Translated by Rabbi Dr. Michael Berger

 

THE VALUE OF PERSUASION

 

     In light of the previous discussion, it is clear that there are a number of different reasons why there is no obligation to rebuke Jews who do not believe in the sanctity or binding force of the Oral Torah: (1) it is clear that they will not heed the words; (2) they are part of a group with respect to which it is said that "just as it is a mitzvah to speak words that will be heeded, so too it is a mitzvah not to speak words that will go unheeded" (Yevamot 65b); (3) in the sinner's own opinion, his conduct is permissible.  In all of these cases, the authorities cited above do not require rebuke.  Indeed, R. Yechiel Mikhel Epstein (1829-1908) deemed it obvious that with respect to such Jews, the entire notion of rebuking them simply does not apply:

 

     Understand that all [the laws of rebuke] apply only to a   Jew who believes but has been overtaken by desire to commit [his sin].  In such a case [the mitzvah of]tokhachah applies.  But with respect to those who totally deny the words of the Rabbis, reproach simply does not apply, for they are apostates and heretics and one should   not argue with them.(11)

 

     Nevertheless, even though formal reproof is ineffective and hence inappropriate, there is still room for other means of persuasion and influence.  According to those who maintain that the aim of tokhachah - returning errant Jews to the path of Torah and mitzvot - is actually part and parcel of the definition of the commandment, then it is possible to expand the scope of the mitzvah to include the use of other kinds of persuasive means, as was suggested earlier.

 

     Some might argue, however, that in order to fulfill this commandment, the other Jew at whom the persuasion is being directed must at least be considered "your neighbor ('amitekha),"(12) a title nonobservant Jews lack according to R. Israel Meir Hakohen (the Chafetz Chayyim; 1838-1933).(13) However, as is well known, many great scholars have already dealt with the status of today's nonobservant Jews and determined that such an extreme position is inappropriate.  For example, R. Jacob Ettlinger (1798-1871) wrote:

 

     As to the sinners of our time, since, due to our overwhelming sins, [lack of observance] has reached epidemic proportions, such that the majority deem desecration of the Shabbat to be permissible, I do not  know whether to treat them as those who view their behavior as permissible (i.e., omer muttar) and do not willfully desecrate the commandments.(14)

 

     It was his considered opinion that nineteenth-century German nonobservance was not to be treated as harshly as it should have been in earlier periods.  Similarly, R. David Tzevi Hoffman (1843-1921) stated:  "There is room to be lenient [in regard to counting mechalelei Shabbat to a minyan] for today they are not called public desecrators of the Shabbat, since the majority of them act thus."(15) Be that as it may, the views of R. Abraham I. Kook (1865-1935) and R. Isaiah Karelitz (the Chazon Ish; 1878-1952) are our most reliable guides:  we must try to attract the unobservant and return them to Torah observance "with bonds of love."(16) Moreover, R. Joseph Babad (1800-c.1874) implicitly disagrees with the Chafetz Chayyim's opinion and writes that "it appears to me that if there is a reasonable possibility that he [the unobservant Jew] will accept the reproof, then one is obligated to reprimand him, so that he may return to the correct path and be considered, once again, a brother."(17)

 

     Therefore, even if the formal mitzvah of tokhachah may not be applicable, communal leaders have a special responsibility and a unique obligation to engage in other forms of persuasion.  Further corroboration of this position is found in a passage of the Jerusalem Talmud.  Commenting on the verse, "Cursed be the person who does not fulfill the words of this Torah to observe them, and the entire nation will say 'Amen'" (Devarim 27:26), it states:

 

     Rabbi Assis said in the name of Rav Tanhum bar Hiyya:  If one learned, taught, observed and performed [mitzvot] but was in a position to encourage others in their observance and did not do so, such a person is included in this curse.  This is interpreted as referring to the king and   the Nasi who, by virtue of their power, have the ability to force violators of the Torah to observe it.  Even if he [i.e., the leader] was an impeccably righteous person in his own conduct, but had in his power to encourage Torah observance among the wicked and did not, then he is accursed.(18)

 

     Clearly, these words are applicable also to those who have the ability to enhance Torah observance through persuasion.  In fact, one's responsibility in this regard is measured precisely according to the degree of one's powers of persuasion, as the Talmud (Shabbat 54b) states:  "Anyone who is able to protest the behavior of his family members and does not, is held responsible for his family members; [if he is able to protest the activities] of the members of his town and does not, then he is held responsible for the conduct of the people of his town; if for the whole world, then he is held responsible for the entire world."  "Protest" here refers not only to rebuke in the conventional sense but also to the use of persuasion.(19)

