudiates the authority
of the law. (Tosefta Shevuot
3:5)
Rav Soloveitchik elaborates on this:
Rabbi
Reuven felt that the nonbeliever constitutes a danger to the moral fabric of
society. The philosopher was
astonished by his answer because faith, after all, is the private affair of the
individual; and, furthermore, are not many atheists teachers of morality?
The Rabbi insisted, however, that
eventually atheism leads to the demoralization of the individual and society.
Man can easily rationalize his crime, declare norms to be relative, and proclaim
himself the arbiter of right and wrong.
With most people, the baser part of their natures will tend to dominate. Indeed the moral bankruptcy of
secularism is apparent to all students of our contemporary world
Morality
without faith cannot sustain itself. (Reflections of the Rav, p. 194)
Rav Natan Gestetner (Le-horot Natan, Avot
1:1) explains that Rav Ovadya Bartenuras explanation of the introduction to
Avot teaches us that, despite the fact that without a command we would have
been able to know how to act interpersonally, the requirement to do so is
divine. For one who acts this way out of
rational understanding will not be able to maintain his convictions when faced
with a situation of temptation or where moral actions will cause him a great
loss. He will fail to remember that the punishment for sins between man and
his fellow is more severe than [the punishment for sins] between man and God.
Evidence of this may be seen in the law
that ritual obligations can be violated in most cases for pikuach nefesh,
saving a life, while some opinions (though they are not accepted halakhically)
rule that a person cannot rob another even to save his own life. (See Chiddushei Ha-Rea, Ketubot
19a.) He adds, Because
mans understanding of morality is not complete, even the people of Sodom saw
themselves as lawful individuals
Those people who claim they violate the Torah but maintain their moral compass
are merely fooling themselves; any moral principles not rooted in unwavering
commitment to the Almighty are limited by human understanding and will be pushed
aside in the face of difficulty.
In next weeks lesson, we aim to conclude our
discussion of the need for commandment and examine the Torahs employment of
this idea.
[1]
By His Light (Yeshivat Har Etzion 2002), p.19. See
also Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakha? p. 66.
[2]
Orot Ha-Torah 12:2-3, quoted in Rav Amitals work, Jewish Values in a
Changing World (Ktav 2005), p. 24.
[3]
Rav Eliezer Berkowitz, Essential Essays on
Judaism (The Shalem Center 2002), p. 19. See
chapter 1 for a lengthy history of the history of rational ethicists and their
failures.
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