 

ARGUMENTS FOR TEMPERING REBUKE

 

     However, the effective use of persuasion to help the unobservant return to Judaism raises a number of halakhic problems that we must consider.  The Rambam (1135-1204) writes in connection with the Great Sanhedrin that "if they see that the situation requires the suspension of a positive commandment or the violation of a negative one in order to bring many back to proper observance, or to save many Jews from stumbling in other areas, they may enact whatever they feel the moment requires."(20) The problem that the Rambam identified in connection with "many" Jews (a "rabbim") may also arise in our day when dealing with individuals.  At times, in order to assist individual Jews to return to observance, and to spare individuals from stumbling, there is a need to ignore certain violations of rabbinic or even Torah laws; at times, there is a need to rule permissively, and even to abet the violator indirectly.  Such halakhic questions arise daily, as we shall shortly see.  Moreover, the halakhic considerations in any given case cannot be exercised in a vacuum, limited exclusively to the particular situation under discussion.  Every deliberate overlooking of a sin, and every dispensation given in a specific case, may result in a cumulative negative affect with regard to the public at large.  There is a need for tremendous caution and a large measure of divine assistance to help us refrain from destroying in one case when we want to improve in another.  In the same vein, many questions arise in the domain of "putting a stumbling block before the blind" and assisting sinners," where the one who is doing the influencing may himself be violating the law, as will be shown below. As a result, persuasion as an alternative to rebuke is a dangerous route, "on which the righteous travel safely but the frivolous stumble."(21)

 

     In his responsum cited above, the Rashba afforded us wide latitude in overlooking a sinner's misconduct, based on a consideration of long-term goals.  He explicitly noted that "looking the other way from the sinner is, at times, a positive commandment."  Indeed, it is standard procedure to ignore a whole host of violations when dealing with penitents at the outset of their return to observance (chozerim bitshuvah), out of a concern that if the burden imposed upon them is too heavy at the beginning, they might become frustrated and revert to their former (mis)behavior.  I heard from a reliable source that one of the leading halakhic authorities in Israel instructed those who work in kiruv not to discuss the laws of family purity with those married individuals taking their first steps toward renewed observance. Furthermore, he suggested that even if the subject is broached by the penitent him\herself, the instructor should plead ignorance.

 

     Rabbi Dov Katz relates that when R. Israel Salanter (1810-1883) arrived in a port city in Germany, he discovered that those Jewish merchants who had business at the port  would load and unload their goods on Shabbat as on any other day.  When R. Salanter arrived in the synagogue where those merchants prayed, he asked if he could give a sermon about Shabbat.  However, after discovering that there were Lithuanian visitors present, he refrained from doing so.  On the next Shabbat, after he had determined that there were no such guests, he delivered an inspiring sermon on the importance of Shabbat which was perfectly suited to his audience.  He concluded the sermon by saying that "while loading and unloading at the port is necessary, writing is not," and the merchants accepted his suggestion and refrained from writing on Shabbat.  After several Sabbaths, R. Salanter offered another sermon in that same synagogue and told his audience that "removing one's goods [at the dock] is essential, but surely loading is not," and the merchants accepted this as well.  A while later, he again delivered the sermon, and spoke of the prohibition of unloading also, and thus the Jews were slowly brought to observe Shabbat properly.(22) The novelty of this tale is that it allows for much more than simply looking the other way.  Indeed, R. Salanter explicitly permitted behavior which was prohibited by law in order to attract his audience to observe Shabbat completely.(23)

 

     Quite frequently, Orthodox synagogues do not refrain from allowing unobservant Jewish families to celebrate their bar mitzvah celebrations in them.  They do so even though it is obvious that many members of the family will drive to the synagogue on the Shabbat.  As long as they park their vehicles out of sight of the synagogue, the rabbi and the congregants ignore the Shabbat desecration that such celebrations necessarily entail.  They are clearly not concerned with violating the prohibitions of "putting a stumbling block before the blind" or "assisting sinners" in their transgressions.  Moreover, it is also an everyday occurrence in Israeli rabbinical courts, on which sit very distinguished Torah scholars, to spare no effort in trying to reconcile an unobservant couple which has come to them for a divorce despite the fact that they obviously do not observe the laws of family purity.

 

     Apparently, in both these cases the rabbinical authorities are relying on a statement in the Mishnah:  "Beit Shammai says that one should not sell a cow for plowing to those who work their fields during the Sabbatical year (when the law requires the land to lie fallow), and Beit Hillel permits it, for the buyer may slaughter it (and not use it for plowing)."(Shevi'it 5:8).  R. Ovadya Bartenura (c. 1450 - before 1516; ad. loc.) explains Beit Hillel's reasoning by noting that "if any conceivable possibility can be suggested (that will not entail violation of the law) we accept it."  So too in these cases of the potential violation of either Shabbat or taharat ha'mishpachah, we consider any possibility, however remote, that will not necessarily result in any violation of the law.

 

     However, R. Abraham Gombiner (the Magen Avraham; c. 1637-1683) stipulates that one may not lend tools to a person suspected of doing work on Shabbat unless there exist permitted uses for these tools that are not farfetched but standard.  If, however, their use for permissible purposes is only unlikely, then such lending is forbidden, unless refusal to lend will lead to strife - "mippenei darkei shalom."(24) According to this, it would appear that a more stringent position would also have to be taken in the cases above, as well, where the possibility of not violating Torah law is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, one may distinguish between the two circumstances, claiming that in the cases under discussion here the demands of peace in the home or the intention of drawing the unobservant to Torah is identical to the consideration of "mippenei darkei shalom," thus allowing for the overlooking of probable Torah violations, as long as it is possible - however unlikely - that they will not take place.

 

     Incidentally, an occurrence similar to the one described by the Magen Avraham occurred to me about twenty-five years ago.  An observant, God-fearing Jew asked me whether he could buy a truck in partnership with a nonobservant Jew, where the latter had conditioned his participation on his being allowed to use the vehicle to take his family to the beach on Shabbat.  I consulted two great rabbinical scholars and both upbraided me, for opposite reasons.  The first, who is no longer alive, claimed:  "I don't understand your question.  What argument can possibly be made to permit this?"  The other, the great Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach [zt"l], claimed:  "I don't understand you.  What argument can possibly be made to forbid this?"  I asked him if his permissive stance was based on the consideration described above, that is, that we consider any feasible possibility in such a case, and he answered:  "Yes," despite the fact that the other Jew had openly stated his intention to drive the truck on Shabbat. 

 

Notes: 

*    A more elaborate Hebrew version of this essay appeared in Sefer Hayovel Le-Rav Mordekhai Breuer.  This translation originally appeared in Jewish Tradition and the Non-Traditional Jew, ed. R. Jacob J. Schacter, 1992. 

11.  'Arukh Hashulchan, Orach Chayyim, no. 608:7. 

12.  After all, that is the text of the biblical verse "Reproach your neighbor" (Vayikra 19:17).  This is the opinion of  Tanna Devei Eliyyahu. 

13.  See R. Israel Meir Hakohen, Bi'ur Halakhah, Orach Chayyim 608, where he takes the position that public violators of the Sabbath are not considered "neighbors" with respect to the observance of Torah and mitzvot and hence are not in the category of those toward whom an act of tokhahah would be a fulfillment of a mitzvah. 

[1]4.  See She'elot Utshuvot Binyan Tziyyon 2:23, end. 

15.  Sefer Melamed Leho'il, Orach Chayyim, no. 29. 

16.  This term is found in Chazon Ish, Yoreh De'ah 2:16.  See also Rabbi Abraham Kook, Iggerot Hare'ayah, vol. 1 (Jerusalem:  Mossad Harav Kook, 1961), no. 138, pp. 170-72. 

17.  See Minchat Chinukh, Mitzvah no. 239. 

18.  See Talmud Yerushalmi (Sotah 7:4).  This passage is cited by the Ramban in his Commentary on the Torah, Deuteronomy 27:26. 

[1]9.  See Rashi, Shabbat 54b, s.v. bekhol ha'olam kulo. 

20.  Hilkhot Mamrim 2:4. 

2[1].  This is a play on the words of Hoshea' 14:10. 

22.  See D. Katz, Tenu'at Hamusar, 5th ed. (Jerusalem, 1974), 1:184. 

23.  I am aware that this book on the Musar movement is not a halakhic work, despite the well-known erudition of its author.  Nonetheless, I think that it is appropriate to mention this story because it is relevant to our subject. 

24.  Magen Avraham, Orach Chayyim 347:4.  See, too, Machatzit Hashekel, ad. loc.